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The MICORD research program 
This dissertation is the result of one of the projects within the MICORD program, initiated by Prof. 
Dr. Jan de Wit and Prof. Dr. Ben Dankbaar. The MICORD program (acronym for Managing 
Innovation, Cooperation and Outsourcing of Research and Development) is intended to 
contribute to the understanding and solution of the so-called ‘Knowledge Paradox’: universities 
develop a wealth of new knowledge, but the industry does not seem to be able to use this 
knowledge for its economic activities. Pre-research carried out in 2004 in 22 companies in 
different industrial sectors resulted in two probable causes for this: 
 Firms have diminished their investments in fundamental research and are therefore 
not capable anymore of radical innovation 
 Industrial researchers are too much oriented on the short term and have lost the ability 
to effectively communicate with university scientists 
Based on these preliminary results we chose to investigate three sectors in more detail: the food 
industry, the chemical industry and the high-tech machine manufacturing industry. These three 
sectors are representative for three of the four types of sectors identified by Pavitt (1984) in his 
influential paper on sectoral patterns of innovation. Moreover, these three sectors are important 
sectors in the Netherlands, represented by many multinational companies. Within the MICORD 
program, four PhD projects in the food and chemical industries are based on the two 
abovementioned causes. In the third sector we found that innovation is already at the centre of 
interest, but we identified two other problems (see figure below):  
 What should the role of suppliers be in new product development?  
 How can companies develop new business opportunities? 
The two projects in the high-tech machinery sector are based on these two problems. 
 
Focal areas 
 
The first four projects started early in 2006 and the other two in the latter half of 2007. The 
MICORD program is sponsored by the Top Institute Food & Nutrition; TNO Innovation Policy; the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs; the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science; Dutch Polymer 
Institute, Akzo Nobel, The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), Philips, ASML 
and Shell.  
 
 
Preface 
Somewhere around 2007 I was looking for a PhD position in the field of Business Administration. 
I found an opening at the Radboud University where MICORD was researching innovation-
processes in the food-, chemicals- and High-tech machinery-industries. The title of the study in 
the job-description said: “Innovation in cooperation with customers in de machinery 
manufacturing industry“. The goal of the research was to study the role of users of machinery in 
the development-stage and how this role could be institutionalized. In the end, the study should 
lead to “a pragmatic framework which should be usable for both the users and the machine 
manufacturers”. All those expecting just that, I must disappoint.  
Within the first weeks of my research I realized that within the Machine Manufacturing Industry 
there was another more pressing and more rewarding issue at hand; the question of how these 
firms could commercialize their often unique and complex technological knowledge in new 
markets. After all these years I cannot recall how this change came about. I did find however 
some scribblings from my first week, in which I wrote: “The main research theme is how to 
improve radical innovation in the equipment manufacturing industry in the Netherlands”. For this 
I came up with two preliminary research questions:  
1) How is the relationship between the manufacturer and the customer organized? What would 
be the optimal organization of this relationship in order for the manufacturer to receive the most 
information from his customer in matters related to innovation and product development?  
2) In which way can manufacturers organize themselves in order to be able to identify new 
markets/new customers in new markets for their products?  
In order to keep focus I had to make a choice between these two research questions. This thesis 
is all about the second research question: How do technical manufacturing firms explore for new 
markets successfully? And yes, in the end I did produce a somewhat pragmatic framework which 
should be usable for practitioners. 
Overall, it has been a long and bumpy journey. I started idealistically with big, promising ideas 
followed by many moments of despair when for example firms refused to cooperate, when 
interviews felt incomplete, or when the data did not spit out the earth shaking results which one 
hopes for. At the end, I was hit by classic cases of writers block.  
Despite all of these setbacks three wise men from the east, Ben, Jan and Geert, kept encouraging 
me to finish my thesis. Whenever I struggled hard trying to create some order in my chaotic 
musings, Professor Ben Dankbaar had the remarkable ability to just listen to these ramblings and 
with few words create perfect clarity. Ben knew how to make sense of my chaos with a few simply 
strokes with his pen on a blank paper. Professor Jan de Wit always was a bit more the manager 
of our group, not surprisingly with his background as R&D manager at AkzoNobel. Jan managed 
our group as a true people manager and he always kept my work in touch with reality. He kept 
reminding us that in the end our studies should have a practical significance.  
 
  
 
 
Last but certainly not least, I must praise Geert Vissers. He was my theoretical consciousness and 
mentor. A source of inspiration and an erudite, good hearted man. I owe him many thanks for 
not only setting me straight when being ignorant but also for his time in helping me rewriting my 
incomprehensible complex lines of text into more readable sentences.  
Being part of the MICORD group Ton Gal and Hanneke Vreugdenhil were both remarkable 
individuals in their own right whom I cared for having a chat with just to clear my head time and 
again. Unfortunately Hanneke has passed away too early but I still remember her always cheerful 
outlook on life and eagerness to help one out.  
Then of course my thanks to my peers and colleague PhD students. Karen Janssen who showed 
me the way on the first academic conference I attended. Raphael Smals helped me out by 
introducing me to several field experts in the early stages of the study. I always liked our talks 
about food and photography. I admire Maarten van Gils’ great optimism and I am still grateful 
for introducing me to an interesting portrait photography gig. I’m still jealous about Armand 
Smits’ encyclopedic brain and the fact he really made it in the academic world. And finally Mark 
Jolink, your concise and straight to the point thesis has always been an inspiration and guideline 
in my writings.  
I also wish to thank those without whom this thesis would never have been written; the 
interviewees of the firms I visited. Their input forms the backbone of this thesis. Any wrong 
interpretations are solely my fault. I would like to thank them for their time and effort to listen 
to me and answering my questions. It was a joy and honor to hear about their triumphs, their 
firm histories, their fears, their dreams and accomplishments.  
Then there is this group of people who supported me with encouragement and a firm belief in 
my competences: my sisters Raquel & Ricarda, my mother, my father. Hendrick, thanks for always 
having your Homey’s man-cave ready for me to cool down. Rene, I will finally become your peer 
as a Doctor of Philosophy. Thanks to all others I forgot to mention. 
Finally, most of all I must praise Muriel, the love of my life, for her total relaxedness about my 
PhD efforts. She encouraged me to follow my calling instead of chasing a regular career. She 
accepted all my grumpy moments and my mental absence during my productive writings 
sessions. I can only hope I will raise our two beautiful, bright daughters, Cathelijne and 
Frédérique, in a more elegant manner than I wrote this thesis.  
 
 
Haaksbergen, Summer 2016
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1 Introduction; opportunity identification in the Dutch 
Machine Manufacturing Industry  
 
" I've worked in so many areas—I'm sort of a dilettante. Basically, I'm not interested in doing 
research and I never have been. I'm interested in understanding, which is quite a different thing." 
David Blackwell 
 
MP inc is a well-established machine manufacturer in the food industry. It is well known for 
manufacturing machines for the production of milk powder. This technology has been refined 
and developed over many years and the firm can be regarded as a market leader in this field. But 
milk powder machinery is not their only product. They are also in the business of waste water 
treatment plants. They discovered that that the technology used in manufacturing milk powder 
can be modified and used in machines to dewater sludge. It is a perfect example of how core 
technology can be used to enter another market. How did this come about? Who came up with 
the idea? Why was the company open for this adventure? These are the type of questions we 
investigate in this thesis. 
1.1 Introduction; Sketching the problem 
This thesis is about the way industrial, medium-sized firms find new markets in new industries in 
which they are able to exploit their technological capabilities. More specifically, it is about the 
identification of such new business opportunities. We refer to this difficult quest for new 
customers in new markets with the term New Business Exploration (NBE). In other words, in this 
thesis we describe and analyze the New Business Exploration methods of medium-sized 
technologically oriented firms. There are two main reasons why New Business Exploration 
deserves attention in the form of an PhD-thesis. First of all, as we will further explore in chapter 
2, there is no generally accepted theory of NBE; it is in fact a topic of controversy in the academic 
literature on innovation, strategy and entrepreneurship and we hope that our thesis will 
contribute, if not to a conclusion then at least to further clarification in this debate. Secondly, 
NBE is a topic of strategic importance and indeed of survival in small and medium-sized firms 
because it involves an investment decision and allocation of scarce resources. If a small or 
medium-sized firm decides to enter a new market in pursuit of new customers, it allocates scarce 
resources to a path full of risk, while the expected revenues will be uncertain. One of the key 
characteristics of medium-sized firms is their often limited access to such scarce resources. 
Therefore, entering new markets is not a daily venture and must be done with great care. 
Moreover, while the decision to seek and enter new industries may be a voluntary strategic 
choice, in some cases it is a last option to secure the continuity of the firm. For several reasons 
current markets may not generate enough revenues for a firm to survive and it forces firms to 
evaluate their current activities in current markets and reflect on their raison d’être, their added 
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value and core business. In such cases finding new markets to exploit the firms technologies may 
become a necessity to ensure the firm survival and continuity. We hope that our thesis will result 
in insights that are useful for small and medium-sized firms in their efforts to improve their 
prospects of survival. 
New Business Exploration goes beyond the ordinary sales activities of finding new customers in 
existing markets in order to increase sales revenues. It is a strategic activity transcending sales 
activities and departments. New business Exploration is not easy. As will become clear in our 
investigation, one of the main characteristics is that it often happens “under the surface”, in the 
firm’s “sub-consciousness”. It happens, but it is hardly defined nor documented in protocols or 
reports. Now and then new customers in new industries have been found and new markets have 
been explored and penetrated, but in retrospect the followed path can hardly be reconstructed 
or retraced, let alone that lessons or best practices can be easily identified. This characteristic can 
partly be explained by the fact that the search for new markets is part of strategic marketing. This 
function or activity is often a less developed if not neglected theme within small and medium-
sized firms (Scherjon, 1994). As we will show, the management of many of the case firms regards 
New Business Exploration as an act of chance and serendipity, not as a controlled, planned and 
manageable process. 
Especially medium-sized enterprises find it difficult to engage in New Business Explorations. They 
are too large to easily change their course of action drastically, but too small to simply shop 
around to acquire new capabilities. They are often a “one trick pony”. In more academic terms 
most medium-sized industrial firms have in general only a single technological knowledge base 
which follows a certain path through time. These technological paths are similar to Pavitt’s 
sectorial trajectories in which technical development is both self-generating and cumulative 
without interference from outside the firm (Pavitt, 1984). Such a path of cumulating technological 
knowledge within a firm is both a blessing and a curse for medium-sized firms when searching 
for new markets. The good thing about such a narrow yet unique technological knowledge base 
is that it can act as a stepping stone into a new market. An SME that has something unique to 
offer may be able to find potential customers in new markets who are willing to pay a relatively 
high price for what the firm has to offer. The firm entering a new market will be able to compete 
on the basis of quality and uniqueness and not on the basis of price, making the entry into the 
new market more profitable with a higher chance of success. The downside of having only a 
narrow technological base to work with is that it is more difficult to find a new market in which 
these technological capabilities may have an added value. The firm’s technological knowledge is 
often adapted to very specific niche markets. Due to limited (financial) resources these medium-
sized firms find it hard to alter their technological knowledge base. We acknowledge that such a 
knowledge base is not static but evolves over time (Dosi, 1982). In this study, however, we treat 
the technological base as a static given with which the medium-sized firm has to work when 
searching for new markets. As such their narrow technological base is a limiting factor in this 
quest. Starting the search for new business from a single point of specialization is called 
“concentric diversification”. In this thesis, we will describe and analyze how specialized medium-
sized firms go about handling this type of diversification with all the peculiarities, issues and 
problems that come with such New Business Exploration endeavors. 
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1.2 Research aims, main research question and overview 
From a theoretical point of view opportunity identification is the central theme of this study. As 
will become clear from the literature review in chapter 2, the entrepreneurship theory which is 
the umbrella framework for opportunity identification is still under development. Although 
entrepreneurship research has made considerable progress during the last decades, the actual 
act of identifying New Business Opportunities remains obscure and fuzzy, resembling a black box 
with shades of dark grey: information enters the system and almost miraculously business 
opportunities seem to trickle out of it (Short, Ketchen, Shook, & Ireland, 2010). Many issues 
remain open for debate and many questions require more research in order to be answered. How 
does opportunity identification come about? Is it a matter of chance, which is sometimes called 
“serendipity” in this context? Does it depend on the creativity of individuals within the 
organization? Is it possible to organize the firm in such a way that the number of successful 
identifications of opportunities will increase? As these and many other questions remain to be 
answered, managers and practitioners lack sound tools and methods to effectively organize for 
successful identification of opportunities (McMullen, Plummer, & Acs, 2007). This study attempts 
to address both these theoretical and practical gaps in our knowledge about the nature of 
opportunity identification processes. Our main objective in this study is to shed light on what is 
actually happening in this dark shaded grey box of identifying opportunities in order to be able to 
formulate some theoretically sound recommendations on how to organize for successful 
opportunity identification.  
Thus, this study has both a theoretical objective and a practical one. The theoretical aim is to 
increase our understanding of the identification of opportunities within medium-sized, 
technology based firms, while the pragmatic aim is to develop guidelines for management to 
organize and improve opportunity identification within these firms. In order to achieve these 
objectives a model is needed that describes this phenomenon. The main research question for 
this thesis then can be formulated as follows:  
“How can opportunity identification in medium-sized, technology-based firms be modelled?” 
An initial framework which models the New Business Opportunity function of a firm will be 
developed in chapter 2. This initial framework basically argues that opportunity identification will 
occur successfully if a firm is able to integrate external information about the firm’s business 
environment with internal technological information about the firm’s core capabilities. It is at the 
nexus of these two streams of information that the identification of opportunities will occur. This 
framework will be based on existing theories in literature which we will also discuss in chapter 2. 
We will present theories about market orientation, resource-based view of the firm, and 
entrepreneurship and evaluate their relevance for our research question. In order to find out 
whether the proposed initial framework reflects the realities of the real world it needs to be 
tested. In a series of case studies we will test whether the framework does model opportunity 
identification correctly. If it does, both objectives will be fulfilled. The main research question 
then can be re-formulated as follows:  
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“Does the proposed initial framework reflect the workings of the New Business Exploration 
function of medium-sized firms in the real world?” 
This derived and rephrased research question will be broken down into more manageable 
questions in section 3.1. In the remainder of chapter 3 we will justify and describe in detail our 
research approach, case selection, data gathering methods and data analysis method (3.2 to 3.7). 
In chapter 4 an overview of the individual case firms will be presented (4.1) together with the 
results and observations of the case studies (4.2 to 4.5). In the final chapter 5 we will return to 
our (sub-) research questions and present a final framework based on the initial framework, but 
adapted with our key findings. Chapter 5 will conclude with a few theoretical and managerial 
implications of this final framework. In the remainder of the present chapter we will provide a 
brief description of our research population, the Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry . 
1.3 The Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry  
1.3.1 Why the Machine Manufacturing Industry  
As research population from which to select suitable case firms we have chosen the Dutch 
Machine Manufacturing Industry (MMI). Although there are also large firms to be found in this 
sector, the majority of the firms are medium-sized and have their raison d’être firmly rooted in a 
technological knowledge base, which are the two fundamental characteristics of the firms we are 
interested in. The Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry had in 2006, one year before this study 
commenced, a total of 8350 firms, making it a large enough pool to make a careful sample 
selection of firms to be included in a study.  
There is a methodological reason to choose for this industrial sector (and only for one sector) 
which will be explained in more detail in section 3.5 (Case selection), but in short it comes down 
to achieve as closely as possible a ceteris paribus context. In order to draw conclusions from 
studying and comparing several case firms it is to be preferred not to have too much 
heterogeneity. Another reason to study this particular industrial sector is that it is an important 
economic sector for the Dutch economy as will be explained in the following sections. Our choice 
of this sector therefore increases the potential relevance of our research. 
High on the Dutch economic policy agenda is the idea to become one of the top innovative and 
knowledge-based economies in the world. Despite this inspiring objective the manufacturing 
branch of the economy has long been set on a side track in the Netherlands. Trade and services 
industries had higher priorities for policy makers and were in general regarded more attractive 
and interesting for the general public (Dankbaar & Velzing, 2013). However, one can hardly think 
of a true knowledge-based economy which is innovation driven without truly new product 
developments based on technological innovations. Enterprises who develop, manufacture and 
sell new products, either to consumers or in a business-to-business environment, are not only 
users of new knowledge but also create new (technological) knowledge.  
In Pavitt’s taxonomy the firms in the MMI sector fall into the category of specialized suppliers 
(O’Reilly III & Tushman, 2008). This category is characterized by firms which work in close 
cooperation with their customers in developing and manufacturing their products, 
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simultaneously expanding their technological knowledge base. Many customers of these 
specialized suppliers are largely depending on them in their new product development activities. 
Also in Michael Porter’s diamond model of successful clusters in national economies related and 
supporting industries are considered a fundamental and essential building block in stimulating 
innovative activities within national economies (Porter, 1990). In other words, as a supporting 
and stimulating industry the Machine Manufacturing Industry is vital for a healthy innovative 
climate in the Dutch economy. More boldly: without a thriving specialized supplier sector in the 
manufacturing industry in general, one can hardly expect a truly knowledge-based economy. 
With its strong position in the international market the Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry 
has proven to be innovative enough to compete with the rest of the world. It can therefore 
contribute to the objective of the Dutch economy of becoming a true knowledge-based economy. 
1.3.2 The Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry in context 
As the Machine Manufacturing Industry does not exist in a vacuum, this overview will start with 
the context in which it is embedded: the national economy and manufacturing industry in 
general. The level of analysis will range from the national economy down to the Machine 
Manufacturing Industry . It should be regarded as a first step towards a detailed analysis of the 
latter. The result will be an overview of the issues that are currently dominating the Dutch 
manufacturing industry. This result will be used as reference in the next section in which we will 
describe the Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry in more detail. 
1.3.2.1 Impact of the manufacturing industry for national economy 
In 2006 the manufacturing industry comprised 46,100 firms which is 6.2% of the total number of 
firms in the Netherlands. This percentage has been decreasing over the years. In 1993 the 
percentage was 7.1% with 36.000 firms. Thus, in absolute figures there was a significant increase 
in firms but because the number of firms has increased even more in other sectors the 
percentages has decreased. If the time span is enlarged to 1983 one notices a stability in the 
number of firms between 1998 and 2006 when compared to the period between 1983 and 1998 
(Biermans & Poort, 2007a). 
The Dutch manufacturing industry contributed 15.6% of the total added value of the Dutch 
economy in 2001 (De Vaan, Rippen, & Haverhals, 2004). This figure might not be considered very 
high, but it is argued that the manufacturing industry cannot be seen as an isolated sector. It does 
have close relations with related industries such as the financial-, ICT-, logistics-, and business 
services sectors. These sectors are highly dependent on the manufacturing industry, which is the 
driving force behind their growth (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2004). With this idea in 
mind one must look at the percentage, which was in 2001 33%, of the total added value of these 
related sectors as well. This conglomerate of interrelated and depended sectors makes up 48.6% 
of the total added value of the Dutch economy in 2001 (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2004).  
Added value of the manufacturing industry as a percentage of total added value in the economy 
has also been declining. In the period between 1980 and 2001 it declined from 18.5% to 15.6%. 
In 2005 this number had decreased to 14.7% (Biermans & Poort, 2007a). This de-industrialization 
however has largely been caused by the faster growth of the service sector. Productivity growth 
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in manufacturing has been much higher than in services. In absolute figures the output of the 
manufacturing industry has even increased in this period (De Vaan, Rippen, & Haverhals, 2004). 
Another important feature of the manufacturing industry is the fact that Dutch private R&D 
investments are mainly being made in this sector (De Vaan, Rippen, & Haverhals, 2004). The 
Dutch manufacturing sector contributes 77% of total business R&D expenditure which itself is 
58% of the total Dutch R&D expenditure. Thus the overall R&D expenditure of the manufacturing 
industry is 45% of total Dutch R&D expenditure (De Boer & Van Steen, 2006). From this point of 
view the manufacturing industry is of high importance for the Dutch economy as a driver of 
innovation.  
1.3.2.2 Machine Manufacturing Industry as part of the total manufacturing 
industry 
In this section we will present some basic figures describing the relative importance of the 
Machine Manufacturing Industry. The first aspect of the MMI that must be stressed is that it is a 
set of firms with a unique character (Kamp & Berkleef, 2004). Most sectors or branches consist 
of firms that fit into a single value chain, like the dairy sector in the food industry in which milk 
and cattle fodder (primary goods) are at the beginning of the chain and several dairy products 
are the end products down the stream. Within these broad value chains traditional sectors can 
be categorized into one of the following sub-categories: primary goods, specialty inputs, 
associated services or machinery for production (Porter, 1990). Where other sectors or branches 
are in general rooted in a single value chain the Machine Manufacturing Industry crosses all the 
value chains horizontally. 
 
Figure 1 The Machine Manufacturing Industry across other industries 
Vissers suggests that the relationship between supplier (machine manufacturer) and customer 
should be referred to as “chain-of-production” instead of “supply chain” to emphasizes the 
unique position this type of firms have in the value chain. Also the output of this sector is very 
heterogeneous, from basic and relatively simple equipment up to high tech complex machinery 
(Vissers, 2006). 
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A second aspect to be noticed is that the Machine Manufacturing Industry has its own value 
chain. The end-users are firms that use the end-products (machinery and equipment) for their 
(primary) production process. The suppliers of machines are part of their own production chain 
in which they have several types of suppliers: machinery, semi-finished products, modules, basic 
materials, etc. The machine industry can therefore be seen as a separate value chain with primary 
goods (semi-finished product, basic materials), machinery (machines and equipment to produce 
machines and equipment), specialty inputs (electronics, software) and services (see figure 2 Value 
chain MMI in relation with its customers value chain). 
A quantitative analysis of the Dutch sector can be based on the Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek 
(CBS) figures. As a boundary or definition for the Machine Manufacturing Industry we follow the 
SIC ’93 classification of the CBS. The following set of five tier two categories will form our research 
population: 
29. Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
30. Manufacture of office machinery and computers  
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus  
32. Manufacture of audio, video, communication equipment  
33. Manufacture of medical and optical instruments 
Table 1 Machine Manufacturing Industry according to the SIC '93 classification 
From the trend figures (table 2) of this research population it is clear that the MMI has grown in 
the period between 1993 and 2006 (Biermans & Poort, 2007a). Its share of the total industry has 
also grown slightly but not significantly. The percentage of companies that are active in the MMI 
as defined here has been stable at around 1.13% of the total of all companies in the Netherlands 
in this period. Also it is clear that “Machinery and equipment” and the “medical and optical 
instruments” are the largest sub-sectors in the Machine Manufacturing Industry. From an 
employment point of view (table 3) the Machine Manufacturing Industry is relatively small when 
compared to the total employment in the Netherlands in 2006 (2.28%) and its share is declining 
(Biermans & Poort, 2007a). 
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 1993 1998 2003 2006 
29. Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment 
3650 3665 4175 4555 
30. Manufacture of office machinery and 
computers 
215 345 285 190 
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery 
and apparatus 
990 805 990 1045 
32. Manufacture of audio, video, 
communication equipment 
210 360 405 390 
33. Manufacture of medical and optical 
instruments. 
1655 2010 2170 2170 
Total machine industry 6720 7185 8025 8350 
Total manufacturing industry  42525 47055 46000 46135 
Total economy 596225 660275 698255 741775 
     
Percentage machine industry of total 
industry 
15,80% 15,27% 17,45% 18,10% 
Percentage of machine industry of total 
economy 
1,13% 1,09% 1,15% 1,13% 
Table 2 Machine Manufacturing Industry Number of firms (Biermans & Poort, 2007a) 
  
 1993 1998 2003 2005 
29. Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment 
83000 88000 84000 83000 
30. Manufacture of office machinery and 
computers 
7000 7000 6000 5000 
31. Manufacture of electrical machinery 
and apparatus 
21000 22000 18000 16000 
32 & 33. Manufacture of audio, video, 
communication equipment & medical 
and optical instruments. 
74000 62000 59000 55000 
total machine industry 185000 179000 167000 159000 
Total manufacturing industry 960000 925000 885000 835000 
Total economy 5509000 6262000 6995000 6975000 
Percentage machine industry of total 
industry 
19,27% 19,35% 18,87% 19,04% 
Percentage of machine industry of total 
economy 
3,36% 2,86% 2,39% 2,28% 
Table 3 Employment in the Machine Manufacturing Industry (Biermans & Poort, 2007a) 
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1.3.2.3 Qualitative role of machine and equipment manufacturing industry 
Despite its relatively small direct impact on the national economy, the Machine Manufacturing 
Industry does play an important role in a more indirect manner. On the one hand, an increasing 
number of firms, not just large ones, but also small and medium-sized firms in the MMI are 
getting more closely involved and integrated with their suppliers. Close collaboration and 
partnerships between firms are becoming more important as firms in the Machine Manufacturing 
Industry are being forced to deliver “full life cycle services” instead of solely products. On the 
other hand, customer firms tend to outsource more activities upstream, including R&D (Vissers, 
2006). One of the consequences of these developments is that firms in the Machine 
Manufacturing Industry and their suppliers are becoming more important for technological 
advances, R&D and innovation in the sector of their customers. Downstream firms get more 
dependent on the ability of the supply firms for innovation and hence for their competitiveness. 
Given that the machine industry is a “horizontal” industry that has customers in many vertical 
value chains the machine industry is indirectly important for the innovative performance of the 
Dutch manufacturing sector as a whole. 
If we limit ourselves to SIC categories 29 (Manufacture of machinery and equipment) and 31 
(Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus) the R&D expenditure is 29,5% of the total 
Dutch business R&D expenditure (De Boer & Van Steen, 2006). If we combine these figures with 
the above qualitative notions the conclusion may be justified that the Machine Manufacturing 
Industry is of fundamental importance for the innovative performance of the Dutch economy. 
  
 
Figure 2 Value chain MMI in relation with its customers value chain 
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1.3.3 SMEs in the Machine Manufacturing Industry  
Since 2004 the number of start-ups has grown considerably, both nationally and in the 
manufacturing industry. The growth in the manufacturing industry was with 35.6% a fraction 
smaller than the growth in other sectors (39.2%) (Biermans & Poort, 2007a). Between 1993 and 
2006 the number of large firms (more than 100 employees) has decreased with 18% from 1585 
to 1300. Also in the medium-sized group (from 10 to 100 employees) there is a significant 
decrease in firms. Therefore, the growth in the number of firms in the industry can be mainly 
attributed to start-up firms (Biermans & Poort, 2007a). 
If we focus on the largest sub-sectors in the Machine Manufacturing Industry (machine- and 
equipment industry, medical-and optical instruments) it is notable that these two sectors differ 
significantly in the SME segment. For both sectors the percentage of large firms (more than 100 
employees) is almost the same, respectively 3% and 2%. In the middle-group (20-100 employees) 
and in the small firms group (less than 20 employees), however, they differ with the medium-
sized segment being twice as large in the machine- and equipment industry. 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 0-20 20-100 > 100 
Machine- and equipment industry 81% 16% 3% 
Medical-and optical instruments 90% 8% 2% 
Table 4 Firms size in the Machine Manufacturing Industry  
However, in both sectors SMEs play a significant role. The fact that the size of the average firm in 
the industry is decreasing and that the number of large firms is decreasing faster than that of 
smaller firms suggests that specialization and small-scale production are the trend. However, part 
of the explanation is also the trend of increasing outsourcing and splitting up of larger firms 
(Biermans & Poort, 2007a). The origin of quite a few Dutch SME firms in the machine industry lies 
in the divestment of machine building activities by large internationals in the past, creating new 
enterprises which were, simply said, large firms’ departments before splitting off. 
In the SME segment the majority of the enterprises that can be labelled a “technology-firm” (a 
company that actually has an active R&D policy and attitude) are to be found in the sub-segment 
of the medium-sized enterprises (between 10 to 100 employees) (De Jong, 2006). De Jong 
describes several characteristics of typical “SME technology firms” (De Jong, 2006). First, they are 
engaged in exporting and large part of their total revenue is from exports. They have a sense for 
strategy and very often they have an explicit strategy written down in a business plan. Product 
development is mentioned in 84% of the strategies, being the most mentioned item. Further 
items mentioned in strategic-plans are continuity and revenue growth. Product development as 
a strategic aim permeates in the way these firms are organized. Innovation has been given a 
distinct function within the organization: at least one individual is responsible for innovation, 
sometimes more than one person depending on the specific organization model that is used. 
These firms cooperate with various external actors but the most enduring and appreciated 
relations are with customers and suppliers. Cooperation with universities and knowledge 
institutes is less common but not rare. Overall these technology firms in the SME category do not 
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perceive the competition as very high, neither from direct competitors nor from substitute 
products. Also they do not feel any hard pressure from suppliers or from customers (De Jong, 
2006). In general this is in line with the idea that these firms act in niche markets. We are not 
saying that all firms in the MMI are of this exact type, but, if we realize that a large part of the 
MMI are SMEs and that many of them are innovative (a presumption based on R&D expenditures) 
and involved in technology development, it is obvious that this stereo-type fits quite a few 
companies in the machine industry. 
Another R&D-related issue is that SME firms in general are sensitive to the economic cycle in 
matters of their R&D expenditures. In economic low tides they spend far less on R&D than in 
more prosperous economic times (Jong & Jansen, 2007). This becomes clear by examining the 
trend of innovation determinants (knowledge networks, cooperation in R&D and special 
innovation personnel) against the economic cycle: the patterns are significantly similar (Jong & 
Jansen, 2007). A final innovation and R&D-related issue within SMEs is that size matters. Medium-
sized firms spend more on innovation and R&D than small firms. Particularly, firms with more 
than 50 employees seem to be more innovation oriented than smaller firms (De Kok, Prince, & 
Span, 2015; CBS, 2015).  
1.3.4 Structural, regional and sectoral patterns in the Machine Manufacturing 
Industry  
In recent years the idea of firms clustering together into networks that act as innovation 
incubators has received much attention from academia and policy makers. In this section we will 
focus on two elements of clustering in relation to the Machine Manufacturing Industry : regional 
patterns and cooperation within networks . 
1.3.4.1 Regional patterns of the Machine Manufacturing Industry  
There is a clear pattern in the regional distribution of the Dutch manufacturing industry. The 
province of Brabant and the northern part of the province of Limburg are mentioned in every 
report as regions with high industrial activity. The areas around Amsterdam and in Zuid-Holland 
are also identified in many reports as regions with a high concentration of industry. Finally Twente 
can be labelled as a region with a high industrial activity (Biermans & Poort, 2007b). When 
focusing on firms according our definition of machine industry, a similar pattern appears: 
Brabant, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland score high on firms in the machine industry. Twente (in the 
province of Overijssel) does not score high when looked at the machine industry, unlike 
Gelderland (Vissers, 2006).  
These patterns are also visible if R&D investments and R&D related indicators are used to map 
regions. With regard to R&D intensity and R&D developments the regions of Eastern Noord-
Brabant, Delft & Westland, Leiden and the Bollenstreek excel. Though the regions around 
Amsterdam, ‘t Gooi and Twente still have high R&D intensities, the R&D activities have slowed 
down there (Augusteijn, 2005). It is not easy to present an explanation for this regional pattern, 
due to the heterogeneous character of the industry. Closeness to large international firms as well 
as regional concentrations of customer sectors may have played a role in the past. Though one 
might expect regional patterns due to advantages of geographical proximity to customers 
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(Vissers, 2006), with the present levels of internationalization this seems less likely when more 
customers are abroad. The same reasoning can be applied to the suppliers of the firms in the 
Machine Manufacturing Industry. 
1.3.4.2 Cooperation within networks in the Machine Manufacturing Industry  
Regional concentration alone does not create innovative clusters. Besides regional proximity, 
inter-organizational relationships are the key element of truly innovative clusters. Porter (1990) 
stresses the importance of related and supporting firms for the innovativeness of clusters. The 
Dutch machine manufacturing clusters seem to lack these relationships (De Vaan, Rippen, & 
Haverhals, 2004), partly no doubt due to the heterogeneous character of the sector. The 
cooperation that does exist in the machine industry is mainly technology based and focuses on 
production, product development and information-sharing (EIM, 2006). This collaboration is 
primarily between similar companies and vertically within the value chain (EIM, 2006). 
Collaboration with other firms outside the sector seems to be absent. Networking with 
knowledge institutes does not seem to happen very often. The reason may be that the majority 
of the firms are relatively small, a type of firm that is less often involved in cooperation with 
knowledge institutes. 
1.3.5 The Machine Manufacturing Industry in an international context 
1.3.5.1 Forces and trends 
That globalization is of major influence on an open economy needs no explanation. It may serve 
a better insight, however, if we identify the different components of this container concept. First, 
the evolving development of technology plays a vital role. Developments in ICT have made our 
world smaller by making communication faster and cheaper. This produces opportunities as well 
as threats. Exporting, for example, has been made easier for many firms because it has become 
easier to find new markets abroad. On the other hand it has become easier for foreign companies 
to find the Dutch market, resulting in increased competition for the Dutch enterprises on their 
relatively small home market.  
The same reasoning applies for the second development: the expanding European Union. This 
institutional development made it easier for new EU members to compete on Dutch markets but 
it also opened new, easier to explore, export markets for Dutch firms. The rise of China and India 
is a third development that has the attention of western economies. These two countries have 
shaken off their “low-tech offshore” profile and have begun to penetrate the high tech arena as 
well. With populations of about 1 billion and a steadily growing middle class these economies are 
potentially large export markets. The levels of education and technology are also rising fast in 
China and India, making them potential rivals on the world market. Especially China seems to be 
able to make the transition from low tech mass production to world-class high-tech products, 
while at the same time opening its home markets to foreign investment and imports. The Chinese 
industry can rely on political support and until recently had to deal with relatively less limiting 
environmental and labor restrictions. The result is a world market where not every player faces 
the same set of rules, which has as a final consequence that the world market is far from optimally 
functioning (Deloitte, 2005). 
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1.3.5.2 Exports 
So far, the Dutch manufacturing industry is performing quite well in this international context. 
An indicator to measure the performance of the Dutch industry is to examine the export figures. 
A general trend of Dutch industrial companies is a concentration on core competencies and a 
focus on niche markets (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2004). Some firms even have a 
leading position in such markets. However, one faces some issues when studying this theme. 
Export figures are an indicator to measure the performance of the Dutch industry, but the 
available figures are on a high level of aggregation and a more differentiated view is hard to 
achieve. Not only are the import- and export figures only available on a high level of aggregation 
and not on sub-sector level, there is also the problem of the ambiguity of export data. These are 
contaminated with the imports of machinery that is solely imported to be exported. Hence the 
export data on machinery does not give a correct figure of the Dutch manufactured machinery. 
Moreover the data is not very detailed on a low level of aggregation, one cannot examine the 
position of Dutch High tech exports in detail as a measure of the competitiveness of the Dutch 
manufacturing industry. 
1.3.5.3 Offshoring 
In 2005 the industry itself had a negative outlook on the international competitive position of the 
Dutch industry. One of the expected primary threats was offshoring. According to Deloitte (2005), 
entrepreneurs recognized the idea that with transferring production R&D activities are also lost 
in the long run. Remarkably, later studies have not confirmed this threat becoming a reality. The 
import-, export- and investment statistics suggests that offshoring is (still) not a dominant factor 
(Biermans & Poort, 2007b). A possible reason for this might be that outsourcing and offshoring 
are complex processes and that many firms had preliminary plans in such a direction but failed 
to actually execute the plans due to more complexity than expected. 
1.3.6 Summary Machine Manufacturing Industry analysis 
Although one cannot conclude that the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands has 
transformed into a purely high-tech, innovation-driven knowledge-based sector, there seems to 
be less place for the “classic” low-tech-mass-production industry. The manufacturing industry 
does create employment and contributes to national GNP, especially to exports, but it seems to 
us that its most important contribution to the Dutch economy is that of supporting 
innovativeness. Its main contribution is that it is the engine for knowledge creation and 
innovation, the key features that are essential for the Dutch economy to maintain its position in 
the international top of innovative countries and bring the slow but clearly visible decline of this 
position to a halt (Van der Zee, Manshanden, Bekkers, & Van der Horst, 2012) . 
This is even more true for the Machine Manufacturing Industry. This sector can be seen as an 
enabler of the other value chains, as it supplies the industrial sectors with the core of the 
production process: the machine. With more demanding end- users and customers, 
manufacturing industries must keep up with innovative products with ever shorter time to 
market. A MMI that is able to support this innovation process of the manufacturing industry by 
being itself highly innovative is of high value to the economy.  
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The Machine Manufacturing Industry in itself is a peculiar sector if we interpret its value chain as 
one that horizontally crosses the boundaries of other clusters or value chains. The consequence 
of this is that the MMI shows a high degree of diversity. A large part of the firms are SMEs, which 
makes the picture even more complex. We conclude that there is no such thing as one 
homogeneous MMI. Rather it is a much differentiated industry with many subsectors using a wide 
range of different technologies and supplying a large set of diverse customer industries. 
1.3.7 Refining the research population: Defining the type of organization 
We can now narrow down the research domain we want to investigate. As described before we 
are interested in medium-sized firms. The exact boundaries are hard to set but we define the 
medium-sized firm as having in between 10 and 250 employees. Secondly, we focus on 
companies that have a certain degree of “High Tech” character. In our provisional idea high tech 
innovative machinery should have some kind of “intelligence”. Hence our focus was on 
companies whose products have two technologies merged: that of mechatronics and 
(embedded-) software. A third criterion for selecting case firms was that the firms operate in 
niche markets and that their products would either be manufactured in small batches or would 
be custom made. A final criterion was a successful export capability as regular export is a sign of 
international competitiveness. 
1.3.8 Refining the research population: Two subsectors of the Machine 
Manufacturing Industry in more detail 
As mentioned already, a feature of the Machine Manufacturing Industry is that it is part of every 
value chain or cluster as enabler and supplier. In several reports a number of specific clusters, 
industries, or sectors has been identified that are of value for the Dutch economy. They have in 
common that they perform well above average, are highly innovative, with exports constituting 
a substantial part of their revenues, and they are expected to be very successful in the future as 
well. In short, these branches are considered to be the “winner branches” (Table 5 "Winner 
branches”). If these sectors are successful we may assume that machine manufacturing firms 
which supply the firms in these sectors with machinery and systems will be successful as well. 
Looking at table 5 two groups of sectors emerge in all four reports: Food and High Tech (including 
ICT, electronics, maritime, automotive and aeronautical and space parts). In order to reduce the 
research population one step further we focus on machine manufacturing firms with the 
characteristics as described in section 1.3.7, which have at least one of these two sectors as their 
main market. In order to get a better understanding of these two subsectors of the Machine 
Manufacturing Industry we have analyzed them along the lines of two more or less corresponding 
employer associations, the GMV (food) and NEVAT (High-tech). We studied these two subsectors 
in a preliminary study, using firms´ website information, industry experts, and written 
information from several sources, and interviewing staff members of those associations. In the 
following we will briefly sketch the two subsectors in more detail. 
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(Deloitte, 2005)  (De Vaan, 2004) (De Boer & Van 
Steen, 2006) 
(De Jong, 2006) 
(Branches with majority of 
technology-driven SME firms) 
Food  agro/food food Food 
Medical care  maritime   Flowers Medical equipment 
ICT  electr./embedded 
software materials  
High-tech 
systems 
Telecommunications 
Logistics  petrochemical  Chemical Chemicals  
electronics  Materials  Materials Rubber & plastic 
 graphical cluster  Water Machinery 
  Creative 
industry  
Audio & video  
   Automobile, aeronautical 
and space parts 
Table 5 "Winner branches” 
1.3.9 Food processing Machine Manufacturing Industry  
The Dutch food processing machinery industry is one of the leading industries in the world. It is 
part of the agro-industrial production complex (Figure 3). This whole complex is traditionally 
divided into the following sub-sectors: meat & fish, vegetables, potatoes & fruit, dairy, liquid 
products, bakery, animal feed and packaging. Together with strong knowledge institutes 
(University of Wageningen, Nizo) this agro-industrial production complex is one of the leading 
agro-industrial systems in the world when measured in market share. The collaboration between 
the industry and science is often mentioned as one of the key factors in the innovative success in 
this sector (De Vaan, Rippen, & Haverhals, 2004). Particular the sub-sectors potato processing, 
vegetable processing, dairy and poultry have large market shares.  
Another often-mentioned factor that pushed these industries to the current level is the high level 
of laws and regulations in the domain of hygiene and safety that obligated the industries to keep 
improving their standards (De Vaan, Rippen, & Haverhals, 2004). The current spearheads of the 
innovation process are hygienic design and integrated design. 
The food processing industry is experiencing a series of changes which is initiated downstream: 
The customers are more demanding than ever before. The Machine Manufacturing Industry is 
part of the whole chain innovation process, creating safer food and more choices. Chain 
innovation in which many members of the total production complex are involved might be a 
feasible opportunity in this sector (De Vaan, Rippen, & Haverhals, 2004). 
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Figure 3 Agro-Industrial production complex 
1.3.9.1 End-products of machine manufacturing firms in de food processing 
industry; machines or installations? 
One of the main objectives of our preliminary analysis was to get an understanding of the type of 
products that are being manufactured in each of the sub-sectors. The range of products is diverse, 
but in general the end-products of this “food processing machine manufacturing” industry can 
be described best as follows. In the continuum from raw materials -> components & modules -> 
machinery -> installations & plants one could add another category between machinery and 
installations & plants: production lines. One might consider production-lines and installations & 
plants as being the same, but we would like to make a distinction. Installations and plants as can 
be observed in the chemical industry are in general relatively large and “alfresco”, meaning that 
the machines and components are not confined within factory walls but are situated outside. 
Production lines are indoors, within the walls of a factory. Whereas installations and plants in 
general have continuous- or semi-continuous (=batch) production processes, production lines as 
studied in this report follow a more classic production process in which raw materials are 
transformed via discrete steps into end products. Production lines are composed of several 
machines which are connected via conveyer-belts and other material transport systems. The 
difference between production lines and plants is not very clear-cut but in general, chemical 
plants have a much more 24/7 continuous character and are larger than product lines in the food 
industry.  
Firms in the food processing machine industry tend to concentrate on manufacturing specific 
machines within a production line. They manufacture the individual machines that make up a 
production-line and also deliver turn-key installation of whole production lines. The conclusion is 
that the firms in this sector are both machine manufacturers and system integrators of 
production lines in which their own machines form the main components. 
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1.3.9.2 Categories of machines and production-lines 
One could further introduce three categories in which these machines and production-lines can 
be divided: First, one can identify the true ”food process” production-lines. In this category raw 
food materials are being transformed into food products with some sort of added value. This 
category can be divided into subcategories that indicate in what type of market/products these 
machines and products are being sold. In the next section we will go into these different markets. 
A second category are “end-of-line” packaging machines. These machines do not actually 
transform the final products but merely package and wrap them in containers, cardboard boxes 
or any other packing material or devices for transportation and preservation. A final category is 
the “Internal-transportation-system” of which conveyor belt systems are an example. These 
products are the internal transportation systems that handle the products in the production-line, 
transporting them from one machine to the next. 
1.3.9.3 Market structure 
In general firms stick to their market segment or niche market. Despite the term “niche” these 
markets can be large in size and in diversity. Specialization and close customer relationships are 
typical characteristics in the food processing Machine Manufacturing Industry . The category of 
food processing machinery can be divided into the following market sub segments: 
• Meat processing (all cattle and poultry) 
• Bakery processing (dough handling and ovens) 
• Dairy  
• Liquid & beverages 
• Vegetable processing (including potatoes) 
• Other food, for example snacks 
• Other non-food (animal feed, laboratory equipment etc.) 
1.3.10 High-tech Machine Manufacturing Industry  
The NEVAT defines seven subsectors (automotive, sheet metal, tools, system suppliers, system 
developers, heavy machines, electronics) to categorize its members. The sub-sector, system 
developers, has not been taken into consideration in our study because it consists of engineering- 
and technical consultancy firms that do not manufacture themselves. Though the other sub-
sectors also show structural differences we will address some general issues that apply to all six 
of them. 
1.3.10.1 Type of products 
To clarify the location of the majority of the firms in the production chain of machinery one needs 
to understand the hierarchy of elements in the production chain. From raw material to end 
product one can identify several stages. Though the stages cannot always be clearly defined the 
following abstraction provides a better understanding of a complex production chain (Figure 4). 
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In this continuum the high-tech supplier sector is active in single and complex components and 
firms have modules as their core product. A very distinct upward trend is to be seen in which 
most firms are moving from single components towards more complex components and 
modules. Traditionally, many of the firms in this sector have offered, beside their products, man 
hours and machine capacity to their customers, for whom they assemble the end-products, being 
the machines. Many firms take it a step further, not only offering man-and machine capacity but 
also engineering and design services. This fits into the trend that some end-product 
manufacturers become so called “head-tail” companies. Such end-product manufacturers or 
OEMs are organizing themselves in such a way that they primarily focus on the marketing & sales 
and R&D activities while the suppliers cover a large portion of the actual production, assembly 
and logistics of the end-products. The firms that manufacture modules and offer engineering & 
design services are labelled as “System suppliers”. It is to be expected that at least some firms 
that are now still considered as suppliers will move up to become full machine manufacturers. To 
take this step the supplier firms must acquire new competences such as co-designing and 
complex project-management skills and new knowledge, for example about the OEM’s markets 
(a development we indeed have seen in this study). 
 
 
Figure 4 Spectrum product types 
1.3.10.2 Sector typical competences 
Another characteristic of the firms in this High-Tech Machine Manufacturing Industry is that they 
offer their products to a large variety of industries. Most firms do not specialize in a specific 
industry. Also the majority of the firms does not have a product catalogue. Their products are 
custom made from scratch. Though it seems these firms are not market driven or tightly bound 
to a specific industry they are very customer driven; “built to spec” or “built to print” are common 
concepts in this sector.  
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Typical of the way these firms present themselves is their emphasis on technological 
competencies. Three types of competencies can be distinguished. Firstly, many firms present 
complete listings of their machine-parks on their website. These competencies we will refer to as 
hardware abilities. The second type of competencies is related the first type. Most firms stress 
the high level of the technical skills of their employees. Continuous education to keep up-to-date 
with the latest technologies is an often-repeated theme in this sector. This competence could be 
referred to as technical human skills. A final type of competency that seems generally present is 
process and quality control.  
CNC machines have become the standard in the industry since the eighties. A more recent trend 
is the introduction of ERP systems in order to gain better control over the internal processes. The 
majority of the firms present the fact that they are ISO certified as one of their major assets. 
Overall these competencies are all related to the process of production. One could conclude that 
process innovations have taken place in the industry on a significant scale. The overall impression 
is that the majority of these firms are very technological competence driven in their thinking, next 
to customer driven. 
1.3.11 Conclusion 
Overall the sectors “Food” and “High Tech” appear interesting for our research because the firms 
tend to have a technology driven way of operating their product development activities. 
Combined with the fact that they serve a wide array of markets one could argue that these firms 
are a well suited research population to study firms’ ability to develop new products for new 
markets on the basis of their current technological competences. In fact, one of the firms studied 
explicitly states this idea on its website: “New knowledge acquired in a certain market can be 
used for new developments in other markets”. 
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2 Theoretical foundations 
 
“Using theory allows us to see the future more clearly and act more confidently to shape our 
destiny”  
C.M. Christensen 
2.1 Initial framework 
2.1.1 Purpose of the framework 
A social study like this in a business context is a complex and challenging undertaking. The number 
of interrelated variables involved makes it easy to lose overview of the research. Also the sheer 
amount of collected data can make the analysis a daunting task. At the end, presenting the results 
to a peer audience in a clear, convincing and comprehensible fashion without losing detail and 
logic is indeed a challenge of its own. The use of a framework as a guiding tool can help to 
overcome these issues. We define a framework as an easy to apply analytic construct that 
basically structures information. A framework is not a theory, it is merely a logical construction 
of several checklists (Kaish & Gilad, 1991). 
The framework we present in this chapter serves several purposes. Firstly, it helps us to gather 
information in a structured way and to systematically translate the research questions into an 
interview protocol. Using a framework-based interview protocol we were able to increase the 
consistency of the data. Secondly, this structuring property of the framework enabled us also to 
analyze the large amount of data in the analysis stage in a structured manner. The framework 
therefore made a more focused and efficient way of processing our interview results possible 
(Marshall & Oliver, 1989). Thirdly, just as it guided us through the whole study, the framework 
provides guidance for the reader of this thesis as it brings together several different concepts, 
ideas and notions in a single conceptual structure. 
The framework also serves as a prelude to the theory that will lay the foundations for the 
management guidelines we envision as the final pragmatic objective of this study. In this study, 
we make a clear distinction between a conceptual framework and a theory. A theory goes beyond 
merely structuring information as it connects different pieces of information (Kay, 1993). Also, a 
good theory has the ability to predict outcomes of behavior (Kay, 1993). Because the 
management guidelines should have predictive qualities as well, it should therefore be based on 
a proper theory.  
This chapter then describes the initial framework we have developed as a guiding tool for this 
study. First, however, several basic concepts on which the framework is based need to be 
clarified. Secondly, a review of the literature will highlight the theoretical foundations on which 
the framework has been built. In the next chapter, this initial theoretical framework will be used 
to develop our research-framework in which the several operational research questions will be 
presented.  
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2.1.2 Basic concepts 
Good research needs well defined concepts. While in ordinary daily life we can communicate 
effectively without strict and clear definitions of concepts, in science without them the researcher 
loses focus and gets lost during the research (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 1998). Particularly in 
the field of management science, concepts are often ill-defined and consensus about definitions 
of concepts is hard to find. For example, in 19 years of research there is still not one generally 
accepted definition for the key concept of (entrepreneurial) opportunity (Hansen, Shrader, & 
Monllor, 2011). Therefore, using stipulative definitions in which a specific meaning is given to a 
concept for the sake of argument in a specific context is in order. In this section, we will define 
three main concepts we use in this study: Market Opportunity, Business Opportunity and New 
Business Exploration function. 
2.1.2.1 Market Opportunity 
In our view there is a clear difference between on the one hand a genuine Market Opportunity, 
and on the other hand hunches, surmises and (vague) ideas about how to make money with a 
new product or service. The latter resemble unstructured trains of thought that need further 
refinement. For example, one might have the hunch that due to oil shortages and rising oil prices 
there might be some business in alternative energy sources. Though this reasoning in itself is 
logical, it can hardly qualify as a thorough business model. Business models and business plans 
are based on clear and detailed descriptions of customer needs or problems that may be 
profitable to a firm (Kotler & Keller, 2012). Many opportunities are derived from identifying 
trends which are “directions or sequences of events that have some momentum and durability” 
(Kotler & Keller, 2012). Trends are predictable, durable and happen in the environment of the 
firm. Kirzner (1973, 1979) argues that in order for ideas to become opportunities their 
commercial value must be recognized. Hulbert, Brown and Adams (1997) speak of unsatisfied 
customer needs that are potentially profitable while Ardichvili, Cardozo and Ray (2003) refer to 
a chance to deliver superior value while meeting market needs. By fulfilling an unmet customer 
need and/or offering a solution for a customer’s problem an opportunity has an added value for 
the customer for which he is willing to pay a premium price (Crane, 2010). Thus, there appears 
to be a consensus that commercial value or potential for value creation is an essential property 
of an opportunity (Hills, Hansen, & Hultman, 2005). In this study, we therefore define a Market 
Opportunity as: 
  
2.1.2.2 Business Opportunity 
Market Opportunities exist in the external-environment of a firm. However, firms cannot pick any 
Market Opportunity of their liking, as not all opportunities are suitable for all firms. If a firm 
wishes to fulfil a specific need or solve a problem, it needs to have an appropriate capability base 
that matches that need or problem. The need for high capacity battery packs in the electric car 
industry, for example, may be a very promising Market Opportunity but is hardly suitable for a 
paperclip manufacturer as its core technology base is too far removed from what is needed to 
A  clearly defined  need or problem, which has commercial potential. 
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solve the battery capacity problem. Therefore, a Market Opportunity may be of value for a firm 
only if it can be linked to the firm’s core capability base. In other words there needs to be a fit 
the Market Opportunity and the capabilities of the firm and/or entrepreneur (Crane, 2010). Only 
then can we refer to it as a business opportunity. Business opportunities are therefore defined 
as Market Opportunities which can be fulfilled or solved by firm-specific competences. Business 
opportunities have therefore by definition a more firm-specific character than Market 
Opportunities. As we will explicate in more detail in a next section, we will focus in this study on 
the technological competences of a firm rather than capabilities in general.  
For the sake of clarity we stress that we make a distinction between business opportunities and 
sales leads. To appreciate this distinction an understanding of our definition of a market is 
essential. At first glance the term market seems clear and straightforward. On closer examination 
however, the exact meaning can differ depending on the context in which it is used. For example, 
in an economic context a market is a real or virtual meeting place where buyers and customers 
meet to exchange goods, services and information. In this context both participants - buyers and 
sellers - are of equal importance. In a marketing context the sellers are also part of a market but 
the focus is on the buyers. Surely, one can argue that in marketing literature competitors - in the 
role of sellers - also play a role in the market but nevertheless a market is mainly seen as a set of 
buyers. The term market in the marketing sense has a significant different nature than in 
economics. An “economic market” is more tangible and has clearer boundaries. For example, one 
can count each seller, buyer and exchange from a day at the stock-market. A “marketing-market” 
is more a mental model of managers who try to create order by simplifying the complexity of the 
real world (Day & Nedungadi, 1994). One could see a market in the economic sense as a 
mathematical model, while a market in the marketing context is a sense-making tool. The point 
we are trying to convey is that the term market is ambiguous and depending on the context the 
term must be defined specifically. 
We have defined the term market along the lines of a marketing approach in the sense that we 
focus on the buyers. However, in our definition markets are formed outside the scope of control 
of the firm and thus must not be confused with the concept of market segments as it is used in 
marketing. Market segments can, to a certain degree, be chosen by the firm (Biemans, 1996). A 
market is then a set of (potential) customers, who are usually served by several competing 
suppliers of a specific product or service. One firm will most likely not serve all the existing buyers 
in such a market. A sales lead is then a new potential customer that is not served yet but 
originates from within such an existing market. In contrast, to be considered as a business 
opportunity the potential customer must not only be new to the firm but must also operate in a 
market that is new to the firm. The definition of a genuine New Business Opportunity (NBO) then 
becomes: 
 
These definitions and labels of Market Opportunity and New Business Opportunity are ours. As 
with many other parts of management studies entrepreneurship research lacks a clear set of 
A clearly defined  need or problem with commercial potential that can be fulfilled or solved 
with firm-specific capabilities and that opens up a new market. 
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definitions; so many authors, so many definitions. For example, Shane makes a difference 
between an entrepreneurial opportunity (“..situations in which it is possible to recombine 
resources in a way that generates a profit”) and a business idea (”…are entrepreneurs’ 
interpretation of how to recombine resources in a way that allows pursuit of that opportunity”) 
(Shane, 2012, p. 15). Though there are differences in the details what Shane labels as an 
entrepreneurial opportunity is in this study referred to as a Market Opportunity. Likewise, 
Shane’s “business idea” is what we call a New Business Opportunity. This is just one example of 
the confusion of words, labels and definitions. Because of this lack of consensus about what an 
opportunity is, where it comes from and what it exact definition should be, we have taken the 
liberty to posit our own concepts.  
2.1.2.3 New Business Exploration Function 
In this study we focus on how firms have searched for and exploited new markets, an activity 
which is typically referred to as the New Business Development (NBD) function of the firm 
(Roberts & Berry, 1985). In general, NBD refers to all the efforts made in order to generate New 
Business Opportunities (Bakker, Jones, & Nichols, 1994). It therefore covers a large range of 
activities starting with an initial idea (generation) and ending with a sound business case, business 
plan or an evaluation (Bröring & Herzog, 2008). This process-like character of NBD allows it to be 
modelled as a series of consecutive stages. Following Smits (2010) three main stages of NBD can 
be identified: Initiation, development and commercialization. Because the object of our attention 
is identifying opportunities we have focused on the initiation stage in which various activities take 
place under such headings as exploration, screening, business analysis (Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, 
1968), initial screening, market assessment, technical assessment, market studies (Cooper & 
Kleinschmidt, 1986), opportunity identification (Urban & Hauser, 1993), idea development (Song 
& Montoya-Weiss, 2003), opportunity identification and selection (Crawford & Di Benedetto, 
2005). We have labelled this set of exploration activities, which is a distinct and independent 
function within firms, with the term New Business Exploration (NBE) function. The definition of 
NBE function in this study is as follows:  
 
2.1.3 Initial Framework 
The framework that will be explicated in the remainder of this chapter describes the New 
Business Exploration function of medium-sized firms. It follows the same logic that can be found 
in our definition of a business opportunity. Similar to genuine New Business Opportunities the 
NBE function has both an internal technological component and an external commercial 
component. In order to identify New Business Opportunities the NBE function must connect the 
commercial knowledge base of a firm to its technological knowledge base (Trott, 2008). Following 
this basic principle the framework consists of three components, each representing several 
distinct activities in the opportunity identification process: an external information gathering 
The whole complex of individuals, groups, departments and routines in a firm that are 
involved in the identification of business opportunities. 
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component, an internal information gathering component and a component that combines these 
two streams of information. 
The external information gathering activity monitors the external environment for potential 
customer needs and problems that await a solution. The internal information gathering activity 
seeks internally for those technology resources and capabilities that potentially create value for 
customers and give the firm a relative uniqueness. The main purpose of these two activities, 
generating information input for the firm, and the balanced importance of both is in line with the 
insight that new business development requires absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) 
for both the technology and the market domain (Bröring & Leker, 2007).  
It is the third activity - linking together the internal technological and the external market 
knowledge - in which opportunities are eventually being identified. This is the central component 
of the New Business Exploration framework: “It is the assimilation of knowledge from the external 
environment via the company’s external linkages with its internal capabilities that leads to new 
business opportunities being created.” (Trott, 2008, p. 198).  
 
Figure 5 New Business Exploration Function 
The external gathering of information component of the framework has many similarities with 
the central thesis of the market orientation literature, that in successful firms the whole 
organization is focused on the market and on the market needs of (potential) customers. The 
internal technological capability seeking component is prominent in the resource-based view of 
the firm, which states that the basis for competitive advantages of a firm lies within its own 
unique resources. Opportunity identification is a central notion in the entrepreneurship literature 
(Short, Ketchen, Shook, & Ireland, 2010; Gaglio & Katz, 2001) and the third component of our 
framework is based on this stream of the management literature. As it is also the central 
component of the framework and of this study, the entrepreneurship literature is the main 
theoretical basis of this thesis. In the following three sections we will review the three streams of 
literature and relate them to the framework. 
2.2 Existing literature & theory 
2.2.1 Market orientation 
The first component of the NBE function addresses the nature and scope of the external 
orientation of the firm. Organizations with a market-orientation are presumed to be able to 
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identify and exploit unserved markets better because they have a broader outlook on their 
environment and hence can identify opportunities faster (Slater & Narver, 1995). Opportunities 
derive, among others, from asymmetrical information about gradual trends and abrupt changes 
in industries, technologies and consumer needs (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003). Knowledge of new 
markets, of ways to serve these new markets and of customer problems trigger the recognition 
of opportunities (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003). This knowledge can be derived from a variety 
of sources (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). The observation that opportunities that lead to 
innovative behavior of firms are, among other things, rooted in an ever-changing environment, 
implies that a broad external orientation increases the chances of recognizing such opportunities. 
Firms need to gather information from their environment. Several authors consider this activity 
of gathering and processing external information a prerequisite for identifying opportunities 
(Kaish & Gilad, 1991; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002; Baron, 2006). This 
emphasis on gathering information in the environment of the organization reminds of the 
concept of market orientation. This concept describes in which way organizations should be 
organized in order to be able to gather information from their external environment, analyze it, 
disperse it through the organization and putting it in to use (Lafferty & Hult, 2001). 
Putting the customer at the center of attention is not new. Drucker (1954) argued already in the 
fifties that customer satisfaction is the single valid ground for existence of a business. But the first 
explicit descriptions of the concept of market orientation can be found in the seminal works of 
Kohli and Jaworksi (1990) and Narver and Slater (1990). This was only two years after Webster 
(1988) had announced that after decades of focusing on strategic planning, the marketing focus 
would be rediscovered by management.  
Three decades later there is a large body of literature on marketing orientation, but no general 
consensus on the definition, the true nature, or the implementation of the concept. Many 
perspectives about what market orientation really is have emerged, while several meta analyses 
have been conducted trying to create sense in this rich but scattered body of research. Lafferty 
and Hult (2001) have identified five different perspectives each taking a different approach 
towards the concept. The decision-making perspective put forward by Shapiro (1988), among 
others, emphasizes the importance of information and information sharing in order to be able to 
support an open decision making process. Kohli and Jaworski (1990, 1996) are dominant 
representatives of the market-intelligence perspective in which market intelligence generation 
and dissemination, and organization-wide responsiveness to this intelligence are key themes. In 
the same year Kohli and Jaworski put forward their ideas Narver and Slater (1990, 1994, 1995) 
published a study in which a culture based behavioural perspective is built upon three basic 
elements: a customer orientation, competitor orientation and an interfunctional coordination. 
Next to these three perspectives Lafferty and Hult mention Ruekert’s (1992) strategic view, in 
which several ideas from Kohli, Jaworski, Narver and Slater come together in a business-unit focus 
framework, and the exclusively customer-oriented approach of Deshpande, Farley, & Webster 
(1993) as two additional perspectives. 
Van Raaij and Stoelhorst (2008) have identified a threefold division in the market orientation 
literature: A behavioral perspective based on the definition given by Kohli and Jaworksi, a cultural 
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perspective predominantly built upon Narver and Slater’s definition and a perspective which 
attempts to integrate these two perspectives brought forward by Homburg and Pflesser. Kohli 
and Jaworski (1990) stress the importance of market intelligence that must be generated and 
disseminated. In their approach it is the presence of these intelligence generating and 
disseminating actions that determines whether or not a firm is market oriented. In Narver and 
Slater’s (1990) definition market orientation depends on the appropriate business culture that 
leads to market oriented behavior. Such behavior does not come by itself but is embedded in a 
culture that is aimed at the creation of superior value for customers. They relate this culture to 
three fundamental aspects of the firm: customer orientation, competitor orientation, and 
interfunctional coordination. Several synthesizing and integrating attempts have contributed to 
a better understanding of the concept of market orientation. Lafferty and Hult (2001), for 
example, have conceptualized market orientation in an synthesizing framework based on the 
general agreements between the five perspectives they identified. In an attempt to integrate the 
previous perspectives Homburg and Pflesser (2000) created a model in which Kohli and Jaworski’s 
organizational behavior is one layer in a multi-layered cultural framework. Van Raaij and 
Stoelhorst (2008) have constructed an integrative framework that does not simply attempt to 
describe the concept but also facilitates the implementation of a market oriented approach. 
2.2.1.1 Criticism and confirmation 
The concept of market orientation has not been without critique. Particularly the aspect of 
customer orientation stressed by Narver and Slater (1990) and Deshpande et al. (1993) has been 
criticized. MacDonald (1995), for example, has argued convincingly that in a business-to-business 
environment firms can become so obsessed with satisfying needs of existing customers that the 
suppliers and the customers’ innovation, logistics and strategic processes gradually become 
inextricably integrated. Getting so close to the customer may lead to a “too close for comfort” 
situation in which a firm fails to see other opportunities in other markets or industries. 
Christensen and Bower (1996) came to a similar conclusion in their study of the disk drive 
industry. They argue that industry leaders lost their leading positions because they listened too 
carefully to their customers, thus restricting their strategic options. What these studies have in 
common in their critique is the awareness that Von Hippel’s (1988) idea that following and 
understanding customers is beneficial for innovation and a source of new product concepts might 
not always hold true. Too much focus on existing customers and their existing needs in served 
markets leads to a kind of opportunity myopia. The threat to firms is that, as they get locked into 
a certain niche, they will be unable to exit the niche once it is no longer profitable. No niche lasts 
forever (Mazzoleni, 1999). 
To counter this critique, Narver and Slate (1998) introduced the concept of a “customer-led” firm. 
Conceptually there is a distinction between firms with a market-orientation and firms that are 
customer-led. They acknowledge the apparent shortcomings that Christensen, McDonalds and 
others have raised about firms that are too much focused on their customers, are too reactive 
and have a predominantly short-term focus. In their view these firms are not market oriented but 
customer-led. This type of firms focuses on measuring existing and expressed customer desires 
and needs. According to Narver and Slater a market oriented firm is also concerned about 
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customers’ latent needs. Also, market oriented firms use more than one source - not just the 
customer - in their quest for information. Another difference they make in distinguishing 
customer-led from market-oriented firms is that the latter are aiming to find unserved markets 
while the former focus on existing markets. 
A final observation made by Narver and Slater (1999) is that being market oriented may not be 
easy to achieve, but it does not need to be expensive. With this statement they address the 
assumption that only large companies would have the resources to be market oriented. It has 
been shown that market oriented small and medium-sized firms also exist (Pelham & Wilson, 
1996).  
The idea that a market orientation may be beneficial to a firm has been supported by a multitude 
of studies. In a meta-analysis study based on 53 empirical studies in 23 countries Cano, Carrillat 
and Jaramillo (2004) come to the conclusion that there is a worldwide consistently positive 
relationship between market orientation and business performance. The worldwide applicability 
of this relationship is based on the finding that possible moderating variables such as cultural 
factors, GDP per capita and the Human Development Index do not play a significant role. Their 
data also suggest that the relationship is stronger for service firms than for manufacturing firms. 
Kirca, Jayachandran and Bearden (2005), in contrast found that in manufacturing firms the 
relation between market orientation and performance is stronger than in service firms, but they 
agree to the general conclusion that market orientation is beneficial for business performance. 
Henderson (1998) has questioned several of the studies included in the meta-analyses mentioned 
above, as well as the ontology of market orientation in general. Still it is clear than that a large 
body of studies shows that monitoring the outside world is essential for the success of firms. 
Market orientation positively contributes to the development of new products and to the 
discovery of new opportunities, and thus contributes to the innovativeness of firms. Simply said: 
successful innovative firms have, beside other essential characteristics such as entrepreneurship, 
creativity and organizational learning, an external orientation (Hult & Ketchen, 2001).  
2.2.1.2 Market-orientation in a process perspective 
Another accepted view of market orientation is to approach it from a -market- information 
processing perspective. In such a perspective information about the outside world is the key 
element around which the whole concept of market orientation evolves. Kohli and Jaworski 
(1990) refer to this crucial element as market intelligence, which must be generated by, and 
disseminated throughout the firm. 
Slater and Narver (1994) speak of a market driven organization when its culture is focused on 
systematically collecting and coordinating external information to be used in creating value for 
the customer. Shapiro (1988) considers the ability to acquire and utilize information on all 
important factors that influence buyer behavior as the key characteristic of a market-oriented 
firm. George Day (1994) introduced the term market sensing which he defined in exactly the same 
terms as Kohli and Jaworski in their definition of market intelligence gathering. He regards market 
sensing as a sequence of learning processes or activities. First information must be acquired, then 
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distributed, thirdly interpreted and finally it must be utilized (Day, 1994). In a later article Day 
(2002) divided this market sensing into a market-sensing process, which involves information 
acquisition and distribution, and a sense-making process which includes the interpretation and 
the utilization of the information. Sinkula (1994) proposes a market orientation perspective in 
which the focus is on the processing of market information grounded in the theories of 
organizational learning. According to Sinkula, the rich literature of organizational learning shows 
similar purposes to that of market orientation and it can be used for a better understanding of 
how organizations process their market information. The concept of market information 
processing in this perspective encompasses the acquisition, distribution, interpretation and 
storage of market information. 
This processing of market information happens all the time in the corporate world. Managers are 
confronted with a relentless stream of fuzzy input as well as hard data from the outside world, 
which they need to process. They are always scanning their environment. However, managers 
from a market oriented organization are more active scanning their environment for new 
opportunities (Day, 2002). Likewise, at the level of organizations all firms acquire external 
information about trends, events and opportunities through scanning the environment (Day, 
1994). Market-oriented firms are doing this in a more thoughtful and systematic manner (Day, 
1994). An increase of market intelligence-related activities has often been seen as the transition 
from an intuitive manner of decision making to a more scientific manner in which managers rely 
on an orderly and logical approach in gathering information instead of relying only on personal 
knowledge and past experiences. In this sense, market intelligence is a premium ingredient for 
better decision making (Ferrell , Dibb, Simkin, & Pride, 1991). What becomes clear from the 
market orientation literature is that external information or market intelligence must go 
sequentially through three main stages in order to be beneficial to the firm. Firstly, information 
from the outside world must be gathered, then distributed to where it is needed in the 
organization and finally it must be used (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Slater & Narver, 1999; Ruekert, 
1992; Deshpande, Farley, & Webster , 1993; Day, 1994). 
A final feature that emerges from the literature is the need to have an organization-wide 
approach towards market orientation. At the heart of the market oriented approach lies the 
notion that not only the marketing and sales departments should be involved in gathering 
external information but the whole organization should be focused on gathering, dispersing and 
using market intelligence (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). Other functional entities of the firm, such as 
R&D, procurement, accounting, management or even shop-floor employees should be involved 
as well. It is a market-oriented, not a marketing-oriented concept as Shapiro (1998) argues. It is 
his conviction that market orientation encompasses a set of processes that “touch all aspects of 
the company”. Market information should permeate every firm’s function, moving beyond 
market research, sales and marketing departments, and directors; R&D scientists and engineers, 
manufacturing people and field service specialists are just as important. This linkage between the 
sales and marketing domain and the technological core of the firm is of importance because often 
technologists do not transform their technical insight into business opportunities. There is a gap 
to be bridged between the technologists and those blessed with commercial sensibility because 
it is at the nexus of the external market intelligence and the knowledge of one’s own technologies 
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that genuine New Business Opportunities are being identified (Rice, Kelley, Peters, & O'Conner, 
2001). Particularly Slater and Narver (1990) have stressed the importance of this interfunctional 
coordination.  
2.2.1.3 The organizational implications of market orientation 
Several methods that encourage firm-wide gathering, distribution and usage of external 
information are mentioned by Shapiro (1988) such as cross functional meetings (not teams!), 
firm-wide full access to market research reports and joint opportunity analysis in which people 
of different departments and functions share and discuss ideas. Kohli and Jaworski mention 
informal “hall talk as an extremely powerful tool for keeping employees tuned to customers and 
their needs” (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990, p. 5). Telling stories and anecdotes is another method to 
distribute information about customers and their needs throughout the firm letting secretaries, 
engineers and production personnel getting to know the customer (Kohli & Jaworski, 1996). In 
other words, a market orientation is increased by interdepartmental communication, in the sense 
of formal or informal contacts between individual employees across different departments, 
leading to greater sharing and usage of information (Kennedy, Goolsby, & Arnould, 2003). 
Next to sharing external information the gathering of market intelligence is an activity which 
should not be monopolized by the marketing department. An obvious candidate for the job of 
gathering information outside the firm is the sales department. As the sales and account 
managers are the ones who visit the (potential) customers regularly it seems obvious that they 
gather a tremendous amount of market intelligence. However, despite that they are a rich source 
of such information, they are not always included in the formal market intelligence gathering 
activities. Ideally they should be treated as a strategic source of external information and work in 
close coordination with the marketing department (Piercy & Lane, 2003; Le Meunier-FitzHugh & 
Piercy, 2006; Rouzies, et al., 2005).  
Though sales and marketing are the most obvious interfaces of the firm with the external world, 
other channels for the acquisition of external information can be identified. Other individuals and 
departments may gather external information as well, for example: (R&D) engineers visiting 
scientific conferences, top management reading trend reports, engineers communicating directly 
with customers assessing their needs and as such identifying new opportunities, and individuals 
exclusively responsible for studying trends and forces in the economy (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). 
Shapiro (1988) enumerates a similar array of functions adding field-service specialists as well. 
Engineers visiting trade shows to come in direct contact with customers and competitors is 
another example of a non-sales or marketing officer interfacing with the outside world. Slater 
and Narver note that “any individual in any function of the seller firm can potentially contribute 
to the creation of value for buyers” (Slater & Narver, 1994, p. 23), because each activity in the 
customer’s value chain is a potential opportunity to create value for that customer (Porter, 1985). 
Their vision for a truly market-oriented organization is one where the marketing department has 
become less important because all other departments are involved with the marketing function: 
“the crux is that the responsibility for superior buyer value is beyond that of any function“ (Slater 
& Narver, 1994, p. 24). This view is not exclusively stated by the market orientation literature but 
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echoes of Webster’s (1988) idea of making marketing management responsible for making the 
entire firm market-driven and customer focused. 
Overall, the market orientation concept states firstly that external information or market 
intelligence is of importance for the innovativeness and for the sustained competitive advantage 
of the firm. Secondly, a market oriented firm performs three principle activities: the gathering of 
market information, the distribution of that information, and the usage of it. Finally, for a true 
market orientation the whole organization should be aligned towards gathering, distributing and 
using market intelligence. These three generally accepted principles from the market orientation 
literature form the theoretical foundation of the first component of the NBE function framework. 
2.2.1.4 The external focus of market orientation 
Earlier we discussed the critique that the market orientation approach is focused too much on 
the customer. In this section we will elaborate a related criticism, which argues that even true 
market oriented firms may have a too narrow external focus and that a broader external focus is 
needed. It is true that implicitly the external focus of market orientation has been described as 
rather broad by many authors. Kohli and Jaworski define their core concept of market intelligence 
in a relatively broad manner, in which next to customers also “exogenous market factors that 
affect customer needs and preferences” are included (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990, p. 3). However, 
despite this seemingly broad view the whole concept of market orientation in Kohli’s and 
Jaworski’s articles breathes a restricted focus. Slater and Narver (1990) too have a strong 
customer orientation in their framing of the concept. It is one of the three behavioral components 
they identify, next to competitor orientation and interfunctional coordination. They stretch the 
customer orientation into a focus on the whole value chain of the customer including the 
customers of the customer and the suppliers of the customer. Also, they express a broader view 
on market orientation by explicitly seeing the competitor as a separate component as well. In a 
later publication they refer to three types of external information which must be collected: 
customer information, competitor information and other market information. Surprisingly 
enough the latter is not further elaborated upon (Slater & Narver, 1994). In 1995 they become 
more explicit about an even wider approach of the concept when they refer briefly to the dangers 
of a too narrow construction of market orientation: “A business must be careful not to 
underestimate the potential contributions of other learning sources such as suppliers, business in 
different industries, consultants, universities, government agencies, and others that possess 
knowledge valuable to the business” (Slater & Narver, 1995, p. 68). However, despite these often 
implicit broader views of the external world in both Kohli and Jaworski’s and Slater and Narver’s 
proposals, the customer and the competitors remain the most important elements to focus on.  
As the earlier described critiques have shown, many researchers interpreted the market 
orientation concept in such a narrow sense that the risk of focusing too closely on the customer 
remains. Despite the semantics of what is written explicitly and implicitly, and what is exactly 
meant by customer focus, these approaches have in common that they imply that understanding 
one’s customers and competitors is enough to have complete knowledge of the whole industry 
one operates in. Heiens (2000), for example, conceptualizes the market orientation construct 
with customer focus and competitor focus as building blocks. With these two building blocks a 
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market orientation matrix is developed consisting of four distinct strategic types of market 
orientation. The customer preoccupied type has a high customer focus and a low competitor 
focus, while the marketing warrior shows opposite focus points; low customer focus, high 
competitor focus. Firms that have no focus are referred to as strategically inept, while those that 
focus on both the customer and the competitor are labelled strategically integrated. This 
perspective on market orientation is an example of the overall picture that emerges from the 
literature: as a concept market orientation remains primarily focused on the customer and the 
competitor as the main external elements that must be observed while all the broader views that 
have been brought forward generally remain implicit and unobserved. 
Modern organizations, however, need a wider perspective on their environment because it is by 
scanning the broad environment that New Business Opportunities can be revealed (Yasai-
Ardekani & Nystrom, 1996). Therefore, a firm should focus on more than just its customers and 
competitors. We refer to this as the environmental orientation of a firm. This environmental 
orientation can be regarded as the next step going beyond market orientation in the evolutionary 
market orientation framework presented by Biemans and Brenčič (2007). By measuring seven 
dimensions - management focus, time horizon, role of sales, role of marketing, importance of 
manufacturing, use of network, and organizational culture - they have identified four 
evolutionary stages in moving towards a market oriented organization. In the first stage of 
product orientation the management focus is on products and process optimization while the 
sale function focuses on the selling of existing products. Marketing hardly plays any role of 
importance and the firm is very oriented towards technology and production which is often done 
in-house like most other functions. The firm is very self-reliant and solitary, its course of action is 
hardly affected by the outside world. In the second, sales orientation stage the firm starts 
developing a network of partners. Understanding customers’ buying behaviors and adaptation to 
these becomes the main focus. The culture revolves around getting orders. The outside world 
consists mainly of customers in this stages. In the third stage the firm is becoming marketing 
orientated by establishing a formal marketing function. Sales has a role in understanding the 
customer needs, while marketing has still just a sales supporting role. The general culture of the 
organization is to get out there and to understand the customer needs. The last stage is a true 
market orientation featuring a customer focus throughout the whole organization. The sales role 
is to create value for the customer, and marketing creates value for customers rather than merely 
responding to their current needs. This last orientation has in contrast with the previous two 
orientations both an inward and an outward orientation. In this final stage the whole organization 
is involved in understanding current and future customer needs and creating value for the 
customers. However, even in the fourth stage of this evolutionary framework the focus is still 
very much on existing and potential customers in existing markets. In order to be able to find 
New Business Opportunities as defined for this study – new potential sets of customers in new 
markets - firms need an even wider perspective on their environment. Studies have shown that 
successful firms often have a wider scope of environmental scanning than less successful firms 
(Miller, 1987). As described earlier, many studies have implicitly a wider view than the labels 
customer orientation and competitor focus suggest. For example, Biemans and Brenčič give a hint 
of possible other elements in the environment that can and should be monitored as well by 
stating that a true market-oriented organization has a “..holistic supply chain orientation…” 
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(Biemans & Brenčič, 2007, p. 270). In such an orientation the customer’s customers and its 
suppliers become points of interest as well. Following this logic we expect truly environment 
oriented firms to extend their scanning horizons to the element at the end of the industrial 
production chain: the consumer. Overall, firms should monitor their own industrial value chain 
from top to bottom. 
Moreover, for firms to be able to identify New Business Opportunities in other industries it seems 
logical that information beyond their own industrial production chain is needed. Firms with a 
genuine environmental orientation should monitor therefore carefully several types of trends 
that are not directly related to their own business or even to their own industry. Trends may be 
the source for New Business Opportunities. Trends can and must be distinguished from fads by 
several distinct characteristics. Firstly, unlike fads, trends have a significant impact on society, 
economy and (consumer) behavior; secondly, trends have a more durable and sustained 
character; and thirdly, trends transcend individual industries and as such can be discernible 
across many industries. Altogether, because of these characteristics, trends unveil glimpses of 
the future for those who carefully monitor and interpret them (Kotler & Keller, 2012). Trends can 
be categorized in many different categories such as: consumer trends, technology trends, social 
trends, cultural trends, demographical trends, political trends etc. Dibb et al. (1991) refer to 
environmental forces instead of trends as focus point for environmental scanning (Ferrell , Dibb, 
Simkin, & Pride, 1991). Their segmentation of the business environment in legal, regulatory, 
societal, economical, and technological forces however, is similar to that of Kotler and Keller 
(2012). 
2.2.2 Core competences and the resource-based view of the firm 
In the previous section we reviewed the theoretical ideas that revolve around the concept of 
market orientation. The models and frameworks developed in this stream of literature gave us 
an insight into why and how firms scan their surroundings. For the second component of our 
framework we will look at the strength of firms themselves. For this, the body of literature 
generally referred to as the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm will be explored. The RBV 
attempts to explains how firm resources can lead to sustained competitive advantage (SCA) 
(Barney, 1991). Before we discuss the origins, development, related theories and the basic 
concepts of the RBV, a closer look at the concept of SCA is appropriate. 
2.2.2.1 Sustained Competitive advantage 
Despite the fact that the SCA concept is at the center of strategic management thinking, a clear 
definition of the concept is still not readily available (Rumelt, 2003, Hoffman 2000, Klein 2001). 
Each researcher seems to have his own definition of what SCA means. Porter (1985), introduced 
the term in its current usage arguing that CA can be achieved by following either a low costs 
strategy, a differentiation advantage strategy, or a successful focus strategy, but he offers no 
formal definition of the concept. Peteraf (1993) defines competitive advantage as “sustained 
above normal rents” caused by imperfectly mobile resources that can be sources of competitive 
advantage. Barney comes close to a formal definition when he states that "a firm is said to have 
a sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not 
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors and when these other 
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firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy" (Barney, 1991, p. 102). This definition 
is reframed 11 years later as: “a firm experiences competitive advantages when its actions in an 
industry or market create economic value and when few competing firms are engaging in similar 
actions.” (Barney, 2002, p. 9).  
Being ill-defined made the concept of (S)CA open to criticism. Rumelt (2003) is particularly critical, 
calling for a clear definition of the concept or otherwise researchers in the area of strategic 
management studies should stop employing it. It can be argued that Hoffman already presented 
such a formal working definition in 2000. She developed a definition on the neutral basis of 
Webster’s dictionary definitions of the terms competitive, advantage and sustained. After 
reformulating or translating these dictionary definitions into a business specific context she 
formulates the following definition: “An SCA is the prolonged benefit of implementing some 
unique value-creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors along with the inability to duplicate the benefits of this strategy” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 
257). This in essence is almost the same definition as Barney gave in 1991. Rumelt’s critique itself 
is a clear echo of Klein (2001), who is also very critical about the concept, which he rightly sees 
as having become commonplace in every conversation, paper, book and report in the 
management sciences. He criticizes not only the lack of a formal definition but goes so far as to 
state that the concept is most of the times being presented in a tautological fashion: “The secret 
to success is competitive advantage” which is however not defined “in any other way than the 
quality that brings about success” (Klein, 2001, p.2). A similar circular reasoning Klein detects with 
Barney’s definition (Klein, 2001). Though Klein’s critique cannot be put aside easily he also makes 
clear the concept has become so much commonplace in management science that one cannot 
dismiss it all the way.  
It seems to us that there is such a thing as an competitive advantage. It is however not an inherent 
quality of a firm which can be managed. It is a term that addresses the relative position a firm 
and/or its products have in the market place compared to its (potential) competitors. In contrast 
to the general view that competitive advantage equals having success, we propose that 
competitive advantage may lead to success (i.e. performing better than the competition). As such 
competitive advantage is not a guarantee nor a synonym for firm success. It is rather a 
comparative description of a firm’s competitive position in the market.  
2.2.2.2 The resource-based view of the firm – the basic idea 
Until the birth and rise of the RBV in the late eighties of the 20th century firm performance and 
success were mainly attributed to market and industrial forces outside the control of the firm. In 
this Industrial Organization (IO) view the performance of firms was the result of the conduct of 
firms in a specific industry. This conduct was determined by the market structure of the industry. 
This has also been called the ‘structure, conduct and performance’ paradigm. Michael Porter’s 
(1985) “five forces” model describing industry structure has stood the test of time and is still 
included in the strategic thinking and generic strategic management textbooks. The RBV came 
into fashion as a reaction to this static, equilibrium framework of IO economic theory and explains 
sustained competitive advantage (i.e. performance) from internal firm-specific resources rather 
than market structures. The RBV acknowledges that competing firms within a specific market or 
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industry have heterogeneous strategic resources that are not easily transferred between firms 
(Barney, 1991). In laymen’s terms: some firms outperform other firms simply because they have 
a trick up their sleeve which has value for customers that other firms don’t have. This focus on 
firm resources is the essence of Wernerfelt’s 1984 article which is often seen as the birth of this 
school of thought. In this article, which Wernerfelt rightly saw “as the first cut at a huge can of 
worms”, firms were described in terms of their resources instead of products. This was assumed 
to open up new strategic options for diversification. Unique strategic resources instead of unique 
products were seen as the basis from which firms could launch themselves into new markets in 
other industries (Wernerfelt, 1984). Therefore, according to Wernerfelt finding New Business 
Opportunities can be based on such firm-specific internal resources. This logic links the second 
component (gathering information about internal technological resources and capabilities) of our 
framework to this RBV school of thought.  
Since the start of the RBV there has been discussion about the nature of the resources involved. 
Barney had defined resources as “all assets, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991, p. 101). 
Wernerfelt (1984) defines resources as tangible and intangible assets that are semi-permanently 
tied to a firm. In his view such assets can be anything from brand names, technological 
knowledge, skilled personnel, trade contracts, machinery to efficient routines and capital. In the 
following sections we will explore the idea of such resources in more depth as the debate about 
it has spawned various sub-streams within the RBV literature. 
2.2.2.3 Resource-based view of the firm – Characteristics 
Although different authors emphasize different characteristics there is a certain overlap and 
general consensus about what the characteristics of resources should be. Barney (1991) states 
that firm assets that are to be considered as resources – which lead to SCA - should at least be 
valuable, meaning they enable a firm to device and implement strategies that improve firm 
performance. These valuable resources are those assets that make it possible for firms to exploit 
external Market Opportunities because these assets are creating value for the customer of the 
firm. The second characteristic he describes is the rareness of the resource. If all competitors 
have the same valuable resource it will not lead to SCA (Barney, 1991). Therefore, the resource 
should be relatively rare meaning that none or not many other firms in the market or industry 
should be able to employ the same valuable resource. Valuable resources are thus firm specific. 
The third characteristic introduced by Barney (1991) is the notion that resources should be 
imperfectly imitable. Valuable and rare resources only lead to SCA if they remain rare. 
Competitors should therefore not be able to buy or imitate them. He relates this imperfect 
mobility to the historical roots of the resources. He describes another cause for imperfect 
mobility: causal ambiguity. If competing firms do not know which resources cause sustained 
competitive advantage, the resources are hard to imitate because it is unclear which resources 
to imitate. The reason for such causal ambiguity is the complexity of the relationship between 
resources and SCA. The third reason why resources can be imperfectly mobile is social 
complexity. Sometimes a rare valuable resource is embedded in complex social ties such as 
customer relations or supplier relationships. Such social phenomena are in general difficult to 
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manage or to influence and therefore hard to imitate. The last characteristic Barney (1991) 
describes is imperfect substitutability, which seems quite similar to that of imperfect imitability. 
It indicates that the resource is not just difficult to imitate, but also difficult to replace by some 
other resource. One can describe at length the differences between these two criteria but the 
basic idea behind them remains the same: an asset should be relatively unique for a firm in order 
to be considered as a SCA enhancing resource.  
Writing in the same year, Grant (1991) proposed a similar set of characteristics. He presents a 
RBV approach to strategy development that rests on a distinction between resources and 
capabilities. Resources are in his opinion “input into the production process”. They can include 
anything from capital goods to skills of individual employees and from patents to brand names 
and finances. Capabilities are a couple of resources working together in a specific combination. 
While resources are the sources for capabilities, capabilities are the sources for competitive 
advantage. Grant links capabilities to the idea of organizational routines of Nelson and Winter 
(1982) stating that ”capabilities are a routine or several related routines working together” 
(Grant, 1991, p.122). Grant and Barney have a similar idea of what resources, assets and 
capabilities are. Unfortunately and confusingly, however, they do not use the same wording and 
definitions: what Barney defines as an asset, Grant describes as a resource and what Barney labels 
as a resource is called a capability by Grant. Both, however, see a two-layer hierarchy in the 
sources of SCA. Also the characteristics Grant describes are in essence the same but differ in 
wording. While Barney speaks of imperfect imitability and substitutability, Grant uses the terms 
transferability and replicability. Grant’s third characteristic is transparency which revolves around 
the same idea as what Barney describes with causal ambiguity: if the relationship between 
resources, capability and competitive advantage is complex, it is difficult for a competitor to 
replicate and/or to imitate. Grant’s final characteristic, durability, that sets capabilities apart from 
resources (i.e. resources from assets in Barney’s vocabulary) stands out when compared to 
Barney’s list of characteristics. According to Grant, capabilities tend to have a longer durability 
than firm resources. While longevity is implicitly incorporated in Barney’s framework, Grant 
makes it more explicit.  
Peteraf (1993) defines some fundamental notions of the RBV by moulding previous work, 
including that of Barney and Grant, into four conditions that must be met to “enjoy sustained 
above-normal returns”. Her first condition deals with the basic assumption of the RBV that firms 
are heterogeneous in matters of resources and capabilities and that this leads to “above normal 
revenues”. The second condition, which she refers to as ex post limits to competition, combines 
the two notions of imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability as defined by Barney. 
These ex post limits to competition preclude that rents are being competed away in the long run. 
To make sure the valuable resources stay within the firm Peteraf prescribes as a third condition 
the idea of imperfect mobility which is similar to Grant’s transferability and replicability. Her final 
condition, ex ante limits to competition, needs to be in place in order to ensure that costs will not 
outweigh the rents.  
Overall, there is a broad consensus about the basic idea of the RVB and the essential 
characteristics which distinguish those resources that eventually should lead to a state of 
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sustained competitive advantage of the firm. A specific type of resources is the explaining variable 
of firm performance in an industry made up of heterogeneous firms. Such distinct resources are 
firm-specific because they are rare or unique to the firm and are not easily transferable. Also no 
other resources that could act as substitutes exist.  
Though its heydays were between 1984 and the mid-1990s, the resource-based view of is still 
after 25 years one of the most influential theories in the field of management studies 
(Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010). The attraction of the RBV is that it has been presented 
as a complementary theory next to strategic management research of the late eighties, the 
industrial economics stream of thought and industrial organization literature (Mahoney & 
Pandian, 1992). It was always intended as an addition not as replacement. In a retrospective 
article Barney (2001) argues that the RBV also can be seen as a complementary theory to the 
neo-classical microeconomics and evolutionary economics streams of literature. Also, the fact 
that the core ideas of the RBV were not something completely new but based on ideas and 
concepts that already had a long history in strategic management thinking made it acceptable, 
plausible and attractive (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). For example, Penrose’s (1959) “The theory 
of the growth of the firm”, in which firm-specific resources play a central role, is often seen as 
the precursor of this school of thought long before the term RBV was in fashion (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). But above all the RBV is an elegant and simple perspective with 
a core message that is appealing and easily understood (Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010). 
2.2.2.4 Core competences 
It should be realized that the RBV is not a theory in the academic sense of the word. As sketched 
above it is a central idea of how firms can achieve sustained competitive advantage by use of 
certain firm specific resources accompanied by a set of characteristics that define what such 
unique resources should look like. Over the years these two fundamentals have served as a 
starting point for management researchers and economists to further develop insights into how 
sustained competitive advantage can be achieved. As such the RBV is an umbrella-concept under 
which several schools of thought, some overlapping, some complementary, have developed over 
time. One idea that has stood the test of time is the concept of core competence. Brought to 
fashion in 1990 by Hamel and Prahalad the phrase “back to core business” still lingers in many 
board rooms, management conversations and consulting reports. When they wrote their classic 
article, “The core competence of the corporation” (1990), in which they describe the idea of core 
competence, Hamel and Prahalad specifically had the diversifying firm in mind. Carefully studying 
two case firms in the IT business - NEC and GTE – they came to the conclusion that NEC had been, 
in contrast to GTE, successful in diversifying, meaning that NEC had been able to invent new 
markets and quickly enter emerging markets (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). This successful 
exploration and exploitation of new markets in new industries was possible because of NEC’s 
focus on a portfolio of competencies instead of on a portfolio of businesses. NEC’s diversification 
strategy, in which new products for a new sets of customers were being developed that had 
technological synergies with existing products (or product-lines), is often referred to as 
concentric diversification. This type of diversification is characterized by the existence of core 
competences. Adjacent businesses are sought in which these core competences can be 
leveraged. Effective concentric diversification based on core competences can lead to sustained 
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competitive advantage and to improved business performance (Rijamampianina, Abratt, & 
February, 2003). The idea of core competences as wellspring or engine of New Business 
Development was born (Bakker, Jones, & Nichols, 1994). 
Although Hamel and Prahalad (1990) provide a lively picture of the idea of core competence by 
comparing the diversified firm with a tree in which the leaves are the end-products, the major 
limbs the core products (product-lines) and the roots the core competences, their article does 
not contain a formal definition. Such a formal definition was provided in their main work, the 
book “Competing for the future”, in which they define core competence as “a bundle of skills and 
technologies that enables a company to provide a particular benefit to customers” (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1994, p. 219). That the complexity involved in coordinating bundles of resources rather 
than an individual resource might form the basis for SCA is also stressed by Barney (1991) and 
Grant (1991). With its focus on skills and technologies, intangible assets and the potential benefits 
for the customer Prahalad and Hamel’s idea of core competences fits perfectly in the RBV 
framework. Hamel and Prahalad’s approach however is much more prescriptive and pragmatic 
than it is theoretical and conceptual. For our framework, their most important contribution is the 
description of three “tests” to distinguish core competences from “regular resources”. These test 
criteria resemble the characteristics described by Barney (1991), Grant (1991) and Peteraf (1993).  
The first test criterion states that a core competence must be able to create customer value 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). This customer element makes it clear that there is always a relation 
between the internal core competences and the environment. In this study we will describe and 
use the concept of core competencies as being an isolated phenomenon that lies deep inside the 
firm; however, we acknowledge the fact that the concept of a core competence is by definition 
related to the external market place. The second criterion is that the core competence should 
have the property of extendibility, which means that the firm should be able to leverage the 
competence into other markets and products (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). This criterion opens up 
the way for the idea of core competences as a source for New Business Opportunities. The third 
criterion is competitor differentiation, meaning it should not be easy to imitate for the 
competition (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). It is this criterion that represents the notion that the core 
competencies are at the heart of competitive advantage; being able to manufacture a product or 
deliver a service the competition cannot. These criteria can be used as a final reality check to 
determine if the identified resources are true core competencies. If we regard the “customer 
value criterion” as an obvious and therefore somewhat superfluous criterion, core competences 
can be characterized as hard to imitate abilities that can be leveraged into new markets and 
industries.  
Despite this triple test the main challenge for firms remains to identify what their own core 
competences are. The early works of the RBV and core competence literature advocate 
developing unique resources but lack a description of how this should be done. Several authors 
have attempted to formulate templates, frameworks or phased approaches to guide firms to 
identify their core competences, but no general consensus has been reached about the most 
appropriate approach (Tampoe, 1994; Javidan, 1998; Walsh & Linton, 2001). Bakker, Jones and 
Nicholson (1994) have embedded a three step approach of identifying core competences in a 
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structured NBD program. Their approach is essentially a qualitative research method in which 
both internal and external experts are being interviewed in order to establish a list of core 
competences. By including feedback sessions this approach does not only claim to extract the 
core competences but also to create a basis for internal acceptance. By including external 
interviewees the “external acceptance” is secured as well. An important limitation of this 
relatively open and semi-structured approach is the implicit assumption that core competences 
are already known to a degree by the interviewees and are fairly easy to extract by simply 
interviewing them. Snyder and Ebeling (1992) have argued that core competences should be 
derived in an analytic and rigorous manner just as in business process reengineering. They see 
core competences rooted in “tangible value added activities” which are unique and enduring. 
Despite this promising statement, their method does not thoroughly explore the insight that 
identifying core competences should start at assessing the value adding activities of the firm. For 
our purposes their main “take away” is the focus on (top-) management involvement and the 
leveraging of the core competences internally, effectively stressing the importance of internal 
support and acceptance.  
Tampoe (1994) also draws attention to the involvement of top management in the identification 
of core competences by stating that management often takes core competences for granted and 
sometimes never endeavors to understand their true sources of SCA. If managers do explore their 
firm’s core competences, however, personal bias may present itself as a true barrier. Despite the 
insight that end-products and existing markets may also act as mental barriers in this explorative 
process Tampoe’s explorative framework starts at the existing end-products. He presents a 
reverse engineering process that starts with identifying key products via revenue analysis. These 
core products are being further dissected into constituent parts such as technology, people skills, 
processes and strategic assets which together produce these core products. From these 
decomposed elements the core competences should reveal themselves. Though this reversed 
engineering process is elegantly systematic, the final step - from decomposed sub-components 
to core competences - is not described in full detail.  
Javidan (1998) takes an approach in which the idea of decomposing and the technique of 
interviewing are combined. First he introduces a hierarchy of building blocks of core competences 
which he stresses is of importance because of the need for an universal language in matters of 
core competences. At the lowest level are resources which can be tangible and intangible and 
which can be divided into physical, human or organizational resources. At the second level are 
the capabilities, which denote the ability of a firm to exploit its resources. In essence capabilities 
are business processes and routines which he defines as “a set of activities that transform input 
into output” (Javidan, 1998, p. 62). At the third level these capabilities, which are functionally 
based, become cross-functionally integrated and coordinated by competences. These 
competences are seen as SBU (strategic business unit) specific. Core competences are those 
competences that are being shared across SBUs. This SBU mindset is a drawback of this model as 
it applies to large firms that are organized in SBUs. It almost seems that in this model SME’s don’t 
have core competences. Nevertheless, the systematic list of key questions that need to be 
answered is an promising method to identify core competences. It is primarily based on 
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interviewing key managers within the firm, but the use of workshops is also mentioned as a tool 
to identify core competences. 
Walsh and Linton (2001) compare an intuitive and a systematic method of core competence 
identification. They stress that the identification of core competences is not easy, self-evident or 
obvious, but difficult due to the complex, hierarchical and multi-dimensional nature of core 
competences. In order to deal with this complexity, they have developed the competence 
pyramid framework. This framework breaks the concept of core competences down into several 
different sub-categories of fabrication and assembly, materials, knowledge-based services and 
knowledge-embedded services. It also makes a distinction between technical competences and 
managerial capabilities. In contrast to the approaches described above, this framework starts the 
exploration of a firm’s competences in the external environment of the firm. By analyzing 
industry forecasts, technical roadmaps, trade publications, production processes of leading firms 
in the industry and interviewing industry experts essential technical competences of a specific 
industry are identified. This list of competences is then used by firm management and external 
“experts” such as customers, suppliers and competitors of the firm to determine which 
competences the firm possesses (Walsh & Linton, 2002). If this bundle of competences can 
provide for SCA in other industries, they can be considered as core competences. The main 
contribution of this approach is the linkage of the core competences to the external environment 
by the explicit inclusion of external sources in the process of identifying internal core 
competences.  
Hafeez et al. (2002) suggest an approach that identifies core competences through value analysis 
by means of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) method. Based on the Balanced Score Card 
framework (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), financial and non-financial performance measures are being 
determined. Then firm capabilities are mapped at a functional level. Subsequently, by using the 
AHP method the performance contributions of each of the capabilities to each of the 
performance measures is determined. Finally, from the results of this AHP exercise the core 
competences are derived. Though this method does bring forward key capabilities in a very 
systematic and straightforward manner, it does not always lead to identifying core competences 
as defined by Hamel and Prahalad. Because it bypasses the test criteria of being unique and being 
able to be leveraged into other industries this framework assesses the firm capabilities relative 
to each other internally but not the relative position of the capabilities in its industry. Again, 
however, this approach shows that it is possible to identify core competences by decomposing 
business processes into tangible “chunks”. A similar decomposition approach is presented by 
Yang et al. (2006) in their process-oriented core competence identification (POCCI) model. This 
model, which brings together existing tools such as value activity analysis in a standardized 
working procedure, does attempt to deliver more objective suggestions for core competences 
than other more subjective methods, but it is highly elaborate and complex to use.  
A final approach that deserves attention is that of Rangone (1999) who presents a method that 
is focused particularly towards SMEs. In five steps the SME must identify its strategic intent and 
its subsequent key performances. Followed by an assessment of the firm’s resources influencing 
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these key performances, core competences are derived by testing them along five test criteria: 
competitive superiority, imitability, duration, appropriability and substitutability. 
As the brief overview above has shown, the central idea of the RBV has survived more than two 
decades of debate: firm-specific internal resources explain firm success and performance better 
than external market structures or industry forces. However, various related terms and concepts 
are interpreted by researchers according to their own views. The terms assets, resources, 
competences, core competences, capabilities and key capabilities are all being used with 
different meanings and interpretations in all kinds of diverging hierarchical frameworks. A general 
consensus on definitions is missing, forcing each researcher to explicitly stipulate his own 
definitions or interpretations of the terms. Before we will explicate our own interpretation of the 
idea of core competence as used in this study, we need to address the concept of Dynamic 
Capabilities (DC). No concise overview of the RBV can do without mentioning this concept as it is 
the logical extension of the core competence concept.  
2.2.2.5 Dynamic capabilities 
Next to the critique that the RBV has not reached the status of a full scientific theory 
(Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010), another point of critique concerns its core proposition 
that unique resources can explain sustained competitive advantage. It has been argued that 
simply having such resources is not enough to achieve SCA but that being able to employ such 
resources is the crux of achieving sustained competitive advantage (Makadol, 2001; Barney & 
Peteraf, 2003). Some empirical evidence points in the same direction, suggesting other variables 
should be included to explain sustained competitive advantage. Changing environments can 
make core competences of today obsolete tomorrow. Firms that do not recognize such external 
dynamics are at risk of turning core competences into core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). This 
may be caused by the dominant logic - mental models created by positive experiences of the core 
competences - of top managers (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Bettis & Prahalad, 1995).  
In summary, the critique is that core competences are too static to explain sustained competitive 
advantage in a turbulent environment. In such dynamic environments firms need to be able to 
adapt their core competences and to create new ones. It is the ability to adapt to the changing 
environment that is considered to be the core capability of a firm. This reasoning, which is in a 
nutshell the launch pad of the concept of dynamic capabilities, is precisely the definition that 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen use for their concept of dynamic capabilities: “The firm’s ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments” (Teece, Pisano, & Schuen, 1997, p. 516). In this definition dynamic capabilities are 
a distinct second order category of resources that influence the first order category core 
competences. This was the next step in Teece’s and Pisano’s development of the concept of 
dynamic capabilities which were in an earlier stage still regarded as merely a “subset of the 
competences which allow the firm to create new products and processes, and respond to changing 
market circumstances” instead of a category of resources in its own right (Teece & Pisano, 1994, 
p. 541). 
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While Teece and Pisano conceptualize dynamic capabilities in a two-level hierarchy, Wang and 
Ahmed (2007) developed a three-level hierarchical framework of the concept, in which resources 
and core competences form the first two levels and dynamic capabilities form the highest, third 
echelon. In their view dynamic capabilities are in essence “a firm’s behavioural orientation in the 
adaption, renewal, reconfiguration and re-creation of resources, capabilities and core capabilities 
responding to external changes” (Wang & Ahmed, 2007, p. 43). Using a similar definition of 
dynamic capabilities “processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources and 
configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die”, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 
1107) have stressed the routine-like character of dynamic capabilities. They identify distinct 
routines such as product development, strategic decision making and reconfiguration of 
resources (competences) within a firm as dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
Winter has nuanced this need for dynamic capabilities as a necessary condition for change, 
arguing that it is very well possible for firms to adapt a the changing environment without 
dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003). Winter emphasizes that developing dynamic capabilities is 
costly and therefore not all firms will aspire to develop such routines. Consequently, firms are 
often “pushed into ‘firefighting’ mode” by external forces. This mode of change is fundamentally 
different from change achieved by usage of dynamic capabilities as it is not routine-based but 
based on ad hoc problem solving (Winter, 2003).  
Eisenhardt and Martin have widened the conceptual gap between core competences and 
dynamic capabilities further by arguing that the latter are not firm-specific. There are strikingly 
common key features between the dynamic capabilities of different firms. These commonalities 
are explained by the existence of more or less generic effective ways of dealing with specific 
organizational, interpersonal and technical issues often referred to as “best practices” 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Though Eisenhardt and Martin acknowledge that sustained 
competitive advantage is achieved not by dynamic capabilities themselves but by reconfiguring 
resources by managers who use dynamic capabilities, this reasoning has opened up the way for 
a quest into dynamic capabilities in the form of a single universal routine or a set of universal 
routines that guarantee firm success. Many studies have tried to define dynamic capabilities 
more rigorously and to concretize them by showing links with other branches of the management 
literature. Tushman and O’Reilly (2008) have identified ambidexterity as a dynamic capability, 
Zahra, Sapienza and Davidsson (2006) have linked dynamic capabilities to the characteristics of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. A similar study that links specific SME characteristics to the 
RBV, by Runyan, Huddleston and Swinney (2007), argues that reputation/brand identity are key 
resources for SMEs. Yu (2001) seeks to explain the SCA of small firms by arguing that 
entrepreneurship is a dynamic capability from an evolutionary perspective. Alvarez and Busenitz 
(2001) have extended the boundaries of the dynamic capabilities theory by including the 
individual cognitive capabilities of entrepreneurs. Though the RBV has hardly influenced the 
marketing faculties (Srivastava, Fahey, & Christensen, 2001), Day (1994) identifies market sensing 
and customer linking as distinctive capabilities. Davies and Brady (2000) have searched for 
dynamic capabilities in manufacturing firms’ Complex Product Systems (CoPS). Hobday, Davies 
and Prencipe (2005) have also looked at the CoPS industries and have identified system 
integration as the dynamic capability for firms in these industries. Zollo and Winter (2002) have 
linked the RBV to organizational learning. Also in the domain of organizational learning and 
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knowledge management, Berman, Down, & Hill (2002) in their study using data from the National 
Basketball Association have argued that tacit knowledge can be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage. Blum (2004) has argued that product development can and must be seen as a dynamic 
capability. Though this is far from a complete overview it shows that apparently dynamic 
capabilities can be found everywhere within the firm and that the nature of the “discovered” 
dynamic capability is directly related to the frame of reference and background of the researcher 
himself. Overall, although the core idea seems valid and consistent, there is ambiguity 
surrounding the concept of dynamic capabilities in matters of operationalization and current 
conceptualizations are still inconclusive and inconsistent (Wang & Ahmed, 2007).  
The problem of “infinite regress” might be seen as the main point of critique for the concept of 
dynamic capabilities. If dynamic capabilities explain the existence of core competences then the 
next question is where dynamic capabilities come from? Explaining the origin of one type or one 
order of resource begs for explaining the origins of all types and orders of resources. In other 
words; which resources, capabilities or competences explain the adaptation or birth of the 
dynamic capabilities of the firm? Once this is answered and conceptualized by means of a new, 
higher order category of resources this loop can be repeated ad infinitum (Priem & Butler, 2001). 
From this point of view the dynamic capabilities approach does not add to a better understanding 
of sustained competitive advantage but rather makes it more confusing by adding more 
abstractions and complexity. 
A final fundamental critique of the RBV in general has been raised by Priem and Butler. They 
argue that the RBV is not a scientific theory because it cannot be falsified due to its tautological 
reasoning and logic. They show that several fundamental statements in Barney’s work about 
resources, SCA, value and uniqueness are all phrased in a tautological manner. However, for a 
theory to be regarded as a genuine workable scientific theory it must be falsifiable, an attribute 
tautological statements lack. In summary, due to the tautological nature of its arguments the 
usefulness and validity of the RBV has often been a matter of debate (Priem & Butler, 2001; 
Lockett, Thompson, & Morgenstern, 2009; Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010). In a next 
section where we will explicate our framework in more detail we will present our position on the 
Resource-Based View of the firm, core competences and dynamic capabilities. 
2.2.3 Entrepreneurship & Opportunity identification 
The central theme of this study is the identification of opportunities. Because the study of 
recognizing opportunities is traditionally considered to be the key to understanding 
entrepreneurship (Muzyka, De Koning, & Churchill, 1995; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; 
Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003; Baron, 2006) and because entrepreneurship can be taken as a 
mechanism in which technical information is converted into products and services that fulfil 
market needs (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), the heart of our framework is based on this branch 
of innovation studies. Schumpeter (1934) already addressed the significant role of entrepreneurs 
in capitalism early in the 20th century. At that time, the research domain of entrepreneurship was 
still in its infancy (Buzenitz, et al., 2003). No consensus exists today about the exact boundaries 
of this research domain and clear definitions of concepts are often still missing; but it is a branch 
of business research that is growing and is gaining an increasing legitimacy. Busenitz et al. (2003) 
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have argued that entrepreneurship research should not limit itself to the study of -nature, 
sources and types of- opportunities nor to the characteristics of the individual entrepreneur but 
should position itself at the nexus of opportunities and enterprising individuals (entrepreneurs) 
or teams. In this study we follow this domain demarcation as we explore entrepreneurial 
activities of individuals and groups within firms and their efforts to identify opportunities in a 
wider context than their current industry. 
2.2.3.1 Two perspectives on opportunity identification 
Several authors observe a pattern in the research of opportunity identification and 
entrepreneurship. From meta-analyses of this growing body of literature it is concluded that on 
a fundamental level two perspectives on the nature of opportunities and the process of 
identification seem to emerge (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Vaghely & Julien, 2010; Zahra, 2008; 
Murphy, 2011; Alvarez & Barney, 2010). In essence these perspectives revolve around the 
question whether opportunities are objective entities “out there”, ready to be discovered by 
individual entrepreneurs, or that opportunities are subjective social constructions which are 
created by entrepreneurs (McMullen, Plummer, & Acs, 2007)1.  
According to Alvarez and Barney (2007) the discovery approach is the elder one and as such has 
received most attention among researchers. As a result this perspective can be considered as the 
more consistent and coherent theory, while the creation perspective, because of its more recent 
origins, still resembles a loose collection of ideas, concepts and frameworks. However, the latter 
approach shows an increasing and emerging internal consistency. In the discovery approach 
opportunities exist independent of the entrepreneur while in the creation perspective 
opportunities are social constructions that cannot exist independently from the entrepreneur. 
Independently existing opportunities in the discovery approach may be the result of competitive 
imperfections and disruptions in competitive equilibrium caused by changes in technology, 
consumer preferences, political regulations, or demographics (Shane, 2004; Alvarez & Barney, 
2007). Because discovery theory is predominantly about entrepreneurial search, scanning the 
environment plays an important role. In explaining why some individuals, mostly referred to as 
entrepreneurs, see these independent opportunities while others don’t, Alvarez and Barney 
(2007) cite both Kirzner (1973, 1979) and Shane (2004), who argue that entrepreneurs must have 
some special capabilities. This capability, which has been labelled entrepreneurial alertness 
(Kirzner 1973), has become a key concept in many studies supporting the discovery theory by 
unravelling and identifying the attributes that compose this alertness. 
Because opportunities are social constructs in the creation approach, entrepreneurs do not 
search but rather act upon “seeds of opportunity”. While disruptions of equilibriums in the 
environment are as such opportunities in the discovery theory, in the creation approach these 
changes are merely starting points for entrepreneurs to act upon. In this perspective 
entrepreneurs cannot see the “end from the beginning” and instead of a flash of insight an 
                                                                        
1 While the former perspective is most often referred to in terms of discovery approach or discovery theory 
of opportunity identification, the latter perspective goes around by several names or labels; constructionist, 
constructive, creation, or developing theory/approach. For reasons of clarity we will use the term creation if 
we refer to this latter perspective. Hence, the dichotomy we use is discovery versus creation. 
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iterative process of actions, reactions and evaluation unfolds until an opportunity will be fully 
developed (Alvarez & Barney, 2007).  
Barney and Alvarez (2007) also argue that decision making in the context of the creation theory 
is more uncertain than in discovery theory. This is because in creation theory opportunities do 
not exist until they are created and therefore information about the opportunity needed to 
predict future revenues and outcomes of the opportunity will not be available at the beginning 
of the identification process. In contrast, in the discovery theory this information will be available 
even before the opportunity is discovered.  
According to Alvarez and Barney (2007), both perspectives have the same power of explanation 
as “it will always be possible after an opportunity is formed to describe the actions of an 
entrepreneur in both ‘discovery’ and ‘creation’ terms”. A final point is that the perspective of an 
entrepreneur or of (the management of) a firm is of influence on how the activities of opportunity 
identification are being organized (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). If for example, the management of a 
firm predominantly has a discovery perspective it may very likely endeavor to organize for search 
activities outside the firm hoping to discover a New Business Opportunity outside the firm. 
This dichotomy seems to have gained general acceptance as more researchers follow up on it. 
Vaghely and Julien (2010) for example, have linked these two theories to an information 
processing perspective. In their view the discovery theory is rooted in cognitive psychology in 
which information processing relies on algorithmic, methodological problem solving schemes. 
Information in this theory is explicit, codifiable and formal and patterns in this type of information 
lead to New Business Opportunities. In their view, the creation perspective is based on 
development psychology: problems are being tackled by heuristic “trial-and-error” approaches. 
Interpretation and making sense of this information is the path to opportunity identification. In 
their proposed framework the entrepreneur makes use of both approaches in his identification 
of opportunities, switching constantly between the two approaches. 
Zahra (2008) develops the idea of entrepreneurs using both perspectives alternatively further by 
arguing that the switching from a discovery approach to a creation approach by entrepreneurs in 
their opportunity identification activities happens in a dynamic cycle in which a discovered 
opportunity forms the basis for the creation of numerous new opportunities. In contrast to 
Alvarez and Barney (2007), who argue that search is only of importance in the discovery 
perspective, Zahra (2008) proposes that search plays a significant role in both approaches. A 
difference is made, however, between passive search in the discovery perspective and proactive 
search in the creation perspective. The former kind of search is suggested to be more 
autonomous, atomistic, discrete in time, individualistic and serendipitous. The creation 
perspective kind of search can then be characterized as deliberate, planned, team based, and 
elaborate. The idea emerges that both perspectives are at the same time opposing and 
complementary to each other (Zahra, 2008). 
Murphy (2011) builds on these findings of Zahra and adds some observations of the two opposing 
streams of thought in matters of search. He refers to deliberate search versus discovery by 
serendipity. Fiet (1996) postulates that deliberate search is more effective in identifying 
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opportunities than discovering them by accident and serendipity. Kaish and Gilad (1991) arrived 
at a similar conclusion when they found that entrepreneurs do more deliberate search and as 
such find more opportunities than “regular” managers. In contrast, Shane (2000) presents 
opportunity discovery as an act of surprise and serendipity.  
Murphy (2011) extends this unidimensional framework into a two dimensional framework in 
which both the elements of deliberate search and serendipity are being split into two elements: 
high versus low deliberate search, and high versus low serendipity. This results in a two by matrix 
of four types of opportunities: Eureka (high serendipity/high deliberation), deliberate search (low 
serendipity/high deliberation), legacy (low serendipity/low deliberation) and serendipitous 
discovery (high serendipity/low deliberation). The main point of interest for this study is that both 
approaches –active, deliberate search and passively waiting for an accidental opportunity – have 
been argued to lead to the identification of opportunities.  
The observation that there is a kind of dualism in opportunity identification is of recent origin but 
is partially based on earlier thoughts and insights. In a literature review, Sarasvathy and 
Venkataraman, Dew and Velamuri (2002) identified three different views on entrepreneurial 
opportunity. In the allocation view, firms and individuals all have equal access to technology. An 
opportunity is the match between resources and market needs, and identifying opportunities is 
simply matching resources with market needs. Because all individuals have the same chance of 
identifying an opportunity, opportunity identification is a random process with a uniformly 
distributed pattern. In the discovery view, opportunities are the result of asymmetrical 
information distribution. In this perspective not all individuals are equal in their ability to identify 
opportunities. Those individuals we refer to as entrepreneurs seem to be better suited in the 
discovery of opportunities. This discovering of opportunities is not so much an act of resource 
allocation but rather an act of utilizing imperfections in the economic system. In the third, 
creation view, opportunities do not exist before they are recognized or discovered. They come 
into existence by a social process taking place between several individual stakeholders 
(Sarasvathy, Venkataraman, Dew, & Velamuri, 2002).  
The overall picture that emerges from these meta-studies is that both perspectives have their 
merits and their shortcomings, and there is still no consensus which perspective is more valid. 
Because the perspective taken by management influences the way of organizing the activities 
involved, there is also no single best way to organize for opportunity identification. Maybe not 
all roads lead to Rome but as a starting point two main routes appear to be available. 
2.2.3.2 Dimensions of opportunity identification 
It should be noted that the above described division is an attempt to get a grip on the large and 
complex body of literature about the subject. Also, one should keep in mind that the authors of 
earlier references on which these two perspectives are based did not have the notion of a 
dichotomy when publishing their findings. Because of this, most studies are not explicitly written 
to fit under the umbrella of one or the other perspective. Many authors present a set of ideas of 
which some fit in one perspective while other insights - from the same author, study or article - 
fit into the other perspective. The two perspectives are composed of multiple elements which 
Opportunity Identification in Practice 
58 
 
can be found in a wide array of studies and articles each covering a partial element of either 
perspective. 
In the remainder of this section we will describe the two perspectives in more detail by reviewing 
the literature of entrepreneurship and opportunity identification. In order to create some 
structure in this vast amount of literature we will describe the details of the opposing 
perspectives in a simple framework or construct. We composed such a simple construct by 
clustering the different elements around specific dimensions that are derived from the literature. 
In the literature several themes keep emerging over and over again. We categorized these 
themes and re-labelled them as “dimensions”. Each of these dimensions covers a specific 
attribute of the perspectives and contains two opposing views of this attribute. As such each 
dimension has two contrasting extremes or views. 
2.2.3.2.1 Moment versus process 
The first dimension revolves around the role of time in the act of opportunity identification. It is 
about the timescale of the identification for which two contrasting views emerge out of the 
literature. The identification can take place in a single infinitely small moment in time or during 
an elongated process over time. In the first case one views discovery as a discrete act that takes 
place in a split second. Though there may be a certain path towards such a moment of epiphany, 
at this end of the dimension however the focus is on the moment of the discovery itself. 
Information sourcing before a discovery is important, but the discovery itself is seen as happening 
in a singular moment of time. The entrepreneur may execute an extensive search for information, 
the discovery of opportunities is a matter of spotting them (Kaish & Gilad, 1991). In this sense, 
the identification of an opportunity resembles the classic spark of brightness in a singular 
moment (eureka!) by an inspired entrepreneur (Shane, 2000; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Gaglio, 2004; 
Baron, 2006). In this study we refer to this as opportunity discovery.  
While the above authors describe opportunities as events happening in a discrete singular point 
in time, other authors view opportunities as being developed over time and the identification is 
seen as a process rather than an event (Muzyka, De Koning, & Churchill, 1995; Ardichvili, Cardozo, 
& Ray, 2003; Buzenitz, et al., 2003; Sarason, Dillard, & Dean, 2006). In this view opportunities 
evolve from vague ideas that need refinement via business opportunities into solid business 
models and business plans (De Koning & Muzyka, 1999; Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Hargadon A. , 
2002; Hills, Hansen, & Hultman, 2005). In line with the process view, O'Conner and Rice (2001) 
see opportunity identification as a sequence of multiple, successive opportunity discoveries in 
which individuals guide the opportunity through the organization by discovering the opportunity 
again and again. 
A similar view which is based on a sequence of individual discoveries is put forward by Casson 
and Wadeson (2007). They approach opportunity identification not only as a process but also as 
a project in which an opportunity is defined as an unexploited project which can be identified by 
an individual entrepreneur after scanning a set of possible projects “that would best meet the 
needs of society”. Though they follow a rather discovery-like approach to the nature of 
opportunities - external objective entities out there in the environment ready to be discovered - 
and identification - discovery as a flash of insight - their framework does hold a notion of an 
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elongated timeline. They argue that because of the bounded rationality of an information 
gathering entrepreneur the initial discoverer of an opportunity is not always the best suited 
individual to refine the opportunity. Consequently, opportunities are being developed over time 
in a sequence of discoveries by different entrepreneurs. According to Casson and Wadeson 
entrepreneurship is a path-dependent process that may be seen not only as a process but as a 
project as well.  
This path-dependent process is also recognized by Sarason et al. (2006) in their entrepreneurship 
model based on structuration theory. In this model there is an dynamic interaction between the 
agent – the individual entrepreneur - and the opportunity, both influencing each other. One 
cannot exist without the other and they are therefore interdependent. Opportunities do not 
simply exist waiting to be discovered but are developed by the entrepreneur in a process. 
2.2.3.2.2 Individual versus collective 
The second dimension focuses on the individual versus the collective dichotomy in the study of 
opportunity identification. Because traditionally most authors have focused on the individual as 
main acting unit, many entrepreneurship studies focus on the role of a single entrepreneur in the 
process of opportunity identification. Kaish and Gilad (1991) for example stressed individual 
information seeking behavior in their search for the differences in characteristics between 
general managers and entrepreneurs. They found that entrepreneurs show different search 
behavior, use less predictable sources of information, spend more time thinking and scan a 
broader landscape of information. The bottom-line of their analysis is that more information 
gathering is essential for opportunity recognition which is ultimately an individual activity.  
Shane (2000) also focuses on the individual as the main driver of opportunity identification 
arguing that opportunities only exist due to the asymmetrical way information is distributed 
through society and are latently present but come into real existence once they are being 
discovered. Opportunities can therefore not be created and it takes specific individual traits and 
resources to discover them. Shane repeats this focus on the individual in an article written 
together with Venkataraman, in which they endeavor to emancipate the study of 
entrepreneurship as a legitimate branch of management studies by developing an overall 
entrepreneurship framework. The existence of enterprising individuals is one of the main pillars 
of this framework. The cognitive abilities and mental models of the individual determine the 
ability to identify opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). This entrepreneur-oriented 
perspective has a strong cognitive and psychological angle and it has become the dominant 
school of thought within entrepreneurship research. 
The origins of this individualistic and cognitive approach can be traced back to the work of Kirzner 
in the early 1970’s. The individual orientation becomes most obvious in his concept of 
“entrepreneurial alertness” which he coined in 1973. As an exponent of Austrian Economics 
Kirzner saw the entrepreneur as an individual who is “able to perceive opportunities for 
entrepreneurial profits; that is, they are able to see where a good can be sold at a price higher 
than that for which it can be bought” (Kirzner, 1973, p. 14). These opportunities are caused by 
market imperfections resulting from changes in the marketplace combined with imperfect 
information throughout the marketplace. Central in Kirzner’s view is that such imperfections are 
Opportunity Identification in Practice 
60 
 
discovered by individuals with a particular kind of personal trait which he labelled the 
entrepreneurial alertness. Kirzner does not describes this alertness in great detail nor does he 
explain why some individuals are blessed with it and others not. Still, entrepreneurial alertness 
has become a key concept in the individualistic perspective. Subsequent researchers have tried 
to open the black box of entrepreneurial alertness focusing on the cognitive characteristics of 
entrepreneurial individuals. 
According to Ardichvili, Cardozo and Ray (2003) entrepreneurial alertness is formed by the 
combination of entrepreneurial personal traits, social networks and prior knowledge. These 
individual “resources” combined determine the success of opportunity recognition and 
development. Gaglio and Katz (2001) approach entrepreneurial alertness from a psychological 
perspective. They argue that individual entrepreneurs are better at interpreting the external 
information from the environment due to their heightened entrepreneurial alertness which is 
defined as an information processing skill. This entrepreneurial alertness is based on the mental 
models of the entrepreneurs, which are based on the individual’s knowledge and beliefs. 
According to Baron (2006) experiences build cognitive pattern recognition frameworks that 
enable individual entrepreneurs to process external information in such a way that ideas for 
business opportunities emerge more often. Pattern recognition is the key ability explaining why 
some individuals are better at identifying patterns in seemingly unrelated events and trends. The 
frameworks are a kind of storage rooms for previous experiences and act as templates for filtering 
and ordering external information into patterns. Three factors play a role in the development of 
the mental frameworks that enable pattern recognition: active search, prior knowledge of the 
industry and social networks. 
Fiet (1996) has put the act of processing of information at the core of his model of 
entrepreneurship. In his individual entrepreneurial view entrepreneurs will be able to efficiently 
identify opportunities by processing signals from the environment. Gathering and processing this 
information is costly and involves deployment of scarce resources (Casson & Wadeson, 2007). 
Therefore it must be seen as an investment in which the returns are opportunities. Therefore an 
entrepreneur must be able to “optimize the trade-off between investing too much or too little in 
specific, risk-reducing signals” (Fiet, 1996, p. 420). 
Though this individual approach is the elder of the two views it is far from outdated. On the 
contrary, the journal “Entrepreneurship theory and practice” published in 2007 a special issue on 
this entrepreneurial cognition research stream as a follow-up of two conferences. The central 
question, “how do entrepreneurs think?”, clearly confirms the individual focus of this school of 
thought (Mitchel, et al., 2007). Though it is a continuation of Schumpeterian and Kirznerian 
theories, these authors present it as a new branch within the individual entrepreneur-oriented 
perspective, one that focuses on entrepreneurial cognition. Within this new branch they 
recognize two consistently returning concepts: heuristic based logic and perceived connections 
and alertness. The former is based on work of, among others, Baron (2006) and holds the idea 
that entrepreneurs differ from non-entrepreneurs in the heuristics they use to solve problems 
and deal with specific situations. These heuristics are simplifying cognitive decision-making 
strategies which are based on experience and are very effective in uncertain and complex 
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situations. The “perceived connections and alertness” concept follows up on the idea of 
“alertness” introduced by Kirzner (1973). Kirzner introduced the term alertness to refer to a 
presumably unique mental capability entrepreneurs have in interpreting information in order to 
spot opportunities. It has been further studied and developed by among others Gaglio and Katz 
(2001) who stress that the concept is far more tangible and testable than often regarded and by 
Baron (2006) who conceives of entrepreneurial alertness as the ability to connect seemingly 
unrelated environmental changes, market trends and customer niches.  
Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) link entrepreneurship with the RBV of the firm. They adopt a process 
approach of opportunity recognition in which it is the individual who is central. In their vision 
entrepreneurship and the RBV adopt both precisely the same unit of analysis: the unique 
resource. Entrepreneurs have individual-specific resources that facilitate the recognition of new 
opportunities and the assembling of resources for the venture. O’Conner and Rice (2001) also 
combine an individual perspective with a process approach in their study at opportunity 
recognition and breakthrough innovations in large established firms. Though organizations can 
be organized for that purpose, opportunity identification is a creative process in which creativity 
resides in the individuals. Radical innovation – defined as new products in new markets - is highly 
dependent on individual initiative that triggers the process. In their framework, opportunity 
recognition is a continuously evolving process of successive individuals (re)recognizing an 
opportunity. Despite their process perspective, in which an initial idea is constantly re-discovered 
and is being pulled through the organization through “multiple recognitions”, their main acting 
unit is the single individual. 
Opposing this individualistic view other authors have proposed a collective oriented perspective. 
In this perspective the focus is not on the single entrepreneur who discovers opportunities, but 
on the context of a social system in which opportunity identification happens (Sarason, Dillard, & 
Dean, 2006). De Koning and Muzyka (1999), for example, conceptualize opportunity identification 
as cognitive acts of individuals in a social context. Their model recognizes several specific 
activities of which particularly the activities of thinking and articulating, in which the previously 
collected information is integrated into a business opportunity, often take place in a context of 
social interaction. In his inner circle the entrepreneur articulates initial ideas, thoughts, and 
possibilities and receives feedback. This activity is referred to as thinking by talking. This inner 
circle is defined as a set of people with whom the entrepreneur has a long-term, stable 
relationship but who are typically not partners in the venture. In this framework the individual’s 
role is not downplayed completely but the main focus is on the collective effort.  
The idea of thinking by talking resembles the concept of questioning others described by 
Eisenhardt and Okhuysen (2002), which covers the subject of integrating knowledge of 
individuals in groups via formal interventions. The main function of this social interaction seems 
to be extracting the tacit knowledge by sharing it via face to face communication in close physical 
proximity. The idea that unlocking tacit knowledge is an important feature for innovation and can 
be done via social processes has been expressed also by Leonard-Barton (1998). According to her, 
unarticulated knowledge, which resides in individual heads, is at the basis of creativity. Again the 
individual plays an important role, but the social context is of utmost importance for unlocking 
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the tacit knowledge and bringing it to good use. “…innovation in business is usually a group 
process. Therefore, we need to examine more closely both tacit knowing and creativity as they 
are expressed by members of groups-singly and collectively” (Leonard-Barton & Sensiper, 1998, 
p. 115). 
A similar approach in which the individual’s act of recognition is seen in its social context has been 
proposed by Galunic and Rodan (1998). They make use of the Schumpeterian notion of 
innovations as ‘new combinations’ to link innovation to the RBV. They regard existing knowledge 
within the firm, particularly tacit knowledge, as the key resource for radical innovation. It is the 
re-combining of this tacit knowledge that leads to the recognition of new opportunities. In their 
framework it is the social context that influences the likelihood of recombining such tacit 
knowledge. Though the framework explicitly addresses innovation from a knowledge 
management perspective, implicitly it sets opportunity identification, seen as a process of 
recombining tacit knowledge, in a social context. 
West (2007) also stresses the reality of groups making decisions after a process of collective 
cognition. He focuses on the entrepreneurial team and its relation with top management as their 
main unit of analysis. Another author who stresses the importance of the social context in the 
innovation processes is Hargadon (2002). In his brokering model of innovation he suggests that 
taking the specific knowledge base of a firm to other domains can be the catalyst for new 
innovation (spanning multiple domains). New knowledge (ideas & opportunities) can be created 
on the basis of existing knowledge that acts as raw material. Hargadon speaks of brokering 
functions, in which knowledge of a certain domain can be transported into a new unknown 
domain by problem-solution-based thinking in analogies. This analogue thinking takes place as 
the third step of his five steps model in the form of several streams of knowledge which are being 
integrated. He explicitly states that this linking happens in group settings rather than by individual 
efforts. The best ways of gathering this existing knowledge is by tapping into the personal 
networks to be found within the firm, the hallway conversations, and setting up brainstorm 
sessions. As described in a previous section, O’Conner and Rice (2001) follow a route between 
the individual and collective approach. In their multiple recognition model, one of the 
mechanisms to improve opportunity recognition is promoting the informal social networks in 
order to increase the possibilities that individuals pick up each other’s opportunity ideas and 
develop them further. Krueger jr. (2000) presents a similar model which is based on the individual 
but in essence focuses on the social interaction and the social context in which these individuals 
operate. His ideas are rooted in the cognitive school of thought of individual entrepreneurs, 
arguing that “organizations do not innovate; individuals within those organizations innovate” 
(Krueger jr., 2000, p. 5). He focuses on the role of the organization which is to develop an 
infrastructure which promotes a positive attitude of individuals towards the perception of 
opportunities. This infrastructure should make individuals perceive opportunities as something 
positive rather than a threat. He offers a short list of several well-known mechanisms that may 
contribute to such an infrastructure: top management support, strategic guidance, guiding the 
flow of information, working in teams, changing organizational structure and the use of classic 
innovation roles such as mentors and champions. In this respect Krueger also has a strong focus 
on the social context of the opportunity identification process. All these authors stress the 
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importance of the social context in which opportunity identification occurs rather than the role 
of the individual.2  
2.2.3.2.3 Objective versus subjective 
The third dimension of opportunity identification deals with the fundamental question whether 
opportunities are objective entities outside the firm (over which the firm has no control) or 
subjective entities that only exist “in the eye of the beholder”. This understanding of the nature 
of the opportunity is important for the way opportunity identification is being organized in firms. 
Supporters of the objective view will stress the importance of appropriate search strategies 
within the firm while adherents of the subjective view will emphasize the need for integrating 
mechanisms. In classic entrepreneurship theories the objective entity approach has been 
predominant. For example, Kaish and Gilad (1991) state that opportunities are entities in the 
environment of the firm that are bound to be discovered. Their central thesis is that in order to 
find opportunities, the primary activities should be searching and acquisition of information. 
This view of objective opportunities in the external environment rests on two main pillars. Based 
on Austrian Economics school of thought, there is the notion that opportunities come into 
existence as a result of differences in the availability of information, i.e. asymmetrical information 
throughout society and the economy (Hayek, 1945). Opportunities are identified by discovery, 
but not every individual will recognize an opportunity even “if it painted itself purple and danced 
naked on top of a harpsichord singing 'Opportunities are here again'”3. It takes a special breed of 
individuals with special entrepreneurial skills such as superior information processing ability, 
specific search techniques and scanning methods to identify New Business Opportunities (Shaver 
& Scott, 1991). 
Shane (2001) follows this Austrian economics line of reasoning in his conceptual model in which 
prior knowledge plays a vital role. However, in contrast to Kaish and Gilad (1991), Shane argues 
that active searching for opportunities is a futile exercise because opportunities exist only once 
they are discovered, therefore searching for undiscovered opportunities is searching for 
something that does not exists. 
This vision Shane shares with Venkataraman. In their common paper (2000) they sketch an 
outline for future entrepreneurship research. Their framework consist of three components; 
existence, discovery and evaluation. The existence of opportunities is explained by the imperfect 
information distribution of the environment. Prior knowledge of the industry and a specific 
                                                                        
2 A similar individual perspective versus a collective perspective can be found in the literature 
about creativity in innovation processes. On the one hand there is the idea that creativity is 
rooted in personal characteristics, while on the other hand there is the belief that the social 
context is much more of importance for the recognition and adaption of new creative ideas. As 
the former idea is still predominant in the literature and in practice (“some people are simply 
more creative than others”), this may block the adoption of more collective forms of organization 
that increase creativity within organisations (Vissers & Dankbaar, 2002).  
3 Original quote: “Baldrick, you wouldn't see a subtle plan if it painted itself purple and danced 
naked on top of a harpsichord, singing ‘Subtle plans are here again!’" Blackadder's Christmas 
Carol (1988) 
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entrepreneurial mental framework influence the capability of individuals to spot these market 
imperfections more easily than those who lack these two capabilities. Also it is explicitly stated 
that opportunities are objective phenomena (Shane, 2000; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
According to Shepherd and DeTienne (2005), lack of prior knowledge leads to less opportunity 
identifying behavior and success, but this effect can, to a certain degree, be compensated for by 
financial rewards. Individuals without a large stock of prior knowledge of an industry and 
customer problems can be motivated by means of financial rewards to identify opportunities 
successfully. 
Baron (2006) is less explicit on the question whether opportunities are real entities or not. In his 
view opportunities develop through processing external information by pattern recognition 
frameworks that themselves have been formed by experiences. In Baron’s view, opportunities 
are not ready-to-pick cherries but must be developed out of unrelated events and trends. These 
trends and events are real entities and therefore opportunities are to a certain extent realities in 
the outside world. Baron´s ideas are very close to those of Gaglio and Katz (2001) who also 
acknowledge that opportunity recognition is mainly an information processing activity in which a 
certain mental model is essential to identify opportunities. The main difference with Baron’s 
focus on patterns recognition is that they focus on anomalies in the stream of external 
information as main source of opportunities. The idea of the entrepreneur as information 
processor has been put forward by Fiet (1996) as well. 
While these authors locate opportunities in the outside world as a result of anomalies in trends 
or patterns, Hills, Hansen and Hultman (2005) interpret opportunities as perceived realities. They 
stress the central role of unattended market needs as key opportunity markers. However, in their 
value creation perspective the identification of such a latent market-need is merely the starting 
point of a process of further refining a Market Opportunity into a New Business Opportunity. In 
this respect, Market Opportunities, defined as unmet market needs, can be seen as objective 
entities, while New Business Opportunities are human constructions based on these Market 
Opportunities. A similar line of thinking in which the initial recognition of an objective unmet 
market need is followed by a process of further development, has been proposed by several other 
authors as well. De Koning and Muzyka (1999) refer to this as a socio-cognitive process with 
several stages of developing a Market Opportunity into a business opportunity. Alvarez and 
Busenitz (2001) observe the specific characteristics of entrepreneurship in the assembling of 
resources that are needed to develop initial opportunities further. Krueger jr. (2000) explicitly 
states that opportunities are not simply objective entities ready to be discovered but that they 
are man-made constructs.  
As described above many authors have in common that they see opportunities as originating 
from objective elements (“ingredients” or “seeds” for opportunity identification) in the external 
environment, but ultimately they regard the opportunities as human creations. They subscribe 
to the idea that opportunities are not realities in the outside world that only a happy few can 
recognize, but that these external elements are only the triggers of a creative process in which 
opportunities are constructed through human interaction. In this sense opportunities can be seen 
as human constructions or creations instead of (perceived) external objective realities. Some 
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authors take this idea a step further. While the above authors recognize interplay between initial 
recognition or discovery and subsequent development, other studies focus mainly on the creative 
aspect of opportunity recognition. 
In Sarason, Dillard and Dean’s (2006) structuration model, for example, opportunities are being 
created in an ongoing process of interaction between the entrepreneur and the opportunity. 
Galunic and Rodan (1998) focus on the “Schumpeterian” resource recombination type of 
innovation. They regard knowledge as the key resource of firms that can be recombined in order 
to create New Business Opportunities. In their proposed framework the external world hardly 
plays a role and opportunities are truly created by the firms themselves.  
Recombination also plays an important role in Hargadon’s (2002) framework of brokering 
knowledge which explains how firms innovate by recombining extant knowledge in new ways. By 
de- and reassembling existing knowledge new ideas can be created internally. In this approach 
knowledge of multiple domains or industries is explored and recombined into new opportunities. 
The model is based on the two notions that innovation emerges from recombining existing ideas 
and that the environment of the firm consists of multiple “small worlds”, separate domains that 
are internally densely connected, but externally only loosely connected. Following Hargadon’s 
line of reasoning, these domains must first be explored for problems, resources and solutions 
that are valuable, after which these knowledge from the domains must be “stripped” from its 
context in order to be linked into new combinations. After these new connections have been 
recognized the seeds of opportunities must be further developed. In this view, opportunities are 
created via a process in a social context. 
A similar concept has been presented by Danneels (2007) who acknowledges that technology and 
technological competences within firms are often underutilized. Technology has potentially many 
applications and can therefore often be put to use in different markets in several industries. This 
is what Danneels refers to with the concept of technological competence leverage. Via a process 
of de-linking and re-linking one should become aware of one’s true technological competence 
and use this core technology to create new opportunities in other industries. De-linking is the 
process of “abstracting away from the particular product in which the competence is currently 
embedded and identifying the competence in its own right” (Danneels, 2007, p. 520). This means 
technology must be abstracted from the product it is embedded in. Echoing Prahalad and Hamel 
Danneels also suggests managers should invest energy and time in the hard task of escaping a 
product-centric view while being more aware of what the true – technological - core 
competences of their firm are. This de-linking or abstracting core competences out of the 
concrete product can be done by imagining alternative applications via deliberate search in the 
external environment and via technology characterization, which is often done in the R&D and 
engineering domain of the firm (Danneels, 2007). Following de-linking, the identified core 
technology must be re-linked in order to meet other industries’ demands. This re-linking requires 
that human and financial resources must be allocated consistently towards gathering market 
information of new industries (Danneels, 2007). Here, Danneels acknowledges that, because 
opportunities emerge at the nexus of two streams of information - an external environmental 
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information stream and a technological core competence information stream -, opportunities are 
created rather than discovered. 
Hills, Shrader and Lumpkin (1999) also see opportunity identification as an act of creativity. They 
have created a creativity-based model of entrepreneurial opportunity recognition which consists 
of five stages: preparation in which information is gathered by search and experience leading to 
prior knowledge, incubation in which the information gets chewed upon in an intuitive, non-
systematic and almost subconscious manner, followed by insight which is the eureka moment 
that suddenly all relevant information converges into a new insight. This happens not in a singular 
moment but recursively throughout the process. The final two stages are evaluation and 
elaboration. This model has been followed and successfully empirically tested by Hansen, 
Lumpkin, & Hills (2011).  
Baker and Nelson (2005) offer a particularly strong objection against the objectivistic view of 
opportunities. In their study of resource-constrained firms – i.e. SMEs - they found that the 
entrepreneurs did not view opportunities as being external and objective but rather as the result 
of an intertwined process of discovering and enacting resources. In their case studies they 
encountered firms that identify opportunities through “bricolage”. The term bricolage is 
originally a French word meaning to fiddle or to tinker. In a wider sense it means so much as to 
be able to combine the limited resources or materials which are available. The term 
“entrepreneurial bricolage” is their key concept and can best be characterized as “the pursuit of 
opportunity through close regard to the resources at hand” (Baker & Nelson, 2005, p. 359). They 
stress that opportunities can be created on the basis of recombining limited internal resources. 
2.2.3.2.4 Source of opportunities 
Closely related to the third dimension, that describes the nature of opportunities in terms of 
objective versus subjective, is the fourth dimension that distinguishes the sources or origins of 
opportunities which can be either external or internal to the firm. Admittedly, the overlap with 
the previous dimension is significant and in practice it is hard to disentangle these two 
dimensions. However, for reasons of theoretical clarity we will discuss both dimensions 
separately. In practice however, this dimension resembles more a distinctive element or feature 
of the previous dimension.  
If one sees opportunities as objective realities, as entities that are out there in the environment 
of a firm, then the source of opportunities is located externally, outside the boundaries of the 
firm. This classic interpretation of opportunities is especially brought forward by those authors 
who consistently stress the importance of an external view of the opportunity process (Shane, 
2000; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Baron, 2006). Opportunities reside in 
the external environment and they can only be found there. Casson and Wadeson (2008) are very 
explicit in this outward focus. They state that good entrepreneurship, i.e. discovering many 
opportunities in a continuous manner, depends on proper search strategies: “In summary, search 
strategy impacts significantly on the performance of the entrepreneur” (Casson & Wadeson, 
2007, p. 286). 
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If opportunity identification is seen as a creative process within the firm, brought about by an 
external trigger rather than being the result of a search process, the importance of an internal 
focus becomes evident. In this line of thinking it is possible that opportunities are being created 
internally on the basis of both the own internal capabilities and external information derived from 
the environment. Danneels’ (2007) framework of de-linking and re-linking in particular stresses 
explicitly that the opportunity identification process may start internally by assessing one’s own 
technological core competences.  
This distinction between an external and an internal focus is also reflected in two related themes 
in the opportunity identification literature: search activities and social network. Despite the range 
of different activities that has been proposed to facilitate the identification of opportunities, 
many authors share the view that sourcing for information or search for external information is a 
prerequisite with which the identification of opportunities often starts. Several authors have 
explicitly argued that information acquisition and collecting information are essential for 
opportunity recognition and that information-seeking behavior is the central element of 
entrepreneurial behavior (De Koning & Muzyka, 1999; Kaish & Gilad, 1991). 
On the external end of the dimension discussed here, the focus of search activities will be on the 
external environment, which is only place where opportunities are to be found. Here, an 
important issue, and a subject of debate between the various authors, lies in what one is looking 
for in the environment. Baron (2006, 2007) focuses on patterns or trends as source of opportunity 
in the outside world that entrepreneurs are better able to discover. Gaglio and Katz (2001) search 
for changes, disruptions and anomalies in the environment. On the external end of the dimension 
the search activity ends in a eureka experience at the moment an opportunity is recognized or 
discovered. In this view, the processing of information is considered at most as a simmering “pre-
recognition stew” which happens “under the bonnet” in an almost subconscious manner (Gaglio 
& Taub, 1992).  
On the internal end of this dimension, however, the information sourcing activity is imperative 
but merely the starting point. Within the internal focus, opportunity identification is a process 
that is triggered by bits and pieces of information derived from the search activity. Hills, Hansen 
and Hultman (2005), for example, identify unmet market needs as triggers in their value added 
outlook on the opportunity development process. After this searching and gathering of 
information it must be processed in order to extract starting points for the next activity: the 
development and refining of opportunities. For Hargadon (2002) too, market needs are the root 
of opportunities triggering a process of opportunity identification. To refine this idea, Hargadon 
stresses the customer-problem-solving nature of market needs. Information sourcing – or 
searching - is aimed at identifying potential customer problems. By processing this information a 
vague idea emerges which must be further refined into a solid business opportunity. This 
processing is done by confronting the pieces of external information with the internal information 
about the firm’s - key - capabilities, forming a new match, i.e. a New Business Opportunity. Hitt, 
Ireland, Camp & Sexton (2001) have labelled this combining of opportunity identifying behavior 
as strategic entrepreneurship. Though this could be seen as no more than fancy labelling, their 
proposed framework is insightful as it combines the literature on the individual entrepreneur, 
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the entrepreneurial organization, and the RBV in a single coherent model. Hence, on the internal 
focus side of the dimension, beside scanning for external information, two other activities are of 
importance as well: assessing one’s own key capabilities and integrating the two streams of 
information. Baker and Nelson (2005) stress this importance of internal resources as they state 
that alertness to resources is just as important as alertness to – external – opportunities. The 
knowledge and awareness of the resources at hand enable firms to combine these resources with 
opportunities from the environment. Because such an act of combining takes a lot of “give and 
take of the members of the organization”, opportunity identification is an interactive and social 
process rather than an individual epiphany. 
The second feature which is present in the inward-outward dichotomy is the social network, 
which as an explanatory concept is a remarkable constant in the opportunity identification 
literature. On the external extreme of the dimension many studies stress the external nature of 
the social networking activities of an entrepreneur and a large social network is seen as a typical 
entrepreneurial trait. In order to be able to scan the environment as widely as possible an 
extensive network is needed. As a rich source of information about the environment, the social 
network contributes to the prior knowledge of the entrepreneur (Baron, 2006; Shane, 2000). 
Having more prior knowledge than others leads to the ability of entrepreneurs to identify more 
opportunities faster than others (Hills, Hansen, & Hultman, 2005; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
For Ardichvili, Cardozo and Ray (2003) the social network and prior knowledge combined with 
other typical entrepreneurial traits leads to a certain level of heightened entrepreneurial 
alertness.  
Though the importance of externally focused social networks is generally accepted, some authors 
also emphasize the internal social network as key to understanding opportunity identification. 
De Koning and Muzyka (1999) suggest that further development and refining of opportunities is 
done by collaborative thinking, which takes place in a social context. Several people can be 
recruited for the purpose of creating access to the necessary resources (for example financial 
resources, technical competences, market knowledge, access to other specialized information, 
etc.). This set of people is referred to by them as the action set. Though the relation between the 
entrepreneur and his action set may be loose and temporary, it is stressed that it is of importance 
to obtain the resources which are needed for the development of opportunities.  
A similar internal role for social networks is described by O’Conner and Rice (2001) in their 
multiple recognitions approach. They emphasize the importance of informal networks for 
creating sustainable internal support and top management commitment. Internal support is 
essential for building up long term commitment and vision in the opportunity development 
process. This search for commitment within the organization is what happens in the fourth and 
fifth stage of Hills, Shrader and Lumpkin’s (1999) creativity based model. According to these 
authors, building of legitimacy is the most time consuming part of the opportunity identification 
process and a strong internal social network is essential. 
Finally, Hargadon (2002) stresses the need for creating internal informal networks in order to 
actively search for the right information. He mention hallway conversations and brainstorm 
sessions as ways to enter the personal networks of the firm and tap into the existing –firm 
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internal- knowledge. These authors have in common that they acknowledge the importance of 
the internal social network for opportunity identification. 
2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the literature that is relevant for the framework with which we 
model the NBE function of a medium-sized firm. The chapter started with describing the basic 
concepts of this thesis in which we made a distinction between Market Opportunities and New 
Business Opportunities. Based on our definition of business opportunities we outlined a 
framework modelling the NBE function (Figure 5). This basic framework has three main 
components; an external information seeking component, an internal information seeking 
component and an integration component. In order to fine-tune and detail the framework we 
examined for each component the existing body of literature in order to find relevant key 
features. In the next chapter we will describe in detail our research framework, based on this 
literature review.  
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3 Research approach 
“Too often we mistake what is easily quantifiable with what is important” 
John Green 
 
3.1 Research framework 
In the previous chapter we described the New Business Exploration function (NBE) as an 
information processing system in which opportunities are identified by the integration of 
information gathered from both the external environment and internal analysis (Berends, 
Vanhaverbeke, & Kirschbaum, 2007). Following this logic we propose a framework for modelling 
NBE around a central component and two auxiliary components. The first auxiliary component 
refers to gathering external information, the second to the assessment of internal information 
concerning technological resources and capabilities. The actual identification of New Business 
Opportunities takes place in the central component, where these two sources of information are 
combined and integrated.  
The framework, that will be described in more detail in the final sections of this chapter, serves 
several purposes. Firstly, it helps to structure data collection, secondly, it guides the data analysis, 
and finally, it is used as a basis for several management guidelines that can be used by medium-
sized firms to assess their opportunity identification capabilities. In order to answer this study’s 
main research question, presented in the introduction section, the framework is broken down 
into operational research questions. In the next sections these research questions will be 
formulated, and it will be explained why a multiple case study approach was chosen as method 
of research. The research model is described in detail before the case selection, data gathering 
method and the data analysis approach are described. In the description of the research model 
we develop theory testing propositions and theory building statements based on the operational 
research questions.  
3.1.1 Opportunity identification 
As described in the previous chapter many researchers have proposed ideas, concepts and 
frameworks that seek to clarify opportunity identification within firms. A meta-analysis of this 
large body of literature reveals two perspectives that coincide with the dichotomies of different 
dimensions that have been used to structure the literature in the previous chapter. The following 
summary of the two perspectives is based on these dimensions.  
On the one hand there is the discovery perspective according to which opportunities exist as 
objective phenomena in the external environment, and discovering them is an act performed by 
individual entrepreneurs (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Baron, 2006; Gaglio, 
2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Gaglio & Taub, 1992; Kaish & Gilad, 1991; O'Connor & Rice, 2001; 
Shane, 2000; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Examples of such objective phenomena are 
unattended market needs (Hills, Hansen & Hultman, 2005), events and trends that can be 
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transformed into opportunities (Baron, 2006; Baron, 2007), or anomalies in the environment 
(Gaglio & Katz, 2001). The wider the external scope on the environment, the better the chances 
of spotting opportunities (Slater & Narver, 1995). Therefore, in this perspective, a large external 
social network is the key to opportunity discovery (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003; Baron, 2006; 
Baron, 2007; Shane, 2000). The discovery itself happens in a single point in time, resembling the 
classic spark of insight in a singular, eureka-like moment (Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Kaish & Gilad, 
1991), preceded by a “simmering-stew” stage of gathering and processing external information 
(Gaglio & Taub, 1992). This gathering and processing of information is seen as essential for 
identifying opportunities (Baron, 2006; De Koning & Muzyka, 1999; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Kaish & 
Gilad, 1991).  
In the other perspective, here referred to as creation perspective, external information is a 
possible trigger of an internal opportunity development process (De Koning & Muzyka, 1999; 
Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Sarason, Dean & Dillard, 2006). Opportunities are created on the basis of 
both the external information and internal competences (Danneels, 2007; Hargadon, 2002). 
While in the discovery perspective opportunities are completed objects, ready for “usage”, in the 
creation perspective the external environment is searched for bits and pieces of information that 
can be used as “ingredients” in the opportunity development process. Therefore, the search 
activity in the discovery perspective is oriented externally, aiming to catch “instant” 
opportunities, while in the creation perspective the external search is combined with an inward 
focus aimed at assessing the firm’s own capabilities. In-depth knowledge of these (core) 
competences is essential for identifying opportunities (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Danneels, 2007).  
Whereas the discovery perspective tends to view opportunity identification as a single event, the 
creation perspective views it as a collective (rather than individual) process in which 
opportunities evolve through several stages, from vague ideas that need refinement to solid 
business models and business plans (De Koning & Muzyka, 1999; Galunic & Rodan, 1998; 
Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002; Hargadon, 2002; Hills et al., 2005). In the creation perspective, 
therefore, opportunities are subjective phenomena defined through social interaction 
(Companys & McMullen, 2007). This social interaction may have an inward focus in which the 
internal social network is the key for obtaining resources (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; De Koning & 
Muzyka, 1999), for creating internal support or building commitment (O'Connor & Rice, 2001), 
and for tapping into the existing knowledge base via hallway conversation and brainstorm 
sessions (Hargadon, 2002). In this perspective opportunities are often based on initial ideas, 
spawned by a firm’s technological domain, that must be brought to the market (O'Connor & Rice, 
2001).  
In this study the two perspectives will be referred to as Eureka Perspective and Creation 
Perspective, respectively. Eureka takes the moment of discovery as the symbolic attribute of the 
discovery perspective. Creation refers to the central notion that opportunities are created rather 
than found. Table 6 summarizes the two perspectives. 
Each of the two perspectives is grounded in a large body of research. Both perspectives are 
internally consistent and supported by empirical evidence. Just like light can be modelled as a 
wave or a particle, opportunity identification can be modelled as discovery or creation. Therefore, 
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the two perspectives seem at the same time complementary and competing, and a relevant 
research question is how exactly they relate to each other. The theoretical contribution this study 
wants to make is to disentangle and explain this opportunity identification perspective paradox. 
 Eureka Perspective Creation Perspective 
DIMENSION   
Time scale  Singular moment in time, 
flash of insight, Eureka-
moment 
Process over time, evolving, 
stages in the process of 
opportunity recognition. 
Individual versus collective Individual (single 
entrepreneur) 
Collective, contextual 
Source or origin of 
opportunities 
External (information 
asymmetries; market 
imperfections; changes in 
technology, consumer 
preferences, political 
regulations, or demographics) 
Internal (assessment of 
competences) and external 
(information about market 
needs)  
KEY CONCEPTS   
Mode of identification Entrepreneurial alertness, 
pattern recognition, 
gathering and processing of 
information, algorithmic 
problem solving, 
serendipitous search  
Recombining resources, 
bricolage, de-linking/re-
linking, analogue thinking, 
interaction (including 
thinking aloud, hallway 
conversation, brainstorm 
sessions, questioning 
others), sense-making, trial-
and-error problem solving, 
planned and deliberate 
search, creativity 
Role of social network External focus, emphasis on 
recognizing patterns, trends, 
changes, anomalies, 
disruptions 
Internal focus to create 
commitment, identify core 
competences, acquire 
resources, unlock tacit 
knowledge 
Decision making  Under certainty, ex ante 
information available 
Under uncertainty, ex ante 
information unavailable 
Table 6 Two perspectives on Opportunity identification 
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This disentangling is not only a theoretical exercise but has also practical implications. Relying on 
the notion of dominant logic, according to which the organization and behavior of a firm is largely 
shaped by the dominant mental model of its management (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Bettis & 
Prahalad, 1995; Porac, Mishina, & Pollock, 2002), we argue that the way a firm organizes it NBE 
function depends on the perspective on opportunity identification held by the firm’s 
management (in larger firms by the collective of top and middle management, in small firms by 
a single owner/director). Dominant logic has been defined as the way in which managers 
conceptualize the business the firm is in and how they allocate critical resources (Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1986, p. 490). It is developed by the managers’ previous experiences and is stored via 
shared schemas and mindsets (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995). This dominant logic, applies not only 
to management of large firms but also of small firms; “For small firms, inertia is largely associated 
with owners’ perception. Based on their experiences, owners attempt to use the same knowledge 
to solve the same problems they encounter” (Yu, 2001, p. 189). 
The concept of dominant logic allows us to assume that there is an interaction between a 
particular perspective and the perception of success credited to this perspective. The faith in the 
perspective will increase with the accomplishment of successful identification of opportunities 
that are credited to the perspective. We postulate that a firm’s management has a dominant 
perspective and acts according to this perspective in the case of opportunity identification.  
This study will put this relation – between the dominant perspective, which includes the way the 
NBE-function is organized, and successful opportunity identification – to test. Since we are 
studying firms known to have a track record of (at least some) instances of successful opportunity 
identification, we are able to limit ourselves to studying the dominant perspective of the firm. 
The first operational research question is therefore: What is the dominant perspective of the firm? 
To answer this question we developed an interview guide, using the dimensions presented in 
table 6 and we analyzed the interviews by examining which keywords from which perspective 
were the most frequent in the interview transcriptions. 
3.1.2 Environmental Orientation 
From the review in the previous chapter it has become clear that at the heart of the market 
orientation literature lies the notion that being aware of your external environment is necessary 
for the performance of the firm. In order to stay in tune with the outside world firms scan their 
environments continuously. This environmental scanning is also of importance for the 
identification of opportunities as it “…is the process of continually acquiring information on the 
external marketing environment and interpreting potential trends that may lead to 
entrepreneurial business opportunities” (Crane, 2010, p. 14). 
Market orientation is characterized by an emphasis on external information and by the idea that 
all functional groups in an organization must be involved in gathering and using that information. 
External information is referred to as market intelligence (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990), market 
information processing (Sinkula, 1994), or market sensing (Day, 1994; Bharadwaj & Dong, 2014). 
Each of these concepts is about getting environmental information into the organization and 
putting it to good use. More formally a market oriented firm performs three principle activities: 
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the gathering, the distribution, and the usage of external information. The two latter activities – 
distribution and usage – are part of the central component of our conceptual framework (where 
the information is actually being set to use), which is why we focus on the gathering of external 
information activity, in this study referred to as environment scanning. In a genuinely market-
oriented firm the whole organization is involved in this environment scanning activity.  
Characteristic of the market orientation literature is the implicit thought that market-oriented 
firms focus on customers and competitors. As we argued in the market orientation section of the 
previous chapter, such an implicit focus is too limited. Hence we stretched the concept to what 
we refer to as environmental orientation. A firm with such an orientation carries the same 
characteristics as a market-oriented firm with the difference that the former explicitly scans 
broader and further than a market-oriented firm. By explicitly scanning not only customers and 
competitors but also customers of customers, end consumers, suppliers, general trends, and 
other industries, to give some important examples, more relevant external information will be 
gathered. This is likely to lead, ceteris paribus, to more Market Opportunities, ingredients and 
triggers for opportunity development. Therefore, the next working proposition is that an 
environmental orientation is a pre-condition for effective opportunity identification. In other 
words, this study examines whether firms of which we know ex ante that they did successfully 
identify New Business Opportunities have an environmental orientation. In short, the next 
operational research question we ask ourselves at each firm is: Does the firm fit the profile of an 
environment oriented organization? This research question can be broken down into sub-
questions: The first is: How many, and which elements, in the environment does the firm explicitly 
and/or structurally keep track of? The second is: How many and particularly which entities – 
individuals, functional groups, departments – in the firm are explicitly involved in environment 
scanning? 
3.1.3 Technological Core Competences 
The final element in the framework concerns the internal capabilities of the firm. Based on the 
insights of the Creation Perspective it is clear that internal competences play an important role 
in the identification of opportunities, a role that is often downgraded or even neglected in the 
Eureka Perspective. From our discussion of the RBV literature it became clear that it may be 
insightful to explain firm success within the framework of key firm resources. Such resources that 
are unique, not easily transferable and hard to imitate, explain firm heterogeneity, competitive 
advantage and subsequently firm success in specific industries. From the RBV literature the 
concepts of core competences and dynamic capabilities have emerged, and much research effort 
has been spent in explaining what these resources look like and where they come from.  
The concept of core competences, on which our conceptual framework is based, implies three 
preconditions. Firstly, it describes a resource that should be able to add value to the customer, 
to satisfy his needs or contributes to solving his problem. Secondly, it should be relatively unique 
and non-transferable, meaning that no other firm has such resources or will be able to imitate 
them in the short term. Finally, the resource should have the ability to be leveraged into other 
markets as well, while remaining unique and valuable to the customer.  
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The framework is limited to the concept of core competences because, despite a lack of 
consensus on how to operationalize it, it is more robust and consistent than dynamic capabilities. 
The latter concept is valuable in conceptualizing how firms and their key resources change over 
time, but precisely this presents a big hurdle as we concur with the infinite regress critique. 
Moreover, the dynamic capability approach is “all-inclusive”, meaning that research has shown 
every possible department, function and process to have or to be a possible dynamic capability. 
This may in itself not be a problem, but dynamic capability researchers claim that these 
capabilities are, unlike core competence, not firm specific but universally applicable. Combined 
with all-inclusiveness, this makes the dynamic capabilities approach elusive and reduces its 
practical relevance4. 
A second limitation we imposed on our framework is that we decided to concentrate on 
technological core competences. In recent years researchers have increasingly focused on the 
service industry, service capabilities of manufacturing organization and service-based business 
models within manufacturing firms. This study, in contrast, focuses on technological 
manufacturing enterprises, not on firms that are logistics or otherwise service oriented. The 
technical changes in these firms and in their environments are fundamental for creating new 
products and finding new markets. Surely these firms compete on service level, on speed of 
delivery, lead times, but above all they compete on the basis of their creative technical problem-
solving skills, design and engineering skills, and development capabilities. This is why the 
framework used in this study stays close to traditional lines of thinking about core competences 
- that consider such competences as residing predominantly in the technical realm of the 
organization (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Tampoe, 1994; Walsh & Linton, 2001). Prahalad and 
Hamel specifically state that “…core competences are the collective learning in the organization, 
especially how to co-ordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of 
technologies...” (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, p. 82), and Zahra (1996, 2008) argues that in 
established and technological firms, science and technology are the important platforms to 
launch opportunity identification. In the same line of reasoning Danneels (2007) explicitly states 
that technological resources can be leveraged in new markets in other industries but that this 
fungibility is often neglected. In other words, core competences are rooted in technology and 
“are the engine for new business development” (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, p. 82). For reasons of 
clarity, we will use the term Technological Core Competences (TCC) from here on. 
We acknowledge the role of TCC in opportunity identification, but we are not primarily interested 
in what the TCC of a case firm is. More important in the context of this study is the degree to 
which firms are aware of their technological core competences. Thus we will examine whether 
                                                                        
4 It seems to us that over time the ideas of core competences and dynamic capabilities have changed 
significantly. While originally core competences were seen as firm specific, later publications on the concept 
read as a quest for a universal holy grail of business success. Dynamic capabilities were portrayed as non-firm 
specific, universally adaptable capabilities which almost guarantee firm success. As described above scholars 
have started identifying core competences and dynamic capabilities in every aspect of the organization. This 
would not be an issue if not for the fact that the key resources these scholars had found were often implicitly 
or explicitly being elevated to the status of a kind universal set of core capabilities which when applied would 
guarantee success for each and every firm. As already stated, we prefer to stay close to the traditional idea 
of core competences that are firm specific. 
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and how firms utilize the idea of (not necessarily the concept of) TCC, which requires us to focus 
on firms’ search processes. The process of pro-actively asking yourself as a firm what it is what 
makes you unique, different, competitive, why customers come to you rather than to your 
competitors, is what really contributes to the identification of opportunities. This deliberate, pro-
active abstracting and de-linking one’s strengths from concrete products, is what we refer to as 
TCC awareness. 
Two dimensions of TCC awareness can be distinguished. The first revolves around the question 
in what terms firm representatives (managers that were interviewed) describe the firm’s 
strengths and key capabilities. To identify true TCCs one needs to transcend the level of concrete 
products and describe capabilities in abstract terms. These abstracted strengths then must pass 
the criteria of core competences. At the first level of awareness strengths are described in 
concrete terms such as product descriptions, product capabilities, product functions, product 
specifications. At this level no abstraction takes place. When asked about the technical strength 
of the firm, a respondent answers in terms of “products”, such as: “we manufacture X-type of 
machine of the highest quality with the fastest throughput in the industry”. At the second level 
the strengths of the firm are described in more abstract terms such as processes, skills, 
capabilities, or technologies. Here, a typical response might be: “We are able to handle the latest 
manufacturing technologies in our production process”. The key verb in this response is “to be 
able”. Descriptions at this second level, however, do not pass the criteria of core competences 
and are therefore not considered to indicate ‘real’ TCC awareness. At the third level, a firm’s 
strengths are referred to in terms of “to distinguish”. They are not only described on in abstract 
terms but also in terms that mirror the test criteria. An example response might be: “This 
particular production process of ours is unique in this industry and for sure enables us to satisfy 
customer needs which no one else can”.  
The second dimension of TCC awareness concerns the fundamental question how the awareness 
of one’s own TCC’s has come about? We distinguish two extreme positions. One is the systematic, 
deliberate approach often prescribed by several authors in the core competence literature 
(Snyder & Ebeling jr., 1992; Tampoe, 1994; Yang, Wu, Shu, & Yang, Ming-Hsien, 2006), the other 
the less structured reference to past successes. The deliberate approach may involve brainstorm 
sessions, top management strategy councils, or cross-functional meetings. All levels of the firm 
should be involved in this deliberate identification of the firm’s TCC, but in general this is an 
exercise initiated by top management. The other position stresses that top management often 
takes core competences for granted, with as a consequence that no inquiry into the firm’s TCC 
takes place. Instead, the firm’s past successes are used as a source of knowledge about its core 
competences. These success stories, that implicitly convey core capabilities and core values, stay 
in existence because they are passed on to newcomers within the firm. In the end, the (alleged) 
core competences become so firmly embedded in the organization that questioning them is no 
longer acceptable, which then prevents search, discussion, and renewal. Fiol and Lyles point out 
that “superstitions or organizational “success” stories can create the inability or unwillingness to 
change” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 808). Stevenson (1976) speaks of “glory days reminiscing” and 
“wishful thinking” as mechanisms that help to create a non-rational set of core competences. 
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These two mechanisms, both intuitive rather than rationally planned, limit the need for 
rethinking core competences, and thus lower the firm’s TCC awareness. 
Summarizing, firms that asses their TCC in a rational deliberate manner as described in the 
literature are considered to have a higher TCC awareness than firms that perceive their core 
competences as a culturally determined fact. These two dimensions to examine TCC awareness 
also provide the materials to answer the third operational research question – what is the TCC 
awareness of the firm? 
3.1.4 Integration Mechanisms 
The market orientation and core competence perspective have in common that they both call for 
crossing functional boundaries. Both stress that those working in the marketing & sales domain 
as well as those working in the technological domain of the firm should have an understanding 
of (potential) customer needs and of technological possibilities. Thus, next to an environmental 
orientation and a high level of Technological Core Competence Awareness, firms need to 
integrate the views and actions of different groups in the organization. In other words, there is a 
need for organizational mechanisms that bring the external market information and internal 
technical capabilities information together.5 In this study we have labelled such mechanisms 
Integration Mechanisms. 
In the core competence literature it is stressed that top management must initiate and be 
involved in the identification of core competences, and most importantly must be committed to 
it (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Javidan, 1998; Snyder & Ebeling jr., 1992). 
As stated by Hamel and Prahalad (1994), core competencies are at the heart of the company and 
identifying them cannot be left to the technicians and engineering departments. However, 
representatives of all other functions and departments of the organization should participate in 
the process as well (Bakker, Jones, & Nichols, 1994; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Javidan, 1998). A 
similar emphasis on a total-firm approach can be found in the market orientation literature. In 
short, both schools of thought defend a total-firm approach in which sharing and coordination of 
information throughout the firm is essential (Biemans, Brenčič, & Malshe, 2010; Webster, 1988; 
Shapiro, 1988; Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Slater & Narver, 1990; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Day, 
1994).  
This idea of a total-firm approach is added to the center of our conceptual framework. Then we 
find that for the two streams of information pertaining to opportunity identification – external 
                                                                        
5 This linking of the external and internal information resembles the ideas of the so called ‘marketing-R&D-
interface’, a branch of management-innovation literature that has been in existence since the mid ’70’s of 
the previous century (Griffin & Hauser, 1996). This extensive body of literature offers several ideas of how in 
practice this interfacing could be organized. The basic idea however is in line with two of our fundamental 
ideas of integration mechanisms; Firstly, that it is all about transfer of information and secondly that both 
external market information and internal technological information are needed to develop successful new 
products (Moenaert & Souder, 1990). However, because these studies are not focused on opportunity 
identification or entrepreneurship we have not included them in our framework. Also, the marketing-R&D 
interface literature is in general too narrowly focused on only the marketing and R&D departments while 
many of our case firms do not have R&D departments. The concrete interfacing arrangements mentioned in 
these studies however, did give us a certain general direction of where to look for in our study. 
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and internal – to connect and interact with each other, information must be shared and 
communicated throughout the whole organization. To be expected, then, is that mechanisms 
exist that facilitate this interaction of internal and external information (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). 
The final operational research question is therefore: Which Integration Mechanisms can be 
identified in the case firms? 
Combining the above concepts and operational research questions with the initial framework 
leads to the conceptual research framework which models the New Business Exploration function 
of a firm (Figure 6 Research framework). The reader will notice that the dominant perspective as 
a fourth element has been added to the framework. 
 
Figure 6 Research framework 
3.2 Research approach justification 
In the previous section we developed a framework which implies that firms will be successful in 
identifying opportunities under the following four conditions. Firstly, firms must actively gather 
external information, not only about their competitors and customers in current markets but also 
about other industries, several types of trends and anomalies. Firms that comply to this condition 
we consider to be environment-oriented. Secondly, firms must establish a thorough 
understanding of their distinguishing technological capabilities, which we refer to as a high level 
of Technological Core Competence Awareness. Thirdly, firms should have one or more 
mechanisms to combine and integrate the streams of external and internal information. The 
interplay between gathering of internal and external information, and integrating those two 
types of information is what we refer to as the New Business Exploration function of the firm. The 
fourth condition is that the above three conditions will only be met if the Dominant Perspective 
of management resembles the Creation Perspective, because only then will management see the 
need for combining an external focus with an internal reflection on core competencies. 
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To examine whether this conceptual framework indeed models the NBE function of a firm, it must 
be tested in a real-life context. Because we intend to contribute to the understanding of the 
phenomena of opportunity identification by examining how a theoretically based framework 
holds in an empirical context, this study has a predominantly theory-testing character. If the four 
conditions are present in firms of which we in advance know that they have a track record of 
opportunity identification – as indicated by successful organic diversification in the recent past 
(that is, not as a result of acquiring another firm) – this can be taken as an indication that the 
framework models the NBE function correctly. Theoretically, it might be possible that firms exist 
in which the four conditions are present but have not (yet) resulted in a track record of 
opportunity identification. In this study we have not attempted to include such firms. Firstly, it is 
difficult to identify firms that have been preparing for diversification, internally, but without 
having actually diversified. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely that a firm will 
be able to fully develop an NBE function (as specified by the conceptual framework) before 
making any diversification attempt. We assume, in other words, that learning is involved in 
developing an NBE function. 
The integrating mechanism, which is a main aspect of the framework’s central component, 
remains quite elusive. The framework is based on the assumption that opportunity identification 
happens where external and internal information meet, but opportunity identification theories 
pay little attention to the way these different forms of information are combined. The subject is 
largely ignored by theories that fit within the Eureka Perspective, as they view opportunities as 
external phenomena that are to be discovered by individual entrepreneurs. Theories that fit 
within a Creation Perspective, especially those focusing on the (re-)combination of resources, do 
recognize that external and internal information must be integrated, but thus far no elaborate 
model of information integration has been developed. Hence, there is also a theory building 
component in this study. 
This study therefore takes a hybrid research set-up. A conceptual, theory-based framework will 
be used to examine the relationship of the two, apparently conflicting, opportunity identification 
perspectives (theory testing). Simultaneously a specific component of that framework will be 
developed further (theory building). Although conventional thinking holds that a case study 
approach is suitable for theory building but not for testing (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989), a 
growing number of researchers is arguing that theory testing can be done convincingly with a 
case study method (Johnson, Leach, & Liu, 1999; Hillebrands, Kok, & Biemans, 2001; Dul & Hak, 
2008). 
We therefore adopt the case study as an appropriate method for this study that has both theory-
testing and theory-building elements. In the remainder of this chapter the research methodology 
is described in detail. First the research model, with its operationalizations and logical 
propositions, will be derived from the conceptual framework and research questions. From this 
research model the general set up will be elaborated after which the case selection and research 
domain will be described. The final sections of this chapter will go into details of data collection 
and data analysis.  
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3.3 Research model 
As described above, this study applies a hybrid approach of research. In order to develop theory 
we test a conceptual framework which has one specific component for which a more explorative 
approach is required. The objective of theory testing research is to test propositions (Dul & Hak, 
2008). Therefore the framework and the research questions must be reformulated in testable 
propositions. A proposition is a statement about the relations between concepts6 (Dul & Hak, 
2008, p. 287). Two types of concepts are distinguished: dependent and independent concepts. 
The independent concepts are the inputs and the cause of the dependent concepts; independent 
concept A leads to, results in, or influences dependent concept B (Dul & Hak, 2008). The ideas 
that were introduced in the previous chapter can be formally reformulated into such concepts. 
Firstly, what this study is all about is getting to grips with what is essentially the output of the 
framework and the NBE function which it models; the New Business Opportunity (NBO). This 
fusion of external (environmental) and internal (firm-specific) information is the dependent 
concept as it results from four other – independent – concepts. The first of these is Environmental 
Orientation (EO) which is the width and depth of the environmental scanning of a firm, measured 
in this study by the number of elements in the environment that the firm explicitly monitors and 
the number of elements in the firm that are involved in this monitoring. The second independent 
concept is Technological Core Competence Awareness (TCCA). This is the level of awareness of 
the firm’s own unique technological knowledge, measured by the terms in which the firm’s 
strength is described and the way in which this knowledge has been acquired. The third is the 
Dominant Perspective (DP), describing the dominant logic that management has about 
opportunity identification, described either in terms of the Eureka Perspective or the Creation 
Perspective. The fourth independent concept denotes the way in which external information 
about the environment is combined or integrated with firm- specific internal information about 
key technological capabilities. While the first three independent concepts are theory based and 
can therefore be regarded as concepts we have prior knowledge about, the latter concept is a 
concept we have no prior theoretical knowledge about and which therefore needs an explorative 
research approach. This integrating concept we refer to as Integrating Mechanisms (IM). 
For the purpose of theory testing, propositions need to be formulated that specify the causal 
relations between the above concepts. Dul and Hak (2008, p. 66) distinguish between 
propositions expressing a deterministic relation between two concepts and proposition 
expressing a probabilistic relation. In the latter case, an increase (or decrease) in concept A very 
likely leads to an increase (or decrease) in concept B. Probabilistic propositions are considered 
weaker than deterministic ones because the relation between A and B is in terms of likelihood, 
not certainty. Such a probabilistic relation is not present in deterministic propositions, of which 
three types have been specified: the sufficient condition proposition, the necessary condition 
proposition and the deterministic relation. In the first two, concepts can only be present or 
absent. When concept A is a sufficient condition for concept B, A may be present but this is not 
                                                                        
6 Dul and Hak use the term concepts while others in general have used the term variable in this context. As 
our research set up and strategy are heavily based on the ideas developed in the work of Dul and Hak we 
have chosen to follow their line in the use of terminology continuing using the term concept instead of the 
more commonly used term variable. 
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necessary. If concept A is present it is certain that concept B will be present, but in the absence 
of A, B may be present as well. In contrast, the necessary condition proposition states that 
concept B can only be present if A is present. However, the presence of A may also go along with 
an absence of B. The final deterministic proposition, the deterministic relation, can be expressed 
as “if more of A then more of B”. This type is similar to the probabilistic kind but without the 
characteristic of chance. It can be “recoded” into a sufficient or necessary condition proposition 
by applying a specific cut-off point. Above or below this point a concept is considered to be 
present or absent. By use of such a cut-off point the deterministic concept is dichotomized (Dul 
& Hak, 2008; Goertz, Hak, & Dul, 2013). 
This is what we do when introducing NBO as the dependent concept into the propositions. 
Implied by the conceptual framework are two deterministic propositions: higher EO leads to 
more NBOs, and higher TCCA leads to more NBOs. However, in practice it is very hard, if not 
impossible, to determine the number of NBOs that have been identified in a firm’s recent past. 
Moreover, whether an identified business opportunity will eventually develop into a business 
model, a business plan, or even an actual product introduction into a new market, depends on a 
range of other factors. Most identified opportunities will never reach that final stage. Many are 
discarded along the way, somewhere in the firm, often in an informal context that leaves no 
written record behind. Also possible is that the individual or group involved in product 
development never realized that what they were working on was a potential New Business 
Opportunity. For these reasons it is in retrospect nearly impossible to come up with an accurate 
estimate of the number of NBOs that in a certain timeframe have been identified. 
Therefore, this study uses a cut-off point for the dependent concept NBO, to the effect that we 
will have to formulate necessary condition propositions instead of deterministic propositions. 
The criterion is simply whether a firm is currently active in more than one (niche) market as a 
result of internal, organic diversification. The underlying logic is that a medium-sized firm that 
has conducted such a concentric diversification on its own must have identified at least one New 
Business Opportunity at some point in time. 
The case selection used does not allow for sufficient condition propositions. As will be explained 
in more detail in a later section case firms have been selected of which it was known in advance, 
with reasonable certainty, that they were active in at least two, and preferably three different 
(niche) markets. Thus we assume that each firm had identified at least two to three NBOs in the 
past. In other words, the cases selection has been set up in such a way that the dependent 
concept NBO is always present. As such the dependent concept NBO equals to the Proven Ability 
to Identify Opportunities (PAIO), making NBO and PAIO interchangeable in the research model. 
Given this procedure, the first proposition to be derived from the conceptual framework states 
that an NBO will be identified only if there is simultaneously a high EO and a high TCCA. This 
condition of simultaneity makes it possible to describe the relations between the three main 
concepts - Environmental Orientation, Technological Core Competence, New Business 
Opportunity - with a single proposition: NBO/PAIO occurs only if both EO and TCCA are 
simultaneously high. 
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The two independent concepts will also be dichotomized. For both EO and TCCA we will specify 
a cut-off point that determines whether the concept is present or absent. EO is measured along 
two dimensions: how many elements in the environment are monitored, and how many 
elements within the firm are involved in environmental scanning. Using these two dimensions we 
make a clear distinction between environmental orientation and market orientation – with the 
criteria for environmental orientation being more stringent. An environment-oriented firm “does 
better” on both dimensions than a firm that is “only” market oriented. As to the first dimension 
- monitoring the environment - studies of market orientation tend to require three “external 
elements”: competitors, customers, and preferably a third element. Environmental orientation 
as defined in this study requires two more external elements to be monitored, that is, a minimum 
of five in total. This requirement is justified, at least partly, by the nature of this study’s case firms. 
All are specialized suppliers, “who work in close cooperation with their customers in developing 
and manufacturing their products” (see chapter 1). Thus, the monitoring of customers is not an 
aspect that discriminates between firms. What is more, the fact that all case firms are market 
oriented in this respect adds to the need to introduce a stringent criterion for environmental 
monitoring or scanning. 
Regarding the second dimension, the market orientation literature suggests that, ideally, 
environmental scanning is done by the whole organization. However, this ideal is rarely met. In 
practice, firms are considered to be market oriented if at least the “usual suspects” – sales and 
marketing – are structurally involved in environmental scanning and information sharing, and 
preferably a third organizational unit. In this study a more strict criterion is used for 
environmental orientation. Required for that is that at least four of a firm’s units or departments 
are involved in environmental scanning. 
For TCCA also two dimensions are measured: the level of abstractness in which strengths are 
expressed, and whether the knowledge about one’s own key competences results from pro-
active, deliberate activity or rather from passive, culturally determined suppositions. The 
independent concept of TCCA is taken to be present if a firm’s core competences are described 
in abstract terms (that is, without direct reference to concrete products, technologies, or skills) 
and if the understanding of core competences was pursued deliberately. Proposition P1 presents 
the hypothesized relation between EO, TCCA and NBO:  
 
From the framework description and literature review it became clear that NBO identification is 
influenced by the dominant perspective (or dominant logic). As indicated, “Dominant 
Perspective” (DP) refers to the way those in charge of a medium-sized firm think about 
opportunity identification. DP influences the way the NBE function will be organized within the 
firm but, as explained before, influence in the other direction is possible as well. If a specific way 
to organize NBE is associated with success (even if the success seems coincidental to an external 
observer), this will confirm the management’s prevailing perspective. Therefore, over time, the 
way the NBE function is organized will increasingly reflect the dominant perspective. The 
P1: NBO/PAIO exists only if EO and TCCA are simultaneously present 
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implication, we assume, is that firms in which a Eureka Perspective is dominant will increasingly 
focus their NBE function on gathering external information. In firms in which management has a 
Creation Perspective on opportunity identification, the organization of the NBE function will have 
a more balanced organization in which internal and external information gathering is combined 
with mechanisms to assess and integrate all the information. 
Two aspects of the concept of Dominant Perspective can be distinguished. One emphasizes 
management’s views on the nature of opportunities and the art of identifying those, the other 
focuses on how the NBE function is embedded in the organizational structure of the firm. Thus it 
appears that DP involves both an interpretative, socially constructed component (management 
views on opportunity identification) and an organizational component (the organizational 
structure of the NBE function).  
From the line of reasoning so far it follows that the Creation Perspective is likely to lead, more 
than the Eureka Perspective, to a NBE function that resembles the balanced organization as 
depicted in the conceptual framework. Therefore, proposition P2 states that the Creation 
Perspective leads to New Business Opportunities. Again we create a dichotomy, so that the 
proposition is phrased as a necessary condition proposition. To be sure, the presence of the 
Creation Perspective may lead to the presence or absence of NBO, while the presence of the 
Eureka Perspective is assumed not to lead to the identification of NBO. The formal proposition to 
be tested, then, has the following form: 
 
The two propositions that we presented have a priori known concepts and known relations and 
are therefore testable, as explained. However opportunity identification, arguably the most 
interesting concept in the context of this study, is an unknown concept in the sense that it has 
been formulated as a dark grey box of which we only know that it has two inputs – internal and 
external information – and one output – New Business Opportunities. In terms of the framework, 
opportunity identification connects the two inputs and produces the output, but the exact 
mechanisms at work are still elusive. Moreover, few details are known about the relation 
between this independent unknown concept and the dependent concept NBO. Because of these 
two theoretical gaps – an unknown concept and a poorly defined relation – this part of the study 
does not have a testable proposition, and a theory-building approach will be followed here. For 
matters of clarity, “working” statements will be formulated which reflect these “unknowns”. 
 
 
P2:  NBO/PAIO exists only if the DP is similar to the creation perspective 
S1: The internal mechanisms of the independent concept of IM are unknown; the 
objective is to discover and describe these mechanisms 
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The overall objective of this theory building component is then to formulate new propositions 
about the relation between the mechanisms involved in Opportunity Identification and the New 
Business Opportunities that have been achieved. All these propositions and working statements 
are brought together in the “research model” – not to be confused with the conceptual 
framework – as depicted in figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 Research model 
3.4 General research set-up 
This hybrid research strategy of theory testing combined with a theory building component leads 
to a two-stage research set up. This section will outline these two stages in more detail. 
3.4.1 Strategy for testing necessary condition propositions 
A necessary condition proposition can be tested by selecting a case with dependent concept B 
present, and inspect whether independent concept A is present or absent. If A is present, this is 
an indication that the proposition is valid; if A is absent the proposition is invalid (Dul & Hak, 
2008). For this study we selected cases of which we knew in advance with a reasonable degree 
of certainty that PAIO was present and then we inspected whether EO and TCCA were 
S2: There is an unknown relation between IM and NBO/PAIO; the objective is to 
describe and specify this relation 
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simultaneously present. Next, we examined if the DP met the criteria of a Creation Perspective, 
as defined above. 
Such a test can be done using a single case study (Dul & Hak, 2008). However, if a single case has 
been studied it is possible that test findings reflect features of this particular case, and that 
findings cannot be generalized to a larger research domain. Therefore it seems to us wise to adopt 
a parallel single case study. Theory building is about creating concepts and propositions on the 
basis of empirical evidence (Dul & Hak, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
The primary aim is to generate propositions that need testing in further research (Dul & Hak, 
2008). Theory develops in a continuous cycle between the empirical case data, the already 
existing literature and the emerging theory itself (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In this process, 
the use of multiple cases makes it possible to distinguish between idiosyncratic findings and 
similarities. Eisenhardt argues compellingly that developing theory from multiple cases “typically 
yields more robust, generalizable, and testable theory than single case research” (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 27). Dul and Hak propose a similar strategy in their approach to theory building 
research, which they refer to as proposition building research. They also acknowledge the need 
for more cases for reasons of comparison and hence call for the strategy of comparative case 
study (Dul & Hak, 2008). Alvarez and Barney (2010) suggest that particularly in the study of 
creating opportunities it could be beneficial to conduct a study of comparing a small number of 
cases. 
Hence, for both the theory testing component and the theory building component the use of 
multiple related cases is appropriate even though there is a clear theoretical distinction between 
the serial and the comparative case study. In the former, each case is selected and conducted 
after the results of the previous have been processed, analyzed an evaluated, leading to a serial 
character of research. The latter approach has a more parallel character in which the cases might 
not be conducted simultaneously, but the analysis is done across all cases in a single, grand, 
integrative analysis. Such a cross-case analysis is particularly suited for a comparison in which 
both the similarities and the differences between cases are identified, interpreted and explained. 
However, because both approaches require multiple cases to be studied, we opted to deal with 
both components simultaneously, using the same cases. Each case firm was subjected to a theory 
testing and, in parallel, a theory building exercise. 
Initially, a routine for the theory building exercise had to be developed. This is why we started 
with six case firms which we examined in depth, as in a comparative case study. In each of these 
case firms we were able to arrange four interviews at the management level. For the interviews 
in these firms, an elaborate interview protocol was used. In a following section we will discuss 
the interviewing process in more detail. In the present section it is only noted that the interviews 
were structured, because of the interview protocols, but they were also open. The interview 
protocol was hybrid, containing “straightforward” testing questions but also more explorative 
questions aiming to encourage the interviewees to give broad and complete answers. In order to 
get as much and as rich information as possible we did not try to stop the interviewees when they 
were “wandering off” in their answers. We presented the findings from these cases in two 
conference papers (Wijngaarde, 2009; 2011). This first-stage analysis gave rise to some initial 
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ideas about the Integration Mechanisms, that is, about the process of combining and integrating 
Technological Core Competence Awareness (internal) and environmental scanning results 
(external). In the follow-up stage we tested whether these ideas were confirmed in case studies 
of other firms. In the data analysis section we will explain this process of theory development in 
more detail.  
The analysis, conference feedback, and the preliminary results were used to design a more 
concise interview protocol that was used in the second stage, in which we continued the testing 
of propositions. Although we had a first idea of concrete Integrating Mechanisms, the theory 
development part of the case studies was not completed yet. Because these initial ideas were 
rather clear, concrete, and specific, the term “concept fine-tuning” would be more appropriate 
than ‘theory building’. As a result, the second stage had a strong proposition-testing character 
while theory building (in the form of fine-tuning) became less prominent, to the point that 
additional cases did not appear to enrich the concept any more (Lee, 1999). Once this theoretical 
saturation point (Strauss, 1987) was reached, we stopped interviewing and started the overall 
analysis. In contrast to the first stage, where the six cases had been selected and handled 
simultaneously, in this second stage we moved from one case to another, resembling the serial 
single case study as described by Dul & Hak (2008). A further difference with the first stage is that 
instead of four interviews per case firm we limited ourselves to a single interview with a member 
of senior management, with the exception that on a few occasions we had a “duo-interview”, 
with two managers/directors/owners in a single interview. Because there was no more need for 
exploration we could keep the interviews focused within narrow thematic margins. Relying on 
one interview was possible because the interviewees had agreed a priori to do a full length 
interview, which would often take more than 90 minutes. In a few cases the interview was 
completed with a walk through the firm, extending the whole visit up to half a day. The second 
stage included ten case firms. In short, we conducted this study in a two stage, hybrid set up in 
which we studied sixteen case firms in total. In the first stage there was a balance between theory 
building (along the lines of a comparative case study) and theory testing (parallel single case 
study). In the second stage, best understood in terms of what is referred to as the serial single 
case study, testing became more dominant, and theory building diminished until the point was 
reached where no new relevant information was emerging. Figure 8 Research set up depicts this 
general set up. 
 
Figure 8 Research set up 
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3.5 Case selection 
For a multiple case study, potential case firms must be selected. Despite the importance of theory 
testing, the aim of the selection was not to arrive at a representative sample of cases – as common 
in quantitative hypothesis testing studies. Instead, a selection strategy was used that is often 
referred to as theoretical sampling, which means that cases were chosen on the basis of their 
pragmatic suitability towards the objective of the study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). They 
were chosen because they were expected to present useful cases to test a set of propositions, 
and for that they had to fit within a specific, predetermined profile. This profile was demarcated 
by several criteria. The next paragraphs will discuss the criteria we applied – firm size, technology 
based manufacturing, industry and successful organic diversification.  
The first criterion was firm size. As mentioned, this study is particularly interested in medium-
sized firms which as a typical group have been somewhat neglected in innovation studies, where 
the main interest used to be on either small starting firms or large established and incumbent 
firms.  
In this study we make the distinction between a Eureka and a Creation Perspective. The Eureka 
Perspective seems to fit, almost intuitively, the small starting enterprise with its typical 
entrepreneurial individual, while the Creation Perspective is easily associated with the large 
incumbent firm. This linkage between Eureka Perspective and small start-ups is relatively self-
evident. In both the individual entrepreneur has a dominant role. The connection between 
Creation Perspective and large incumbent firms is less straightforward. In the Creation 
Perspective, opportunity identification requires that one’s own key capabilities (or competences) 
are ascertained. These key competences can be a source of opportunities. 
This possibility of identifying opportunities based on key competences, however, is often 
neglected or even deliberately dismissed by small firms’ management. It is possibly regarded as 
too abstract and not directly adding value to the firm or generating revenues. In large firms, in 
contrast, it seems to us likely that they are more willing to identify these key competences. In 
general large firms have formal marketing departments which are more likely to adopt the 
concept of core competences as it is part of the marketing idiom. The conclusion can be that the 
core notion of the Creation Perspective – that opportunities are created, rather than discovered 
– is to be associated more with large than with small firms.  
Because this study researches the relationship between the two perspectives and their role in 
the identification of opportunities, medium-sized firms provide an adequate theoretical sample 
as they can be taken to be a hybrid type of firms with characteristics of both small starting firms 
and large incumbent firms. It is not easy to offer a sharp definition of medium-sized firms because 
it is not only the number of employees that characterizes them, or the annual revenues. Also 
important are more qualitative factors such as the life stage and the organizational structure of 
the firm. Particularly the edges of the spectrum of medium-sized firms are unclear, so that it is 
hard to tell the difference between a “big small firm” and a “small medium-sized firm”. 
Nonetheless, the medium-sized firm can be considered a type of its own with its own particular 
challenges, advantages and characteristics. Because of this hybrid character, it is likely that in 
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matters of opportunity identification elements of both perspectives will be present within 
medium-sized firms. Because of the expected presence of both perspectives in medium-sized 
firms, it is that we use medium-sized as the first criterion in our case selection. 
A pragmatic choice is to stay close to the Dutch situation and define a medium-sized firm to have 
25 to 250 employees. Ideally, such a firm is an independent company owned by a family or by a 
single stockholder who serves as general director. But it is also possible that a medium-sized firm 
is part of a group, in which case it qualified for inclusion in this study if had a large degree of 
operational, financial and strategic freedom. In other words, the firms studied may legally be part 
of a bigger group but must act and operate as an independent firm.  
As pointed out in a previous section, Technological Core Competence Awareness is one of the key 
concepts of this study. Therefore, firms have been selected that are heavily technology based. 
The competitive advantage of such firms is based on key technologies and firm-specific 
knowledge of technology. Though this criterion applies to both manufacturing firms and service 
firms – for example engineering consultancy firms – in this study only manufacturing firms have 
been selected. Service firms operate in a fundamentally different manner than manufacturing 
firms in areas such as entering new markets (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003), levels of required 
financial investments (Erramilli & Rao, 1993), moments of production and delivery (Habib & 
Victor, 1991), operations (Morris & Johnston, 1987), and market scanning (Peters & Brush, 1996). 
In order to arrive at a homogeneous set of cases we chose to include only one of the two types 
of firms in this study. In other words, as a second criterion we searched for technology-oriented 
manufacturing firms.  
This study applies a ceteris paribus line of reasoning to opportunity identification, in order to 
answer the question whether and how TCC awareness and environmental orientation, other 
things equal, give rise to opportunity identification in real firms. Ceteris paribus is a hypothetical 
condition, strictly speaking, because complete similarity of case firms is unattainable. However, 
it points to the need to achieve a certain level of homogeneity of case firms. Real world firms are 
complex entities operating in a dynamic and complex interaction with each other and with other 
entities – such as governments and consumers – and it is possible that opportunity identification, 
the dependent concept, is also influenced by other concepts than those prescribed in the 
research model. It is not possible to eliminate this “noise”, but a ceteris paribus condition can be 
expected to increase the “homogeneity of the noise”. This means that if the case firms are 
relatively similar, and operating in a relatively similar environment, they most likely will face the 
same external influences. In this way the “noise” will be comparable for all firms, which reduces 
the risk that firms differ in the degree that unanticipated factors (concepts not included in the 
research model) influence the relation between independent and dependent concepts. In short, 
a set of relatively homogenous multiple cases provides for a ceteris paribus situation that helps 
to eliminate alternative explanations of observed phenomena (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). For 
this reason we limited ourselves to one industry made up of a group of firms that is in many 
respects homogenous: the Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry . In the introduction chapter 
a description of this industrial sector was given that offered basic information and added some 
points that are relevant in the present context.  
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The fourth and final criterion follows directly from the research model and has been described 
extensively already. Recapitulating, the dependent concept in the research framework is the 
identification of New Business Opportunities by the case firms. Therefore, the case firms must 
have a track record of several successful opportunity identifications in the recent past. Because 
this property is difficult to observe directly, firms have been selected of which we knew 
beforehand that they were active in more than one (niche) market. The logic is that identifying 
New Business Opportunities is a necessary first step in becoming active in (niche) markets that 
are new to the firm. Hence, being active in multiple (niche) markets is a clear indication of 
successful opportunity identification in the recent past. In other words, we selected potential 
case firms in which it was most likely that the relations as proposed in the research framework 
would be found. According to Flyvbjerg (2006), using cases that clearly have the potential to 
confirm propositions is the best approach to identify critical cases. Such critical cases are those 
that deliver data and information that eventually permits the logical deduction of the type , 
meaning that conclusions drawn from studying such cases may be generalized (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
Summarizing, we narrowed the pool of theoretically possible candidate firms down to firms active 
in the Dutch machine industry that do manufacture machines (in the sense of capital goods), have 
between 25 and 250 employees, operate independently, and have a track record of successful 
opportunity identification as reflected by the fact that they are concentrically diversified, meaning 
that they have clients in several (niche) markets that are all served on the basis of a core 
technology or set of core competences. 
Having demarcated the search domain, we analyzed the corporate information on the websites 
of firms which are members of two large branch organizations – GMV and NEVAT – in order to 
find firms that fit the profile for the first stage of research, which had a theory testing but also an 
important theory building component. From a total of 222 firms that were quick-scanned a long 
list was created with 40 firms of which the website information revealed a clearly diversified 
market portfolio. We contacted the firms on this long list to explain the study and ask for their 
willingness to cooperate. In the end six firms were willing to cooperate, agreeing to have four 
interviews with members of the top management. 
The selection strategy of the second stage was more incremental. Once we had some contacts in 
the Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry , new candidate case firms started to present 
themselves. Some firms were unpromptedly presented to us as possible case firms, but we also 
asked at the end of each interview whether the interviewee had suggestions for other firms that 
might fit our research profile. In this second stage we hopped from case firm to case firm in a 
stepping stone manner. We continued this process until the point was reached that new cases 
did not add new information. In this second stage 11 additional firms were interviewed. One of 
these firms has been excluded from this study as from the interview it became clear that this firm 
was far less diversified than it presented itself (its overall strategy was to specialize in a single, 
specific niche market). Thus, in the second stage of this research ten firms were included. The 
next chapter will briefly introduce all sixteen case firms.  
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3.6 Data Collection 
As already mentioned in a previous section, interviewing was the main data collection method. 
In this section we will explain why we relied predominantly on the interview, followed by a 
description of how we set up the interview protocols and how these were used in the field.  
An often cited argument to include multiple sources of evidence – that is, applying more than 
one data collection method – is that it enables the researcher to come to triangulated 
conclusions. Data triangulation is supposed to enhance a case study’s persuasiveness as it 
addresses the issues of construct validity (Yin, 1994). In theory this may be true, but in practice it 
is not always possible or appropriate to use other methods next to the interview. Documentation, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artefacts 
are mentioned as the main six sources of evidence in case studies (Yin, 1994). We will briefly 
discuss these sources, and explain why in this study the interview is chosen as the primary and 
documentation as a secondary source of evidence.  
Of the six sources, the least applicable in our study is the physical artefact. While it is imaginable 
that some artefacts might be relevant for opportunity identification, the available literature gives 
no directions or hints of a starting point of what to look for. We therefore disregarded this source. 
Direct and participant observation are two other sources that have not been used. In the former 
the researcher takes a remote stance, in the latter the researcher participates in the activities 
that are the object of study. Both are powerful methods of data collection, but in this study they 
are not used because they are hardly reconcilable with a multiple case study that is performed 
within a limited time span. Instant opportunity identification, as in the Eureka Perspective, does 
not occur on a daily basis within firms. And identification according to the Creation Perspective 
may be a lengthy process. In both perspectives, the use of an observation method would require 
the researcher to observe the specific case firm on a continuous, daily basis for a long time: from 
a Eureka Perspective to make sure that the tiny moment of identification is not missed, and from 
a Creation Perspective to make sure that the researcher is able to observe the process as a whole. 
Had we limited ourselves to a single case study within a single firm these two methods would 
have been feasible. However, the set-up of this study – multiple case study in combination with 
the constraint of limited time – made real-time observation neither promising nor realistic.  
If we interpret archival records simply as files in the archives of the case firms, there are two 
reasons why this is an unlikely source of data. Firstly, what we encountered in the field is that 
most medium-sized firms are relatively closed. Although collaboration with other firms and 
external entities is not rare, firm-specific knowledge is safeguarded carefully. Many firms would 
simply not have granted access to their archives. Secondly, even if access to archival records 
would have been granted, the usefulness is questionable. Opportunity identification and the 
other concepts as defined in the research framework are of such a nature that traces of them in 
archival records are highly unlikely. Such records may contain evidence about the follow-up 
activities of a newly identified business opportunity, such as the development of a business 
concept or a business plan, but the activities leading up to identification itself are seldom 
documented, let alone archived.  
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Documentation of the non-archival type is usually part of the public domain and therefore better 
accessible. Again, opportunity identification is not something that is heavily documented, which 
restricted the use of documentation as a primary source. However, we did use candidate firms’ 
websites for our initial screening and selecting, as described earlier. Printed documentation was 
also used. Website information and printed documents such as brochures, leaflets, product 
flyers, anniversary books provided basic facts about firms’ products, the industries they are 
serving, the number of employees, and so forth. Obtaining such information from documentation 
was convenient because it cuts down interview time covering these basic facts, leaving more time 
for research-specific themes and issues. Of course the information in documents of this kind must 
be considered with care. Control questions were asked during the interviews in order to check 
whether the information of the documentation was valid. As described above, in one case the 
discrepancy between information on the website and actual practice was of such magnitude that 
this particular firm had to be removed from the study. In general however, the available 
documentation was valid enough to be used as a secondary source of data. 
By now it should be clear that opportunity identification within firms is often not a deliberate, 
managed or steered activity but rather something that is happening “under the water surface”. 
We can see it, but the view is diffused and distorted by reflections, waves, and the diffraction of 
light. Real-time observation is not an option, for reasons of time and efficiency. Opportunity 
identification is also hardly traceable in documents and archival records. Thus, the human 
memory remains as the primary source of evidence, and interviewing as the preferred method 
to obtain actors’ recollections of opportunity identification activities in the recent past. Besides 
a method for retracing opportunity identification activities, the interview is also a method that 
reveals individuals’ views and opinions about it. We agree with Eisenhardt and Graebner’s remark 
“interviews are a highly efficient way to gather rich, empirical data, especially when the 
phenomenon of interest is highly episodic and infrequent” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 28). 
The use of the interview as a primary method of data collection was also motivated by the fact 
that we were interested in both retrospective information and information about current affairs. 
We opted for the focused interview as described by Yin (1994). Such an interview has a limited 
duration, is still open-ended, takes place in a conversational manner yet has a specific structure 
laid down in an interview protocol (Yin, 1994). Because this study has a two-stage set-up, two 
protocols were developed. The first was based on the research framework, while in the second 
insights from the first stage were included as well. In both stages the focused interview principle 
was used.  
The interviews in the first stage had the following pattern. As a start the MICORD research 
program was introduced. Then the current study was described, though in general terms (such 
as “market innovation”, “finding new markets”). In this first stage we tried to give the 
interviewees only limited information about the background and context of the study, in order 
to avoid “socially desirable” answers (Callegaro, 2008). However, it was necessary to explain 
some concepts in detail at the beginning of the interview, to make sure that the interview would 
not take a totally different direction than opportunity identification. Moreover, during the first 
interviews we noticed that interviewees did not made a distinction between a sales lead and a 
New Business Opportunity. As this distinction was necessary for the quality of the interviews, 
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explaining the concept “genuine New Business Opportunity” (as defined in the conceptual 
framework) became an important objective of the introduction. Another objective was to set the 
interviewees at ease and have them adopt an open attitude towards the interview, not feeling 
intimidated or questioned. After the introduction we first asked about the interviewee’s personal 
background, which included education, previous career, and current function, tasks and 
responsibilities. Again the main point was to get familiarized, creating a relaxed atmosphere 
which often made it possible to ask critical questions in a later stage of the interview. Most of the 
time the personal background discussion moved seamlessly to a discussion of general 
characteristics of the firm, in which key features such as organizational structure, firm size in 
terms of revenue, export figures, number of employees, firm history, main products, and 
manufacturing and sales processes were covered. We tried to keep the discussion of these issues 
as short as possible, as it served mostly as a control of the information already available from the 
documentation sources. 
The rest of the interview followed the interview protocol, addressing three themes in particular: 
context, strategy, and core competences. The protocol was merely used as a guideline; the order 
and the depth of discussing the themes could differ between interviews. As to the theme context, 
we tried to map the external environment of the firm and the way it sees and deals with the 
outside world by asking questions about customers, about market segments that had been 
defined, and also about customers’ customers, competitors, supplier collaboration networks, and 
unique selling points. Strategy and core competences were discussed in combination, although in 
the interview protocol they were separate themes. The interview protocol (with more than 40 
questions) was written down before the start of the interviews. The actual flow of the interviews 
was more organic than anticipated by the interview protocol, and developed in the course of the 
research. In particular, the themes of strategy & strategy development and firm strengths & key 
competencies gradually merged into a single coherent line of questioning. We asked whether the 
firm had a formal or informal strategy, after which we followed up by asking how this strategy 
had been developed within the firm. Then we asked quasi-naively whether during the strategy 
development the key strengths of the firm had been defined as well. Whether the answers were 
positive or negative the logical next question was of course what these key strengths were and 
how they had been identified by the firm. In other words, we started out with a formal 
questionnaire which we gradually used in a more fluid and organic way. However, the protocol 
remained a useful instrument to make sure that all themes were addressed. 
In the second stage we built on insights from the first stage and asked questions that had a direct 
link to concepts in the research framework. The introduction and the personal background theme 
evolved in the same manner, except that we described our research framework and concepts in 
greater detail - so that interviewees were more informed about the research subject. This 
enabled us to do with less interviews per firm. We now had a much sharper focus of what we 
wanted to know and in which direction the research was going. In short, while we were less direct 
and to the point during the first stage, trying to avoid “correct” answers and trying to develop 
theory, in the second stage we became much more straightforward and focused. For example, 
when studying the concept of Dominant Perspective in the first stage we asked for key points in 
the firm’s history in which a new market was explored instead of asking “what is your perspective 
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about opportunity identification?”. From the historical anecdotes a picture could be drawn of 
how the firm sees opportunities. Also asking about the future strategic directions of the firm - to 
diversify or not to diversify, or how to diversify - yielded insightful answers and opinions. In 
contrast, in the second stage we explained the two perspectives as derived from the literature 
and asked interviewees directly to express their opinion about the perspectives. While we used 
in the first stage an extensive questionnaire – the interview protocol as reproduced in Appendix 
A - in the second stage we had a smaller set of questions and we also showed the interviewees 
graphical charts and tables in a PowerPoint presentation to explain our ideas about opportunity 
identification (Appendix B). All the interviews were recorded and were transcribed verbatim. 
These transcriptions were the basis of the data analysis which will be explained in the following 
section. 
3.7 Data analysis 
Describing how qualitative data has been analyzed and how one has come to specific conclusions 
is not an easy task. There are no universal formulas or statistical tests with well-defined 
procedures that can be followed. This is often seen as the Achilles’ heel of case study research. 
Several strategies and step-by-step approaches have been proposed in the attempt to deal with 
the problem, often in connection to other problems of case study research such as validity (Yin, 
1994; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). Still, data analysis is “the most difficult and the least 
codified” part of the process of building theory from case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 539). 
Comparable is Packer’s verdict that “remarkably little is said about analysis in many introductory 
qualitative research textbooks, and what is said is often unclear“ (Packer, 2010, p. 57). Packer 
goes on to say that the available approaches tend to emphasize coding of words or phrases as a 
way to reveal what different interviews have in common. The problem with such coding, he adds, 
is that words and phrases are taken out of their context before they are interpreted, which may 
result in unwarranted similarities. Notwithstanding, in the following we will outline the steps we 
have taken in analyzing the data we gathered during the interviews. As will become clear we did 
several rounds of analysis on different levels. The method of how we handled the data resembles 
Burawoy’s description of the extended case method in which analysis is an ongoing process that 
mediates between field data and existing theory. Two continuous ‘running exchanges’ are 
involved, the first between field notes and analysis, the second between analysis and existing 
theory (Burawoy, 1991).  
3.7.1 Stage 1 Individual case analysis  
The first major round of analysis consisted of a series of individual case analyses of each of the 
first 6 firms at the end of stage 1. In each case the transcripts of the interviews of that particular 
firm were analyzed following this scheme: careful reading –> identifying meaningful text 
fragments –> coding –> scoring –> categorizing. The individual case analysis started by carefully 
reading the transcripts searching for meaningful text fragments which related to the concepts in 
the research framework, on the basis of which they could be coded. Instead of coding merely 
words (or sentences), without context, we coded our interpretation of text fragments of the 
interviewees responses. For example, the words core competences or key capabilities alone were 
not enough to code a certain segment with the label core competence because these words could 
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be used in totally different ways. Therefore the context in which specific words were used was 
taken into consideration as well. We interpreted each segment thoroughly trying to extract the 
true meaning of the interviewee’s responses. Also, sometimes a segment was coded even if the 
exact wording was not present. For example, interviewees sometimes explained what their firm 
is really good at, what attracts customers and make them choose the firm over the competition 
and why it was that the competition was not able to offer a similar product to potential customers 
etc. Without ever using words like core competences or key capabilities. Such text segments were 
nevertheless codified with the label “core competence”.  
After a segment was coded it was further analyzed and scored along the dimensions we 
introduced in section (3.3). To continue the above example; if a segment was coded “core 
competence” it was then analyzed along the two dimensions of the concept of TCCA (3.3). Values 
were assigned for both dimensions in this particular segment, for example: deliberate use of TCC 
& moderate level of abstractness. In this manner the individual case analysis was done for the 
theory testing part of the study - for which we had created measurement scales in advance. For 
the concept of Integration Mechanism, the theory building part of the study, the scoring of coded 
text fragments was omitted as there was no a priori scale established along which to score (3.3). 
For this theory building part of the study, we selected (and later coded) those text fragments that 
pertained to the issue of bringing internal and external information together. These text 
fragments were labelled IM, and listed in a separate database. 
3.7.2 Stage 1 Cross-case quality control and comparison 
After completing the 6 individual case analyses as described above we performed a cross-case 
quality control of all the cases. The aim was to corroborate already found patterns and search for 
additional ones, but also to have a kind of quality check. Questions we asked ourselves were 
among others; “Did we code, score and categorize in the first case in the same manner as in the 
last case?” To ensure this we went through all the interviews again in a single run. “Were the 
interviews ‘rich’ enough”, meaning did we have enough meaningful data in the text fragments 
that could be related to concepts within the framework? It was only after we had inspected the 
quality of the data and made sure that our coding was good enough that we continued with a 
first cross-case analysis of the first 6 firms. In this cross-case analysis we tried to identify patterns 
firstly by listing the firm cases in order of their scores on the several concepts. Then we used 
matrices to identify possible relationships between the several concepts. For example, we 
mapped the firms on a matrix with on the x-axis the level of Environmental Orientation and on 
the Y-axis the two possible Dominant Perspectives, in order to establish whether there was a 
relation between the Dominant Perspective and the level of Environmental Orientation. In that 
manner many possible variations and combinations were tested. The relations we found were 
not very strong, but promising enough to continue the analysis. 
Next to the cross-case comparison we compared our list of text fragments with possible 
Integration Mechanisms. We did not start from a predefined idea how to extract patterns out of 
this “bucket full of possibilities”, which makes it difficult to give an exact description of the 
procedure that was followed. In the end it was a matter of grouping text fragments together that 
had certain similarities. These grouped text fragments of possible IM candidates were included 
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in the stage two interview protocol. Setting up this stage 2 protocol, based on the first stage 
interview protocol and all the preliminary findings described above, was the final step in this 
round of analysis. For this second stage interview protocol we developed tables and matrices of 
categories which are similar to the analytic techniques as described by Miles and Huberman 
(1994). These tools are needed to structure the large body of data and help to see patterns. They 
were used both during the interviews in the second stage to illustrate the interviewees our 
concepts and in the final overall cross-case analysis. 
3.7.3 Stage 2 individual case analysis 
After transcribing all the interviews of stage 2 we performed the same procedure again as we did 
at the end of stage 1: careful reading –> choosing text fragments –> coding –> scoring –> 
categorizing. This time, however, we had a priori ideas about the Integration Mechanisms from 
the results of the stage 1 analysis, that enabled us to categorize the IM text fragments. For those 
remaining text fragments we coded IM but still could not place them in any of the existing 
categories of IM we had another “bucket” file (created in the same way as described above) which 
we filled with IM-candidate text fragments.  
3.7.4 Stage 2 Cross-case quality control and comparison 
This round of analysis was highly similar to the one we described before. Again we did a single 
run of all the cases to ensure similarity between the codings of the very first individual case and 
the last. Concerning the Integration Mechanism we did a final grouping of similar text fragments 
including those text fragments of the stage 2 “bucket of IM candidates”. What followed was a 
final grand cross-case analysis in which we, firstly, tested the propositions as described in section 
3.3. Secondly, we tried to answer our sub-questions and then the main research question. And 
thirdly, we made cross-case comparisons, based on a variety of matrices and tables as described 
above, in order to identify patterns.  
In the next chapter, while describing our observations, we will elaborate in more detail how we 
conducted several analyses. 
 
Opportunity Identification in Practice 
96 
 
4 Observations 
"The nature of reality is this: It is hidden, and it is hidden, and it is hidden." 
Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī, 13th-century Sufi poet 
 
4.1 Introduction of the case firms 
In this first section the case firms are briefly described to familiarize the reader with the sixteen 
firms included in this study. It has been argued that cases, to be convincing, should not be 
presented anonymously (Yin, 1994; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008). However, in the course of 
the study it became clear that anonymity was often a precondition for a firm to cooperate. This 
can be explained partly from the fact that we selected firms from an industry in which the players 
are pretty well known to each other. Also the firms often consider their specific technology and 
know-how as being in need of protection. Even though we made clear that the interviews were 
not about technology itself but about innovation processes, concerns over leaking of technology 
were a show stopper for many firms. Therefore, early in the study the decision was made to 
anonymize all firms. 
In this section we first introduce the individual case firms by briefly presenting their product-
market portfolios and their firm histories. We take a historical perspective depicting the firms’ 
product-market-portfolios, focusing in particular on the points in time when opportunities were 
identified. This way the case descriptions begin to address the issue of diversification, the 
indicator for the dependent concept opportunity identification in the research model (Figure 7 
Research model).  
Because opportunity identification narratives are often insightful and powerful, some have been 
included as well. They will be presented in the sections that follow the introduction of case firms. 
These sections will present the observations for each independent concept of the research model 
individually.  
4.1.1 Lime-Dry 
Lime-Dry was founded at the beginning of the sixties of the last century as a metalworking jobber 
firm with a regional scope. In its early years it relied predominantly on a single, large customer 
for whom it manufactured specific machinery parts and components on request. Being a family-
owned enterprise it remained a jobber until the son of the founder-owner took over the firm. 
Realizing that the margins as a jobber in general would remain low, this new owner set out to 
find a “product of its own” that over the years could develop itself, market- and technology-wise. 
The idea behind this was that by creating a relative unique product the margins would 
substantially increase. After an extensive internal and external search it became clear that making 
the jump from being a jobber in the Dutch food industry to becoming a full-fledged machine 
manufacturer in this well-developed sector was the most promising direction. After obtaining a 
patent, in the late eighties the first machine with a very specific food processing function was 
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introduced. To this day the ongoing jobbing activities and this specific machine remain the two 
pillars of Lime-Dry. In this study we focus only on the machine manufacturing pillar. The function 
of the machine within food processing is so specific that according the management Lime-Dry 
faces hardly any competition.  
Over the years it became apparent that the typical characteristics of the machine could be used 
in other industries besides food as well. Currently Lime-Dry is also active in the chemical 
(including plastics) and pharmaceutical industry. The most recent diversification is into the field 
of the electrical/hybrid car for which a machine variant has been developed that is used in the 
process of manufacturing a new generation battery packs. 
It should be realized that although Lime-Dry operates in four different industries, it only serves 
specific niche markets within those industries. It should also be kept in mind that Lime-Dry is one 
of the smaller firms in this study. It has approximately 25 employees in a traditional organization 
structure which is best characterized as Mintzberg’s (1980) simple structure. There are no formal, 
well-developed departments, and the owner/director has a strong direct influence throughout 
the whole firm. In Mintzberg’s terminology one could speak of direct supervision. The 
diversification broadened the firm’s scope considerably, despite its small size. From a local jobber 
it developed into an international player operating in Great Britain, France, Germany and the Far 
East. The company is currently owned by the third owner who bought it from the son of the 
founder around the year 2000. 
4.1.2 Shorty 
Shorty is a typical family-run machine manufacturer. It was founded as a two man enterprise in 
the mid-seventies, starting as a distributor-importer of machines from abroad. In the mid-eighties 
the firm entered a second stage in which next to selling machines it also started doing after-sales 
services and selling second-hand machines, particularly for the pharmaceutical industry. In the 
early nineties it was more and more felt that the foreign “of the shelf” solutions they were selling 
were not good enough, and that they themselves could come up with better designs. The 
company entered a new stage in which they started to design and implement complete turnkey 
solutions. From a firm that was importing, refurbishing and selling single machines it developed 
into a firm that was able to engineer complete production lines with several different machines 
lined up that work as a single production unit. The individual machines were mostly supplied by 
other – often foreign – manufacturers and Shorty specialized in bringing all these individuals 
machines together to solve a specific customers‘ production problem. In these production lines 
many of the “handling” machines – machines that handle, move, sort, transport the intermediate 
products between the individual machines – were developed by Shorty itself. Besides designing 
such handling machines and the engineering of complete composite production lines, Shorty also 
started to continuously upgrade and reinvent existing manufacturing machines. At this point the 
firm had become a true machine manufacturer, doing its own development, engineering, 
manufacturing, selling and marketing of its brand and products. In this stage the firm left the 
pharmaceutical industry as a market niche behind and found the “small & special bread” branch 
as its main niche market. Due to external forces this market became less favorable in the mid-
nineties and a transition was made into the meat processing market. Currently, the firm has about 
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50 employees and a large part of its revenue is generated by export. The firm is still owned by 
the two original founders and although some responsibilities have been delegated overall the 
real control is still firmly in the hands of these two founders, who are running it in a way that 
resembles the coordination mechanism of direct supervision (Mintzberg, 1980).  
4.1.3 Henry’s 
This firm is also rooted in the food industry. It started out as a supplier of machinery for a specific 
niche in the food processing industry. From this basis it broadened its product-market portfolio 
into other sectors within the food industry and in other non-food industries. At the time of the 
interviews Henry’s was active in several subsectors of the food industry, a specific niche in the 
medical industry, the electronics industry and the paper & photographic materials industry. In all 
these industries it predominantly focused on handling machines rather than production 
machines7. Overall it had a broad product-market portfolio, offering both standard machines and 
specials. Because margins were under pressure, the firm’s portfolio and its strategy were being 
evaluated at the time we visited them.  
As a result, the firm went through several organizational changes in this period, but it has retained 
a functional organizational structure with functional groups or departments such as sales, R&D, 
engineering, and production. The organizational changes were mainly focused on how to 
organize the relation between the externally oriented sales and marketing functions and 
technically oriented functions like R&D and production. Overall, the firm´s structure and method 
of management control comes close to Mintzberg´s (1990) machine bureaucracy, including the 
standardization of work processes. In the period of the interviews the firm had about 70 
employees. Henry’s is part of a larger group but has a broad mandate to operate like an 
independent enterprise.  
4.1.4 Homer 
Homer’s main product is a coating machine. The evolution of the market portfolio for this 
machine shows a remarkable repetitive pattern. It “hopped” from the tool industry to the 
decorative industry, from which it moved to the automotive industry. Homer started in the late 
1960s as a coating firm, doing coating jobs for other firms. With the introduction of a new coating 
technology, in the early 1980s, the firm began to develop, manufacture and sell its own coating 
machines in the professional tooling industry. Similar to Shorty it moved from “building under 
license” to developing its own products because it was not satisfied with the product built under 
license. The jobbing activities remained essential for generating revenues. Beginning of the 
nineties the firm stumbled upon the “decorative” market which it entered successfully. While in 
the tool industry the firm’s customers had mainly professionals as their customers and end users, 
in the decorative market the end users are consumers (the products are all kinds of household 
and consumer products). At first products for decorating indoors such as doorknobs and 
bathroom taps where the dominant market, but later Homer moved into the business of coating 
                                                                        
7 Production machines manipulate and alter the input of raw materials or semi-finished goods. 
In handling machines the input of the machine is not altered or manipulated. Handling machines 
transport, sort, stock, de-stock, stack etc. semi-finished goods within a production line or process. 
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of electronic devices such as mobile phones. Because this market was so successful the 
professional tool-market became neglected. Then, by the end of the nineties, Homer entered the 
automotive industry in car manufacturers were forced, for environmental reasons, to engineer 
more efficient engines. Hard coating of car engine components was one crucial element in this 
development process. Again, Homer became so successful in this market that the previous 
lucrative market was neglected. At the time of the interviews the automotive industry was the 
dominant market for Homer. While the “deco-market” is regarded as a past success – due to 
cheap newcomers from China – the firm is aiming to find its way back into the tool market.  
Over the years Homer has grown into a firm with about 100 employees. Ownership has switched 
several times. In the mid-nineties the founder sold the company to an industrial group, and the 
firm was split into two independent entities: a jobbing enterprise and a machine manufacturing 
company. In this study we have focused only on the latter. Currently the firm is owned by a 
Japanese industrial group and although it is limited in its large scale investment decisions by the 
group, on a day-to-day operational level it operates independently. 
4.1.5 Bee Hurst 
Bee Hurst was founded in the early 1980s by four individuals, two of which are now the remaining 
owners of the enterprise. It is not a machine manufacturer in the strict sense as it manufactures 
subsystems and components rather than machines. It develops and produces measure and 
control devices for gas and fluid flows according to a particular physics principle. This combination 
of measuring and controlling in a single device or system is the core around which the firm 
continuously develops new products. It started out with equipment for gas flows but by the end 
of the eighties, devices for fluids were developed as well. These devices are far more generic in 
nature than the machines manufactured by the other firms in this study and they are applicable 
in many industries. Therefore, Bee Hurst has always been active in many different industrial 
segments such as aerospace, automotive, semiconductor, analytic labs.  
For this research we focused on a second product line which uses another physics principle for 
measuring flows. By the end of the 1990s the technical prospects of further developing the first 
product line seemed to get worse, and the idea was born that equipment based on this principle 
might have benefits to specific industries and thus might open up new markets. Because it did 
not itself have the necessary fundamental and practical knowledge Bee Hurst engaged in 
cooperation with a university and another company, in the attempt to acquire knowledge about 
this principle. After eight years of research and development the first device based on the new 
principle was sold. The equipment turned out to be successful in many industries, among others 
the pharmaceutical, perfume, and semiconductor industry, and it has now been organized as a 
separate business unit within Bee Hurst.  
Currently Bee Hurst operates in a wide array of industries: biotechnology, medical, 
pharmaceutical, health care, energy, metallurgy , food & beverages, semiconductor and the 
chemical process industry. Since its founding most of its revenues have been earned in export 
markets. At the time of the interviews the firm had about 220 employees.  
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4.1.6 Golden Age 
Founded in the first decade of the 20th Century, Golden Age is the oldest firm we have researched, 
and some of its successful opportunity identification moments lie in the remote past. It started 
as a metal works and machine manufacturer, producing a wide array of products ranging from 
bridge components and wagon parts to cheese-turning machines. During World War One, Golden 
Age started servicing and supplying spare parts for a specific type of food-drying machine for a 
large international food processing company that could not import new spare parts from the 
United Kingdom due to the blockade. Reverse engineering (in today’s parlance) enabled Golden 
Age to develop and manufacturing these machines completely by itself. Slowly the firm 
specialized in manufacturing this type of drying machine but only after World War Two it was 
decided that this machine would be the main product. Soon, several varieties were introduced. 
This product is predominantly sold in the food processing industry and has always remained the 
principle revenue generator. In the early seventies a new type of peeler machine was developed 
that has unique properties. This product line is still part of the firm’s portfolio and is solely sold 
in the food processing industry as well. In the 1960s, Golden Age also started to develop machines 
for the chemical industry. In these industries solidifying machines are offered, next to drying 
machines. In the mid-eighties a specific drying machine was developed for the water treatment 
and purification industry, which is the most important final new industry that was entered. 
Currently, Golden Age is active in food-, chemicals- and water treatment and purification, offering 
several types of drying, cooling, peeling, flaking and solidifying machines. Having about 115 
employees on the payroll at the time of the interviews it was one of the larger firms we 
researched. It is still owned by the founding family.  
4.1.7 Luminata 
Luminata is also an enterprise with a long history and with several successful opportunity 
identification moments in the remote past. It was founded right after World War One as a 
German subsidiary in the Netherlands, bypassing as such the restrictions of the Versailles treaty. 
It designed and manufactured a range of optical devices and equipment mainly for the defense 
industry. The defense sector has always remained very important but the rise of the 
semiconductor industry enabled Luminata to find a new niche for its high-tech optics knowledge. 
Over time this semiconductor industry became the main revenue generator. Next to the defense 
and semiconductor industry Luminata is on a small scale active in the medical sector. 
Occasionally. Some work is done for other industries but this is considered incidental, outside the 
strategic marketing scope. The above success stories are in the remote past, which is why we 
have only sparse information about the opportunity identification process in these cases. 
However, the worldwide crises of 2008 led to a steep decline of revenues in the semiconductor 
sector, and the firm had to fundamentally rethink its raison d’etre. By the time of the interviews, 
Luminata was in the middle of this process, in which new Market Opportunities were assessed 
and key technological capabilities identified. In this period, Luminata had about 100 employees 
and the company was run in a way that reminds of Mintzberg’s standardization of work processes 
in a machine bureaucracy structure. 
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4.1.8 Dully 
Dully is a good showcase for this study for several reasons. It has relatively recently moved from 
one industry to another, which makes an interesting case from an opportunity identification point 
of view. We interviewed the two current owners who had guided the firm through this “industry 
hopping” process, giving us first-hand information. What makes this case intriguing is the fact 
that the owners themselves think that diversification is not possible in the Machine 
Manufacturing Industry . Their main argument is that reputations and brand names of existing 
machine manufacturers in existing niche markets are so strong that entering a new market is 
nearly impossible. Which is a remarkable statement if one considers their own track record in 
matters of diversification. Similar to the current owner of Lime Dry, the two current owners of 
Dully were initially not entrepreneurs in the sense that they owned their own company. Both 
worked as regular employees in other branches than the Machine Manufacturing Industry . Right 
after the millennium they had the chance to purchase Dully, then a manufacturer of cattle 
stables. The company had gone through a series of very unprofitable years and its future was less 
than promising. Something had to be done and it was decided that at a short notice a new line of 
products had to be developed along the lines of precision engineering, for introduction in new 
markets. The firm did not have the technological capabilities for such a development trajectory 
but, fortunately, it could rely on the engineering and sales core of another machine manufacturer 
which had just gone bankrupt. This “knowledge boost” enabled Dully develop in a very short time 
its own precision engineered machine for the vegetable and fruit processing industry. The 
company completely moved out of the cattle stable market and incrementally made its way into 
niches of the vegetable and fruit processing industry. Currently, it has several vegetable and fruit 
based product lines with which the whole processing of vegetables and fruits can be 
accomplished. In short, Dully made the step form a heavy metalworking industry into precision 
engineering in completely different markets. At the time of the interviews the firm had about 50 
employees. 
4.1.9 Magnum 
Magnum shows great similarities with Shorty, not only in size – about 40 employees at the time 
of interviewing – but also in culture. The interviewed director/owner, who also founded the firm, 
showed all the traits that are often associated with the classical entrepreneur: the stubborn 
individualist with “his feet deep in the dirt”, with a negative attitude towards established 
institutions (as incumbent firms, banks, universities), and with a strong sense of being a self-made 
man. Magnum, a small firm operating for the food industry in the field of industrial heating and 
deep-fry equipment, has an organization structure and coordination mechanism that resemble 
Mintzberg’s (1980) simple structure and direct supervision. The firm was founded around 2000 
and acted the first years as a one man show. The founder-owner started the firm at a very young 
age after a brief period of working as a welder-construction worker for a machine manufacturer. 
Based on this experience he started as a freelance welder, doing construction and repair jobs. 
Soon, however, the first improved machine parts were being designed and manufactured and 
the firm became a manufacturing firm itself. As workload and orders grew rapidly due to the 
extensive personal network of the owner, employees had to be hired. Though different industries 
were being served from the start, the food industry happened to become the mainstay industry 
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for Magnum. The first employees came from a competitor that was taken over, which is a way to 
acquire technical and commercial knowledge that may be typical for this industry – it was also 
seen in the Dully case. Overall, Magnum shows a remarkable path from an individual freelancer 
to a full-fledged enterprise which exports and competes successfully against the large 
internationals in its line of business. The firm currently has a catalogue of several machines and 
production lines for heating, cooking and freezing of meat and poultry, but it also branched out 
into the vegetable segment of the food industry. 
4.1.10 Smokey 
Among the case firms in this study Smokey has a unique firm history. While other firms started 
as independent enterprises, Smokey was an internal service and repair department in a tobacco 
company. Until the 1970s the manufacturing of tobacco products was labor intensive, and when 
labor costs increased the “mother company” had two options: vigorously increase automation in 
the production process or outsource manufacturing to low-wage countries. Outsourcing was 
chosen because the investments needed for automation were regarded too high, even though 
the service and repair department had already developed machinery to automate a large portion 
of the manufacturing process. Soon, however, it was found that automation was still necessary 
for reasons of efficiency, despite outsourcing. It was decided to develop not machines to 
automate the whole process, but cheaper machines to automate only specific parts of the 
manufacturing process. These machines, then, turned out to be so successful that in the mid-
eighties other tobacco manufacturers became interested in them. Remarkably, it was decided to 
sell the machines to these competitors, which for the service and repair department was a major 
step towards becoming a full-fledged machine manufacturing firm. Its R&D and innovation efforts 
went through three stages. Firstly, under pressure of higher output requirements and 
increasingly strict safety regulations, the existing machines were constantly improved. Secondly, 
a new type of machine was developed for a new type of tobacco product. Again, a machine was 
developed that was unique for the industry and again competitors showed great interest, 
assuring favorable revenues. Thirdly, over time more portions of the manufacturing process were 
automated with newly developed machines, especially the handling process at the end of a 
production line. It were these end-of-line handling and packaging machines that allowed for 
venturing into new, non-tobacco markets. While the first machines had been very typical for the 
tobacco processing industry, the end-of-line handling and packaging machines were more generic 
in nature. Then the department had some adventures outside the tobacco industry, for example 
in the glass industry, but economically these were not very successful. These non-tobacco 
opportunities were unplanned and they were handled as “specials”. They occurred around 2000 
and work was done in close cooperation with another machine manufacturing company whose 
employees were soon taken over by Smokey. What followed were diversification attempts 
according to a kind of “shotgun strategy”. Any possible industry was aimed at, and prototyping 
projects were set up to see which industry was the most promising. This strategy was only 
partially successful. Opportunities were found but they were not very satisfactory in financial 
terms, and at the time of the interview the firm had just decided to change its diversification 
strategy – from the shot-gun strategy to approaching a few carefully chosen industries. To 
facilitate this new approach the department was granted more autonomy, to the point that it can 
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be considered now a stand-alone enterprise. It arranged its own administrative and financial 
functions, added a dedicated non-tobacco account manager to its sales team, and made 
resources available to strengthen the organization overall. Currently Smokey has 60 employees. 
It is aiming to serve the chocolate, perfume and pharmaceutical industry, next to the traditionally 
tobacco industry. For these new industries it develops end-of-the-line handling and packaging 
technology and machinery.  
4.1.11 Chimney 
Chimney followed a traditional path, comparable to many other Dutch machine manufacturing 
firms. It was founded at the beginning of the 20th century. The founder of the firm, a blacksmith, 
started to repair and service machine parts for the regional leather tanning industry. A next step 
was made around World War Two, when the firm started to replicate machines used in the 
tanning industry, thus changing itself into a machine manufacturing firm. In the 1970´s Chimney 
not only manufactured and serviced machines for the tanning industry but also for a wide range 
of other manufacturing industries for which it produced small machines and machine parts for 
other firms’ repair and service departments. All these opportunity identification moments are in 
the remote past. Quite recently, however, Chimney acquired a small engineering firm – four 
employees – specialized in engineering and R&D projects for the aerospace industry. This 
absorption of new knowledge enabled Chimney not only to venture into new opportunities in a 
particular aerospace segment and in aerospace-related segments. For this study we mainly 
focused on this latter diversification.  
Currently, Chimney has defined four types of projects: service and repair, assembly, built to print 
and special machinery. While the first two are of importance the latter two types of projects 
generate about 80% of the firm’s revenue. These two are therefore seen as the core business of 
the firm, and they are seen as mutually reinforcing. Chimney has two remarkable features. Firstly, 
it has no sales force or department of its own, relying instead fully on external agents. Secondly, 
it has no defined markets or market segments to operate in. Instead, it has defined client profiles 
in which requirements are described that potential customers should meet. Agents are sent out 
with these specific client profiles but without specific industries in mind, as potential customers 
that fit the profiles may be found in many different industries. Similar to Henry´s, however, the 
firm has grouped currently served customers into specific segments for the sake of marketing 
and promotion. The main objective is to trigger a process of recognition at potential customers 
that will attract them to Chimney. The currently served segments are manufacturing industries, 
food, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, defense (aerospace), and packaging. Chimney seeks new 
opportunities by pro-actively searching in new industries on the basis of its technological 
knowledge and, somewhat more passively, by trying to increase the likelihood of being found by 
new potential customers. At the time of the interview the firm had about 65 employees and 
generated 25% of its revenues by exports. 
4.1.12 CelaVita 
CelaVita followed a path in becoming a machine manufacturer similar to Shorty. It was founded 
at the end of the Second World War as a machinery trading and distribution company, dealing 
primarily with machinery for the meat industry. As it not only sold the machines but also installed 
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them on site, its technological knowledge grew over time, enabling the firm to sell and install 
large meat processing lines mainly to Eastern Europe. For clarity, CelaVita did not develop or 
manufacture machinery, but traded and installed machines on behalf of third parties. With the 
fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 the main markets in Eastern Europe started to decline rapidly. 
Around the millennium the current four owners bought the firm and set in motion a process of 
strategic change. An internal assessment to identify the raison d’etre and the key strengths of 
the firm resulted in the decision to develop and produce own products instead of remaining a 
distributor for third parties, in order to increase revenues. A second strategic redirection was to 
broaden the scope from solely the meat processing industry to any sector in the food industry in 
which CelaVita’s technological knowledge and skills would be applicable. This new course of 
action, combined with a rigorous cost cutting program, turned out to be successful. At the time 
of the interview the firm had 100 employees spread over the main location in the Netherlands 
and several international sales offices. The firm develops and manufactures single processing and 
packaging machines for what it refers to as “wet-food-sector”, meaning any food that is 
somewhat moist and has a short expiration date. Besides single machines CelaVita also endeavors 
in turnkey projects in which whole production lines are developed and assembled for these 
specific sectors within the food industry. 
4.1.13 Tubby 
Tubby is another typical family enterprise: Founded by the father 25 years ago and soon taken 
over by the son. Since its foundation Tubby has specialized in developing and manufacturing 
machinery for the snack industry. The product portfolio can be broken down into three basic 
product groups, defined by fundamentally different snack processing techniques: deep-fried 
potatoes, coated peanuts and pellet-based snacks. At first glance this firm seems to be the least 
diversified of the firms in this study but closer inspection reveals that diversification is a relative 
concept and the degree of diversification is in the eye of the beholder. From the start, Tubby has 
manufactured machines and product lines for the three product groups. From this point of view 
the firm does not seem to have diversified at all, but the devil is in the details. With 95% of total 
revenues coming from exports, and sales in 50 different countries, Tubby’s diversification is not 
so much a matter of diverting from the three basic product groups but of applying the technology 
of these groups in local niche markets around the world. Despite globalization it is remarkable 
how many different local snacks can be found. Each such regional snack has its own specific 
production process and for each local snack a customized machine or production line has to be 
designed, on the basis of the technology of one of the three product groups. Besides this micro-
diversification at the time of the interview Tubby was in the process of expanding into the meat 
processing industry as they saw potential in the deep-frying and grilling of meat. The problem 
Tubby faces is not to link its own technological capabilities to market demands, but to overcome 
conservative tendencies in the food sector. Similar to Dully, Tubby has experienced that potential 
customers in new markets are reluctant to switch to newcomers even if these seem to have a 
better proposition than established machine suppliers in those markets. Also, in the past Tubby 
has occasionally been approached for projects that do not fit in the profile of one of the three 
basic processes, such as machinery for processing airliner foods or an automated omelet baking 
line. With 12 employees Tubby is one of the smallest firms we visited, but the firm considers itself 
Observations  
105 
 
the central actor in an ‘extended enterprise’ network. In the 25 years of its existence, Tubby has 
built a tight supply network of enterprises which develop, engineer, and produce components, 
subsystems and semi-finished products for them. At the peak of their capacity, approximately 
160 FTEs are working at their projects dispersed over this network. Tubby focuses on marketing, 
sales, R&D, assembly, and the worldwide installation of the machinery and product lines. 
4.1.14 Thames 
Thames went through several stages of diversification. In the first stage Thames diversified non-
organic by merging with other firms. Founded at the beginning of the sixties it started as a little 
nautical machinery repair shop for the local fishing fleet and other small metalwork repair jobs. 
From this humble beginnings the firm moved forward from repairing machinery on fishing boats 
to manufacturing and installing equipment, machinery and complete on-board deck processing 
lines. End of the seventies the firm merged with another machine manufacturer who brought in 
more specific process technology knowledge to the new firm. At the beginning of the nineties 
another merger brought in knowledge about packaging technology. In all these years the fishing 
industry has been the predominant market segment. Around 2000, however, the firm diversified 
organically into flower packaging. The processing of fish on board and the processing of flowers 
is remarkably similar when broken down into single steps. By combining the technologies for 
packaging and processing fish a new industry of flower handling and processing could be entered. 
A similar line of analogue reasoning was used to enter the potato, vegetable and fruit (PVF) 
handling and processing market. Currently Thames has defined for itself these four different 
industries – fishing fleet, PVF, flowers, packaging for other industries, as it main markets. 
However, the current owners (since 2006) state that they are constantly looking for other new 
possibilities in which they can repeat such market introductions based on their current 
technology base. The firm has about 65 employees, and exports are responsible for 20% of the 
revenues. 
4.1.15 Quad 
Quad is one of the youngest firms we studied. It was founded in 2004 and its start could not have 
been more ideal. Usually a newly founded enterprise must try to find customers, but in the case 
of Quad the customers literally asked the founders to start up the enterprise. The background for 
this is that the founders left another machine manufacturing firm after a semi-hostile takeover. 
They disagreed with the firm’s new direction and, apparently, so did the then-customers. These 
customers asked a group of ex-employees of the former firm to start up a new machine 
manufacturing firm. Quad specializes in “end-of-the-line” packaging machines which come into 
action once the end-product of the customer is already placed in its primary packaging by a filling 
machine – e.g. fluids in bottles, cheese in plastic sealings. Thus, Quad’s machines are used for 
handling, transporting and packaging at the end of the production line. Because of the generic 
nature of this type of machines Quad is able to operate in a wide array of industries. 
Diversification is hardly a deliberate choice, but follows from the nature of this type of machinery. 
Although Quad’s first customers were active in the graphical industry, soon the activities spread 
out into the food, chemical, printing, and paper industry. At the time of the interviews the firm 
still had only 14 employees, but a new managing director was hired to prepare for both 
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quantitative and qualitative growth in the near future. Though growth via expanding on existing 
markets abroad has the primary focus, finding new industries on the basis of current products 
and product lines is a strong focus as well. 
4.1.16 BBC 
With about 140 employees BBC is one of the larger firms in this study. It operates in a broad field 
of the machine industry, acting as a second tier supplier that produces machine and metal parts, 
as a first tier supplier that develops and manufactures complete sub-systems for large OEMs, and 
as OEM as the firm has a line of own products and so-called “specials”. These activities are 
organized in four business units: a jobbing unit for small parts, a prototyping and small series 
manufacturing unit, a printing machine unit, and a “specials” unit. With such a range of activities 
BBC serve many different industries, such as the food, the solar-cell, the medical, and the 
semiconductor industry. The firm was founded in 1976 as a jobbing enterprise but at the time 
that the current owner-general manager bought the firm, in the mid-nineties, it had already 
developed into a machine manufacturing enterprise. It then branched out into all these different 
industries, but retaining the distinct approaches of being a jobber, a prototype manufacturer, a 
standard product line producer, or a special machine manufacturer. This way, BBC developed into 
a firm with four separate divisions. At the time of the interview the path towards independence 
of each division was completed by turning the divisions into separate business units, each with 
its own HRM, finance, accounting and sales resources.  
4.1.17 Summary key information case firms 
In the table 7 the key information of the case firms is summarized. 
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LIME DRY Managing-
director/owner 
Sales manager 
Manager 
engineering 
Single 
shareholder 
25 No data 80% - Food 
- chemicals  
- plastics 
- pharmaceuticals 
- automotive 
                                                                        
8 We used as much as possible the title the interviewees used themselves when asked for their function. As 
expected in the larger firms the interviewees had formal titles, while in the smaller firms interviewees often 
lacked formal titles. In these cases we picked a title that fitted best the description that was given of activities 
and responsibilities.  
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SHORTY Managing-
director/owner 
Technical 
director/owner 
Account-
manager/near 
future owner 
Family owned 50 No data No 
data 
- bread & pastry 
- Meat  
- snacks 
HENRY’S account 
manager 
Sales director 
Manager 
engineering 
Member of an 
industrial group 
70 No data <10% - food industry 
- medical 
- electronics  
- paper & 
photographic 
materials 
BEE HURST Technical 
director/owner 
managing 
director of 
subsidiary 
 Sales manager 
General 
director 
Two 
shareholders
 
  
220 No data No 
data 
-biotechnology 
-medical 
-pharmaceutical 
-health care 
-analytic 
-energy 
-Metallurgy 
-food & Beverages 
-semiconductor  
-chemical process 
HOMER CEO 
Commercial 
director 
Product 
manager 
Director 
operations 
Member of an 
industrial group 
120 No data No 
data 
-Tools 
-Decorative 
-automotive 
GOLDEN 
AGE 
manager 
process 
engineering 
sales manager 
managing 
director 
Family owned 115 30 
million 
95% -food 
-chemicals 
-water treatment 
and purification 
LUMINATA - marketing 
sales manager 
shareholders 100 10 
million + 
No 
data 
-defence 
-semi-conductor 
medical 
DULLY Commercial- 
and product 
manager 
General 
manager 
Two 
shareholders 
50 5 million 
– 10 
million 
No 
data 
- vegetable 
-fruit 
SMOKEY - general 
director 
Subsidiary 60 10 
million 
No 
data 
-tobacco industry 
-chocolate 
-perfume  
-pharmaceutical 
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CHIMNEY - General 
director/owner 
Single 
shareholder 
65 11 
million 
25% -Manufacturing -
industries- 
-Food- 
-pharmaceutical 
and chemicals 
-Defence 
(aerospace)- 
-packaging 
MAGNUM - General 
director/owner 
Single 
shareholder 
50 No data No 
data 
- meat 
- vegetable 
CELAVITA - General 
director/owner 
Four 
shareholders 
100 30 
million 
No 
data 
- Meat processing 
- Sauces & Liquids 
- processing 
- Baby & Toddler 
food 
- Vegetables & 
Fruit 
- Dairy 
- bakery 
- Pet food 
TUBBY - General 
director/near 
future owner 
Family owned 12 8-12 
million 
95% - Potato based 
snacks 
- Coated Peanut 
snacks 
- Pellet based 
snacks 
THAMES - General 
director/owner 
Two 
shareholders 
65 4.5 
million 
20% - Marine/fishing 
- Potato, 
Vegetables, Fruits 
- Flowers 
- Packaging 
QUAD Ex-general 
director/owner 
Current general 
director 
Three 
shareholders 
14 2 million 
+ 
20% - Graphical 
- Chemical 
- Printing 
- paper industry 
BBC - General 
director/owner 
Single 
shareholder 
140 22 
million 
No 
data 
- food 
- Medical 
- Solar cell 
- Semi-conductor 
 
       
Table 7 key information of the case firms 
4.1.18 Thoughts on the level of diversification of the case firms 
The analysis of these firms’ histories and product-market portfolios shows that the diversification 
efforts of the firms we selected were more diverse than we had expected. As a prelude to the 
rest of this study, two issues are dealt with in this section. First, as already mentioned in one of 
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the case descriptions, diversification is a relative concept. Some firms, for example Tubby and 
Quad, hardly considered themselves as diversified. In their opinion they simply serve a set of 
firms and no distinction has to be made between market segments. Confronted with their own 
answers, however, they began to realize that they think more in terms of market segments than 
they care to acknowledge. The question can be raised at what point a firm can be considered as 
diversified? Is it when it has for itself defined multiple market segments? Or does an external 
criterion exist that can be used to determine a firm’s degree of diversification? Is a firm that 
defined for itself three market segments within a certain industry to be considered more 
diversified, or less, or equally, than a firm that simply sees one set of customers that happen to 
be in three different industries?  
In the strategic management literature of the late seventies, diversification was often treated 
along the lines of formal structures, groupings and divisions, according to measures that were 
applied by international and national statistics institutes. For example, a dataset we used early in 
this research in order to become familiar with the Dutch Machine Manufacturing Industry was 
the online database of the Dutch Chambers of Commerce. This database holds the data from the 
Chamber of Commerce’s trade register – registration is compulsory for every firm in the 
Netherlands. The database uses the “Bedrijfsindeling Kamers van Koophandel” (BIK) codification 
for categorization of the companies, which is similar to the Standaard Bedrijfsindeling 1993 
(SBI’93) codification used by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). This last codification corresponds to an 
international standard (SIC’93) that was created to make international comparisons possible. In 
other words, there are many related and overlapping schemes to categorize firms according to 
branch or sector or industry. However, there is no generally accepted method to measure a firm’s 
degree of diversification objectively. One of the problems is that in the modern world firms often 
have products that combine technologies, which makes categorization difficult. For example, 
many Dutch machine manufacturers started as metal workers or blacksmiths, which places them 
initially in the metal industry. However, today’s machinery combines metal working, electronics 
and software technologies. As a result, registering such firms as belonging to the metal industry 
does not reflect reality.  
Therefore, we use a more subjective method to determine the level of diversification. Although 
not all interviewees initially subscribed to the idea of segmentation, the interviews show that all 
firms adopted, deliberately or implicitly, a form of market segmentation, except for one firm that 
was eventually excluded from the study. What we focused on is how they talked about their pool 
of customers. Are these customers part of a single, undifferentiated collection, or is some sort of 
categorizing or grouping applied? All firms agreed that they have at least two fundamentally 
different customer groups or segments that require different approaches because of dissimilar 
production processes, end customers, environmental demands, and so forth. In most cases, the 
firms started in a single segment or industry and via the identification of business opportunities 
moved forward, diversifying through time into other segments. From this point of view the first 
analysis confirmed that all the included case firms were indeed diversified in the sense that 
opportunity identification had taken place.  
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A second, more complex issue arose from the preliminary case analysis. In this research we study 
the links between the success of opportunity identification –measured by the presence of 
diversification – and the concepts of environmental scanning, Technological Core Competence 
Awareness, Integrating Mechanisms, and Dominant Perspective on opportunity identification. To 
be able to establish connections between these concepts one must not only find data that pertain 
to each concept or theme, but it is also necessary is that all the concept-related events, 
anecdotes, actions, and statements derived from the interviews refer to the period of time in 
which opportunity identification and diversification occurred. For example, if a firm was founded 
in 1900, and diversified by seizing opportunities in 1915 and in 1950, but the data about EO, TCCA, 
DP and IM gathered during the interviews cover only the period after 1950, there is no overlap 
in time. The consequence is that these other concepts cannot be used to explain the opportunity 
identification events.  
This problem occurred at several case firms. For four firms (Henry’s, Homer, Luminata, Golden 
Age) there was a time lag between the dates of opportunity identification and the time frame 
covered by the interview data. In the following these four cases will be examined more closely in 
order to establish the details and consequences of this time lag for the study. 
4.1.18.1 Henry´s 
In this case it was hard to extract information about past opportunity identification moments 
because all the interviewees had only recently been employed by the firm. However, at the time 
of the interviews the firm was going through a strategy re-orientation process in which current 
markets were evaluated, new markets assessed and new strategic direction developed. In the 
past, Henry´s had diversified several times and managed to enter several different industries, but 
not long before our interviews the firm had become aware of the lack of such market innovations 
in the present. Therefore, instead of focusing on the past in this particular firm, we focused on 
more current events as the opportunity identification process was unfolding right in front of us. 
Unfortunately, the results of this process were not known at the time of the interviews. 
4.1.18.2 Homer 
In Homer’s case there was clearly a time gap because the moments of opportunity identification 
were relatively far in the past and the interviewees had no direct hands-on experience with these. 
Remarkable was that all interviewees had a solid knowledge of the firm’s history as they all 
produced more or less similar narratives. They lacked detailed knowledge of the diversification 
events, unfortunately, but they did acknowledge that Homer operates most successfully in new 
and upcoming industries in which new coating applications and newly developed coating 
machines are needed. Once industries become saturated other machine manufacturers enter the 
market with cheaper products. Currently, therefore, there is a careful search going on for new 
and upcoming industries in which Homer´s knowledge and technology can be exploited. In 
addition, Homer searches for new geographical markets in familiar industries. Therefore, we 
were able to focus in this case on the current state of affairs in matters of opportunity 
identification. Because these current endeavors have not yet resulted in any new diversification, 
it is not possible in this case to establish a relation between the independent concepts and 
depended concept. At the time of the interviews it was clear that at least one potential new 
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industry had been identified as a potential new market, but so far several obstacles prevented 
Homer from actually pursuing this new market. One reason was for example the lack of 
reputation in new markets which is considered to be a powerful deterrent to many machine 
manufacturers, one that makes diversification very difficult. Despite this not actually entering a 
new market the match between the internal and external information, the opportunity 
identification has been made at least once. Therefore, this firm is still a valuable case. Also 
valuable is the information about internal patterns of opportunity identification (such as the 
integrating mechanism) that is obtained from this case. 
4.1.18.3 Golden Age 
A similar scenario can be sketched for Golden Age. Their current market-product portfolio is the 
result of diversification in the remote past. In recent years there were technically sound but 
economically unsuccessful product innovation projects, which made the firm somewhat hesitant 
about entering new markets with new products. Currently the official strategy is to “find new 
markets with new applications for existing machines”. Just like Homer, Golden Age is struggling 
with the question how to continue this process of diversification based on its available core 
technologies. Also in this case we focused predominantly on current opportunity identification 
efforts, the problems faced in this respect, and the current perspective on opportunity 
identification. 
4.1.18.4 Luminata 
Luminata’s opportunity identification narrative resembles that of the above three firms. We 
interviewed the new marketing/sales manager who had initiated a process of strategic 
refocusing. New industries had to be found, as the financial crisis of 2008 had made Luminata 
realize that it depended too heavily on the semi-conductor industry. Like Henry´s, but unlike 
Homer and Golden Age, this strategic refocusing is a deliberate and planned process at Luminata. 
Unfortunately, the process had just begun so that we cannot, again, make a link between the 
efforts made to identify New Business Opportunities and the actual results of these efforts (in 
terms of successfully entering new industries). Again, however, this case offers valuable insights 
in processes of opportunity identification in real world situations.  
4.1.19 Conclusion 
The finding that all the firms in this study are indeed diversified justifies the selection of these 
firms as cases in which opportunity identification has taken place, in correspondence to our 
dependent concept. In four cases we encountered a time lag between the diversification events 
and the period covered by the interview data (informing about the independent concept), but 
there was a clear intent to diversify. These cases are highly informative about the independent 
concepts, even though the time lag prevents a link to be established between independent and 
dependent concepts. In the following sections we present findings and observations about the 
independent concepts – Environmental Orientation, Technological Core Competence Awareness, 
Dominant Perspective on opportunity identification and Integrating Mechanisms. 
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4.2 Environmental orientation 
This section presents observations concerning the Environmental orientation of the firms. The 
aim is to establish whether the firm is customer-led, market oriented or environmentally 
oriented. As explained in the previous chapter, to assess the level of Environmental Orientation 
of the firms we will focus on two aspects of this concept: who in the firm is keeping track of the 
outside world – the Environmental scanning infrastructure – and what elements of the external 
world are being tracked – the scope of the environmental scanning. 
4.2.1 Environmental scanning infrastructure 
In order to assess the environmental scanning infrastructure, the following section presents 
observations at the case firms concerning the involvement of various organizational entities in 
monitoring the business environment. Next to the usual suspects such as marketing, product 
managers and sales, other functional entities such as after sales services, engineering and R&D 
will be examined. The analysis of the level of involvement of each of these entities per case firm 
will result in two types of environmental scanning infrastructure. 
4.2.1.1 Marketing 
Marketing is arguably the first organizational department responsible for scanning the 
environment. Next to an “outbound” function, which dictates how a firm presents itself 
outwards, marketing has an “inbound” function, which is about monitoring the business 
environment (market sensing) and interpreting this external information (sense making). The 
outbound function prescribes the brand color, brand logo, deals with corporate identity, and so 
forth. In terms of this simplified dichotomy we are interested in the Inbound marketing activities, 
also often referred to as market analysis, because these are the activities implied by the concept 
of environmental scanning. A first observation, then, is that only four firms (CelaVita, Henry’s, 
Homer and Bee Hurst) have a formally defined marketing department with market analysis, 
market sensing and sense making as its responsibilities. It must be added that all these four 
marketing departments consists of only a single employee. CelaVita and Henry´s have both a 
single employee to perform market analyses and scan the business environment. Henry´s has 
overcome the “we are too small to have a marketing department” argument (see next section) 
by having appointed a dedicated marketing specialist for the whole group of which Henry’s is 
part, which reduces marketing (overhead) costs. Henry’s sales director was very determined in 
making a distinction between sales and marketing. In his vision sales is short-term focused and 
inclined to stay in its comfort zone of existing industries, whereas marketing is better equipped 
to be in the line of business development, looking over the fences of one’s own industry.  
Two main arguments were generally given for the lack of a marketing department. The first is 
that most firms consider themselves too small to justify the allocation of resources for dedicated 
marketing activities. Secondly, some firms indicated that marketing is only useful and suitable in 
consumer markets, not in the business-to-business environment in which they operate. At 
Golden Age, for example, both these arguments were heard. The manager process-engineering 
stated that marketing in the sense of monitoring external opportunities and connecting these to 
the firm’s technical capabilities was part of his job, while the sales manager explicitly attributed 
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the marketing function to the combined sales and agents force, thereby citing the “we are too 
small” argument. The managing director argued that marketing – in the sense of market analysis 
– was useless because market research is very difficult in industries of which you do not know 
beforehand whether the potential customers will be interested in your products. However 
understandable this position may be, it does have a catch-22 kind of logic to it. 
4.2.1.2 Product management 
The position often labelled product manager is another organizational entity that is likely to be 
charged with inbound marketing activities. Although large parts of product management deal 
with outbound marketing (what is the look-and-feel of our products, how should they be 
packaged, how can they be promoted), several product managers in this study also performed 
inbound marketing activities, connecting external market information with their firm’s 
technological capabilities. The product managers we encountered at Homer and Bee Hurst have 
tasks and responsibilities that include inbound as well as outbound marketing activities. Acting 
as a liaison between technical core and sales force of their firms, they are clearly involved in 
environmental scanning. At both firms the main marketing activities are performed by these two 
formal entities: product manager and marketing employee. In both cases, however, the product 
manager has a leading role, the marketing employee a facilitating role in the process. The 
marketing employee gathers market information which the product manager interprets and 
processes. Therefore, in this study, having such a product manager is considered equal to having 
a marketing department. Although the functions of a marketing department and product 
managers are not identical, in matters of market sensing and sense making there is a significant 
overlap. 
4.2.1.3 Informal marketing 
The majority of the case firms did not have a formal marketing department or a product manager. 
This does not mean, however, that in these firms no inbound marketing activities are performed. 
In firms without a formal marketing entity these activities are done by other organizational units. 
Two types can be distinguished. In the first type some form of market analysis is carried out, but 
in an unplanned and unsystematically way. The gathering and analyzing of external information 
seems to “just happen” at irregular moments in time. Some firms even deny that they “do 
marketing” at all. In the second type a need for market analysis is felt, and here the analysis is 
done more frequently and in a planned and deliberate manner. Yet there is still no formal 
dedicated marketing entity. Marketing activities are – partially – done by other entities. Below 
we will discuss the various organizational entities we encountered that are performing marketing 
activities. But first it must be noted that marketing activities by non-marketing entities are not 
limited to firms without a marketing department. In firms that do have a formal marketing 
department or a product manager, other organizational entities can be actively involved in 
marketing activities as well. 
4.2.1.4 Sales 
A next organizational entity involved in marketing is sales. Luminata, for example, states that the 
primary responsibility of sales is not business fulfilment but business creation, that is the 
endeavor to constantly search for new Market Opportunities. This 1:1 overlap of functions is 
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reflected in the interviewee’s formal title: marketing sales manager. A similar situation can be 
found at Lime Dry where sales and marketing activities have been assigned to a single employee, 
the sales director. As described previously, at Golden Age inbound marketing is organized in a 
way that involves both the sales and the process engineering department. Henry’s is a firm that 
explicitly acknowledges the need to further develop the inbound marketing activities, but at the 
time of the interview this activity was still fully incorporated in the sales department. Smokey is 
a rather unusual case. Its marketing activities were normally performed by sales and the strategic 
apex (see next section), but at the time of the interview a grand market study had been 
performed (by the HRM manager in cooperation with other managers) which had a direct and 
large impact on the firm’s immediate future. How marketing activities will be organized in the 
near future was unclear at the time of the interviews. 
4.2.1.5 Strategic Apex 
The term strategic apex denotes the top management of the firm, which may be a management 
team, a group of managers-owners, or an individual owner-director. This organizational role is 
characterized by two key functions (though in small firms the strategic apex may perform other 
functions as well). The first is that the strategic apex is taking strategic decisions that impact the 
firm heavily for a long period of time. The second key feature is that the strategic apex is the 
organizational entity with final authority. As described, the marketing function is often 
incorporated in a firm’s sales entity, because sales is basically an externally oriented function. In 
many firms, particularly smaller ones in which individuals often have multiple roles, the strategic 
apex has a sales role as well. Thus, general directors, owners, and other strategic apex individuals 
may have an environmental scanning function. For example, the director-owners at BBC, 
Magnum, Tubby and the subsidiary of Bee Hurst explicitly state that they are always, on a daily 
basis, busy with scanning the outside world for New Business Opportunities. In fact, the majority 
of the cases in this study the strategic Apex has such role in scanning the environment. Sometimes 
this is done in combination with sales departments and employees (Lime Dry, BBC) but very often 
the strategic Apex is the exclusive environmental scanning entity in the firm. 
4.2.1.6 Service 
With service unit we mean those employees and departments who are involved in the installation 
of sold products at the customer’s site and in conducting repairs and technical aftersales services. 
One could argue that these tasks belong to the technical core of the firm whose primary activities 
are technical in nature. However, we set the service unit apart as a separate category because, 
unlike other technical units, it has an outward focus. Three firms (Shorty, Tubby and Thames) 
explicitly reported that the employees of their service departments were involved in scanning the 
environment of the firm. They perform only partially the inbound marketing function since they 
only gather information, leaving interpretation and analysis to the “core” officials to whom they 
report. Interestingly, two firms emphasize that this partial marketing role of service units is a 
valuable source of external information, because service employees visit the shop floor of other 
firms, where information will be less restricted, censored and manipulated than in other 
information exchange settings. A caveat is, of course, that a lot of shop floor information must 
be classified as rumor and gossip and should be interpreted and handled with care.  
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4.2.1.7 Technological core 
This category brings all organizational entities together which are involved in the development 
and manufacturing of new products from a technical perspective. Here, research, development 
and engineering denote three different activities, though these terms are often used 
interchangeably and the boundaries between them are not always clear. Research is generally 
seen as referring to knowledge generation activities at a fundamental level, the results of which 
cannot be directly commercialized. Commercialization (or valorization) happens in the 
development stage in which fundamental technical knowledge is transformed into commercial 
design and concepts. Engineering is particularly important in industries in which products have a 
significant customer-specific character. In the engineering stage the products and concepts from 
the development stage are finalized according to a client’s specific needs.  
Although research, development and engineering are theoretically different, in practice the firms 
use these terms at will. In most firms a single department is responsible for all three types of 
activity. Various labels are used for these departments, e.g. R&D, engineering, concept 
engineering, or drawing room. The larger firms Bee Hurst, Homer and Golden Age have different 
departments, performing different tasks. In these firms a clear departmental distinction is made 
between development and engineering activities. However, most of the firms have a single 
organizational entity performing all three types of development, which is why we will treat these 
activities as a single category. Generally speaking, employees in this category were not actually 
involved in environmental scanning. Homer is an exception. In this firm technicians who form the 
technological core visit technical conferences, both passively as visitors and actively as speakers. 
The technical and commercial information obtained from such conferences is then shared with 
sales and others involved in marketing activities. In this way the technicians perform a similar role 
as the service employees described in the previous section. Bee Hurst gave another example of 
technicians leaving their drawing boards. The managing director of the subsidiary we interviewed 
explained how he, in his days as product manager, often asked technicians, engineers and 
developers to join him when visiting (potential) customers. During these field trips the 
technicians’ role was not to support the product manager but to get a “feeling of the outside 
world”. It his view technicians, engineers, and developers must have a first-hand understanding 
of customer needs and problems in order to be able to contribute to the customer satisfaction 
process. His ambition was that in the future each individual in the firm would be involved in 
marketing activities, particularly the technical core.  
At Golden Age the situation is slightly more complicated because the three technological core 
departments (process engineering, test laboratory, R&D) reside under the umbrella of a larger 
entity labelled by Golden Age as commercial. The process engineering department is closely 
related to the sales force, providing technical support. Process engineers often get out the office 
to meet clients, and have become very knowledgeable about clients’ primary production 
processes. They are not actively involved in the search for new markets, but offer assistance to 
sales at new customers in existing markets. Despite this typical technical supporting role, process 
engineers have a broad external view, as became clear from the interview. For example, they are 
encouraged to come up with ideas about new applications and markets for the existing 
technologies. Moreover they have a role at trade fairs, equal to the sales managers, meaning that 
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they are also actively involved in monitoring the environment. We interviewed the manager of 
the three departments, who was one of the few interviewees to explicitly state the need for a 
method to systematically explore new markets on the basis of core technologies. He also made 
clear that the firm does not have a formal marketing department. His departments have, next to 
sales, a clear role in inbound marketing.  
In these cases it is clear that the technical core is actively involved in scanning the environment. 
An exception are engineers who are part of the crew of a trade fair exhibition stand. As repeatedly 
stated in the interviews, in such a case technicians are not performing an “antenna” role. They 
only support the commercial employees. 
4.2.1.8 Conclusion environment scanning infrastructure 
With regard to the Environmental scanning infrastructure, two groups of firms can be 
distinguished. In the first group, firms rely heavily on their sales-related organizational entities as 
antennas to monitor the environment. The sales staff and those residing in the strategic apex are 
the dominant drivers in exploring the external world. This makes for a narrow-based environment 
scanning infrastructure since very few entities are involved. Even the two firms in which services 
acts as a monitoring entity seem to have a narrow-based infrastructure, because these service 
departments are only the second monitoring entity next to the strategic apex. As described 
above, in two firms the service departments are used in a structured manner, but their task is 
restricted to external information gathering and they are not involved in information analysis. 
In this first group we examined whether inbound marketing was a formal task of either the sales 
department or the strategic apex. We also looked for cases in which the inbound marketing 
function was performed in a deliberate and organized way, but incorporated in a non-marketing 
entity. What we found was that the inbound marketing activities performed by the sales 
department and the strategic apex are not institutionalized and hardly systematic. Market scans 
are made and the information is analyzed, but in a casual or even organizationally subconscious 
way, meaning that no one is formally responsible or held accountable. Also, these activities are 
carried out in an ad hoc fashion, rather than in a frequent and pre-programmed way.  
There is a smaller second group of firms (Henry’s, Bee Hurst, Homer, CelaVita) with a formalized 
environmental scanning infrastructure. All four firms have a formal marketing entity that is 
explicitly dealing with inbound marketing activities. Two firms – Bee Hurst and Homer – possess 
a broad Environment scanning infrastructure. Next to a marketing entity they have three other 
organizational entities that actively monitor the external environment: Product management, 
sales, and technological core. CelaVita has a comparably broad range of organizational entities 
that are actively involved in scanning the environment, but in this firm the function of product 
manager is absent. Its marketing entity, however, is very developed and has an explicit role in 
scanning and analyzing the environment. Homer and Bee Hurst, in contrast, point out that the 
marketing function is formally present but it must be better developed in the future. In this 
second group, Henry’s is the odd duck in the pond. This firm has no broad range of organizational 
entities that are monitoring the external environment, but it does have a formal marketing entity. 
Thus, Henry’s has the least developed Environment scanning infrastructure in this group. Due to 
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the formal nature of the marketing department in each of these four firms, the inbound 
marketing activities are done in a more deliberate and structured manner than in firms from the 
first group. Table 8 summarizes the observations concerning the Environmental scanning 
infrastructure. The firms in bold font depict the firms from the second group, with a “broad & 
formal” infrastructure.  
 Marketing Product-
management 
Sales Strategic 
apex 
Services Technology  
Lime Dry   X X   2 
Shorty    X X  2 
Henry’s X  X    2 
Bee Hurst X X X   X 4 
Homer X X X   X 4 
Golden Age   X   X 2 
Luminata   X ?   1 
Dully    X   1 
Smokey   X    1 
Chimney    X   1 
Magnum    X   1 
CelaVita X  X X   3 
Tubby    X X  2 
Thames    X X  2 
Quad    X   1 
BBC   X X   2 
 4 2 9 10 3 3  
Table 8 Environment scanning infrastructure 
4.2.2 The scope of environmental scanning: Beyond customer-led 
A second aspect of a firm’s Environmental orientation is the scope and depth of its environmental 
scanning. All the firms in this study are at least customer focused (defined in the previous 
chapter). Detailed knowledge of the production process of the customer is a main concern, and 
so is compliance to customer wishes and needs in matters of machinery. Most of the case firms 
view customer intimacy as their core capacity: as a strength of their own and a quality that 
distinguishes them from competitors. All firms claim to have this capacity, and most of them offer 
convincing arguments and data to substantiate this claim. Thus, all case firms can be considered 
to be at least customer led. As a next step, we have to differentiate between firms that are 
customer-led, market oriented, or environmentally oriented. We therefore went through the 
interview data in search of different elements of the external environment that the case firms 
claim to monitor in their search for new Market Opportunities.  
We started by simply counting the number of external elements that were explicitly mentioned 
as being actively and continuously monitored. In the course of this initial analysis, however, it 
became clear that not only the elements being monitored are important, but also the external 
elements via which the environment is scanned. A trade-fair, for example, is not so much an 
external element that is monitored itself, but instead it is a tool or channel that a firm can use to 
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monitor its environment. This insight and the subsequently renewed analysis of the data is a good 
example of the extended case method as described in the previous chapter. Initial analysis may 
lead to new insights that require a new cycle of analysis (in which the new insight is one of the 
parameters). As a result we included both the monitored external elements and the monitoring 
tools in the analysis. The following elements will be discussed in the next sections. Firstly the 
monitoring tools (agents, trade-fair, personal social networks, client networks, knowledge 
institutes), and secondly the monitored elements themselves (linked production chain, (quasi-) 
competitors, consumers and other types of trends).  
4.2.2.1 Agents 
Next to the apparent general lack of formal marketing departments in the Machine 
Manufacturing Industry another revelation is the frequent and consistent use of agents. These 
are external sales entities that are being paid for commercial services rendered but they are not 
on the regular payroll of the machine manufacturer. As a sales tool, agents come in many shapes 
and sizes from smallish single person enterprises to large trading companies representing a range 
of (industrial) manufacturers. In general agents act as brokers, bringing in potential customers 
who are not part of the firm’s sales network or do not show up on the firm’s sales radar. Agents 
are not part of a firm’s environment scanning infrastructure but they may be used as a monitoring 
tool. However, not all agents perform this function. Much depends on a firm’s attitude towards 
agents and its perception of them. This perception may vary from seeing agents as the almost 
ideal sales force to considering them a necessary evil. Two firms (CelaVita, BBC) explicitly refuse 
to work with agents, which in the Machine Manufacturing Industry is almost as much an anomaly 
as having a formal and dedicated marketing department. If a firm makes use of agents while it 
has a negative attitude towards them, trust will be low and the agents operate on a “need to 
know” basis and are given only a minimum of (product-) information to prevent leakage of core 
technologies. Such agents’ activities are necessarily restricted to marketing and promotion of 
existing products in existing markets. A low-trust relation will hardly enable the agent to act as 
an antenna in new industries.  
On the other hand there is a group of firms (Lime Dry, Homer, Bee Hurst, Golden Age, Chimney, 
Magnum, Tubby) with a more positive, constructive attitude towards agents. These firms apply 
various methods to build trust and increase information sharing between the firm and the agents, 
for example dedicated agent-meetings, in-house training days and newsletters. The idea is that 
better informed agents – about products but also about more intimate subjects such as strategy, 
objectives, core technologies – are better equipped to search for customers in new industries 
that fit in with the profile of the firm and its core technology. Our analysis started from the 
presupposition that firms with such a constructive attitude towards agents will use agents as 
monitoring tools. However, all firms indicate that establishing a trustful and constructive 
relationship with agents is far from easy and takes time, dedication and an occasional failure. 
Golden Age, for example, notices that the agents say that they need more information but it is 
also found, and repeatedly so, that agents do not or hardly read the frequent newsletter that is 
specifically made to inform the agents. 
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4.2.2.2 Trade fairs 
Exhibiting at trade fairs is common practice in business environments, and the machine 
manufactures are no exception. Nearly all case firms affirm that they are “active visitors” of trade 
fairs, meaning that they participate – complete with stands, brochures, new machines and other 
products on exhibition. One firm (Tubby) does not participate in trade fairs anymore, pointing 
out that it is too costly in relation to the benefits. Ten other firms (Lime Dry, Henry’s, Bee Hurst, 
Homer, Golden Age, Luminata, Dully, Smokey, Magnum, BBC) consider trade fairs as the most 
important marketing-sales tool available. Quad concurs, but thus far this firm did not have the 
time or the resources to make the most of the marketing possibilities that trade fairs offer. The 
other firms (Shorty, Chimney, CelaVita, Thames) take a neutral stance. For these firms trade fairs 
are a pre-condition of doing business rather than a powerful marketing-sales tool. It is not that 
being present has great benefits, but being absent has more disadvantages. It might give a false 
signal to others in the business that something is wrong with the firm.  
From the data two distinct functions of trade fairs emerge: increasing the firm’s visibility and 
increasing the individuals’ social network. In practice, a firm’s presence at a trade fair will almost 
automatically serve both functions, because they are highly related, but firms differ in their 
attitude towards trade fairs. Some firms strongly emphasize either one of the two functions, 
which not only affects their behavior at trade fairs but also corresponds to the way they address 
opportunity identification, as will become clear in later sections.  
The first function is increasing visibility. Its presence with an exhibition stand including brochures 
and demonstration models of machinery reveals much about how a firm wants to create a 
general awareness of its existence, its products, and its technologies. The product manager at 
Bee Hurst for example stated that in general such industrial (business to business) fairs tend to 
be dull exhibitions, which is why he developed a gadget-like device (a small piece of equipment) 
to attract the attention of the fair public in a positive and light-hearted fashion. The device had 
no commercial value but it showed the firm’s core technologies, possibly triggering ideas from 
other visitors for new uses of the firm’s technologies and applications. As another way to increase 
its visibility through trade fairs, Bee Hurst also tends to participate at different, for them new, 
trade fairs to show the firm to potential new customers in new industries. Golden Age has a 
similar approach in trying to find and participate in new trade-fairs in order to trigger new ideas 
for their applications and technologies at potential customers. Dully used such an approach in 
the past in order to increase its visibility as newcomer in different niches of the industry. At the 
time of interview, however, Dully participated only in small, specialized trade fairs specific to the 
niche markets they are currently present in. Lime Dry has its “New product development cycle” 
in tune with the participation at trade fairs. They try to present a new (show) model piece of 
machinery for every next important trade fair. This way they hope to raise interest and increase 
visibility of their firm.  
The second function of participating at trade fairs is to enlarge the social network of the 
individuals representing the firm. Although it has been argued that firms should engage in various 
kinds of business networks (Lechner & Dowling, 2003), the fact is that that much of the 
networking between firms is taking place between individuals (Jolink, 2009). Links between firms 
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are created by one firm’s individual employees who interact with employees from other firms. 
This establishing and extending of personal social network happens at trade fairs in a natural 
manner. For Luminata, for example, meeting individuals employed at new, not previously 
contacted firms is the primary reason to participate in trade fairs. A difference between increase 
of visibility and network enlargement (as functions of trade fair participation) is that the first is 
more passive than the second. In a next section we will discuss in more detail the role of personal 
social networks as a monitoring tool. 
4.2.2.3 Scientific conferences 
Next to the trade fair the technologically oriented scientific conference can be considered as a 
monitoring tool, although it is far less used than the trade fair. Only Homer and Bee Hurst 
indicated that they frequently and systematically have engineers and other members of their 
technological core visit a scientific conference. At these conferences the latest developments in 
a specific field of science are presented and discussed by scientists, engineers and other 
technically oriented individuals. The main objectives are both the exchange of new technological 
insights and personal network building. Unlike agents and trade fairs, scientific conferences are 
hardly used as a monitoring tool. The firms that do use it, however, made clear that it is a very 
valuable method, not only to stay in touch with the latest technological developments and trends 
in their branch, but also to get members of the technological core involved in environmental 
scanning.  
4.2.2.4 Knowledge Institutes 
Next to trade fairs and scientific conferences, knowledge institutes are another type of institution 
that can be used as a monitoring tool. This can be any kind of profit or non-profit, private or 
(semi-)public organization which offers specific knowledge. An example are engineering 
companies, although only a single firm (Bee Hurst) indicated that the cooperation with these led 
to new and useful environmental information. Besides engineering companies we found an array 
of organizations that fit in this category: universities, ‘leading technology institutes’9 (Bee Hurst, 
Golden Age), subsidized R&D programs (Homer), branch organizations, semi-public consultancy 
organizations, semi-public development agencies (Chimney). Golden Age, for example, has 
placed equipment and machinery stationed at the premises of a food research institute on a 
permanent basis. Researchers of the institute use this machinery to test new ideas and food 
products, in cooperation with customers of the institute. The feedback of such tests helps Golden 
Age to get in contact with new ideas, information from uncharted markets, and potential 
customers in new markets. 
4.2.2.5 Networking 
The business environment of a firm can be viewed as a network or a set of interconnected 
networks to which the firm belongs. We investigated whether case firms explicitly acknowledge 
the idea of being part of a network and use it as an external environment monitoring tool. The 
analysis of the data revealed two ways in which firms use networks and networking in their 
                                                                        
9 The Dutch leading technology institutes are generally highly specialized and have  a high scientific ranking. 
The accessibility for firms that do not participate in the institute is however not always clear (Vissers, 2006).  
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environmental scanning: the personal social network and the client network. For clarity, we are 
not proposing different types of networks, but different types of use – for environmental 
scanning – of the networks that firms have at their disposal. 
The personal network denotes the set of linkages an individual in the case firm has with other 
individuals outside the firm. As a monitoring tool it is closely related to the trade-fair, and it is 
used by at least five firms (Shorty, Luminata, Magnum, Thames, Quad). Jolink (2009) suggests 
that individual employees’ personal networks may contribute to innovativeness of the firm as a 
whole. In this study we found a similar phenomenon as interviewees mentioned their personal 
relations as a source of external information. They seem to view a large personal social network 
as a set of linkages with the external environment that broadens the horizon of the firm. 
Particularly for two of the smallest firms of our data set (Shorty, Magnum) the personal social 
network seems to be the most important monitoring mechanism.  
The second form of networking is what we refer to as client network. Several firms (Henry’s, Bee 
Hurst, Luminata, Thames, Quad, BBC) indicated explicitly that their clients – customers – are an 
important source of external information. New ideas and Market Opportunities are found via 
existing current customers. Ultimately this type of network boils down to individual relationships 
but the client network, unlike the personal network, is described by the interviewees as a 
relationship at the inter-firm level. Another difference is that the personal network may be very 
broad, and may extend to various segments of the external environment. In Shorty’s case, for 
example, the personal network includes even individuals from firms that may be considered 
competitors of Shorty. In contrast, client networks are only involving existing customers. 
Although the use of one way of networking does not rule out the use of the other – Thames and 
Quad for example indicated to use both – we treat them as distinct monitoring tools. 
4.2.2.6 Linked production chains 
The tools we described for gathering external information emerged from the initial analysis. In 
the remainder of this chapter we will look in more detail at predefined sources of external 
information, as presented in the previous chapters. A first of these predefined sources is the 
Linked production chain, made up of two interconnected production chains: the vertical and the 
horizontal production chain. The vertical production chain is a collection of interlinked firms of 
which the firm’s customer is part. It encompasses the customer’s upstream suppliers (tier 1, tier 
2, tier n+1) and downstream customers (the customer’s customer). Thus, a vertical production 
chain is the collection of production firms of which the case firm’s customer is part, that runs 
from the raw materials supplier to the final firm before the wholesale and retail take over the 
chain. The horizontal production chain is the production chain of which the case firm itself is part, 
and in general consists of the first-, second and N-tier suppliers of the case firm, as figure 9 
illustrates.  
We examined whether the case firms are monitoring any of the grey shaded firms in the figure, 
as a source of external information. Only two firms (Henry, Tubby) indicated that they monitor 
certain firms in their linked production chain. Tubby, for example, has relations with the tier-1 
suppliers of several of its customers. From these relations external information is gathered which 
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occasionally leads to new ideas and Market Opportunities. Overall, however, the linked 
production chain is hardly mentioned as a possible source of external information. 
 
Figure 9 Linked Production Chains 
4.2.2.7 Competitors 
Competitors are another group of external elements that was hardly viewed as an external source 
worth monitoring. In marketing and strategy management theory competitor analysis is a 
significant aspect of environmental scanning, but the case firms we studied did not explicitly 
mention the competition as an entity which must be monitored. Only Homer and Smokey 
indicated that they keep track of their competitors’ actions, while Magnum stated that 
monitoring the competition was essential for the growth and development of the firm in its early 
years. In some sectors the niches are so small that there simply is no direct competition. Overall, 
however, in this industry competitors tend to be seen as a given, only to be paid attention to in 
the bidding stage of a sales process. In other business processes – e.g. strategic decision-making, 
product development, marketing – competitors hardly play a role. They are neither seen as a 
source of inspiration, nor as a source of external information.  
4.2.2.8 Consumer trends 
The consumer as an external business environment entity is the end-of-the-line of every vertical 
production chain. Although machine manufacturers, in the linked production chain, are situated 
far away from the consumer, five firms (Lime Dry, Shorty, Henry’s, CelaVita, Tubby) convincingly 
made clear that they keep track of the consumer as a source of external information in a very 
direct and explicit way. They do not track individual consumers or determined demographic 
marketing groups of individuals, but instead try to identify more generic consumer trends to get 
new insights, new ideas, or new Market Opportunities. Identifying and keeping track of consumer 
Observations  
123 
 
trends is done in several ways. For instance, CelaVita uses traditional desktop research methods 
but also maintains tight relations with the marketing departments of their customers, which are 
food producing companies. These departments pass on information about customer trends to 
CelaVita. Another method mentioned is based on the notion that we all are constantly addressed 
in our role as consumers. Lime Dry stated that analyzing common daily life items such as TV 
commercials and life style magazines gives a fairly good idea of what the trends are. Three firms 
(Lime Dry, Shorty, Henry’s) reported a very direct approach of visiting supermarkets with the 
purpose of observing new trends in consumer behavior and getting inspired by them. CelaVita 
and Shorty take this “consumer-orientation” to a next level as they as machine manufacturers 
developed a consumer product themselves (Shorty a new snack, CelaVita a new type of food 
packaging), and subsequently introduced a machine for these products, instead of waiting for the 
NPD activities of their customers. 
4.2.2.9 Other Trends 
We also asked whether other trends (political, social, cultural, technological) were tracked by the 
case firms. Important here was the technological trend (Lime Dry, Bee Hurst, Homer, Luminata). 
Not surprisingly, two of the three firms with employees from the technological core in their 
environment scanning infrastructure were found to follow technological trends (Bee Hurst, 
Homer). Technical and scientific conferences are mentioned as a proven method to track such 
trends. Luminata uses roadmaps which they develop in dialog with their (potential) customers to 
identify technological trends. One interviewee at Bee Hurst referred to sustainability as a specific 
trend to be monitored. This sustainability trend is viewed as both a technological and consumer 
trend as Bee Hurst monitors technological advances and innovation in matters of sustainability 
but also the interest and support for sustainability of the general public. A final trend, only 
mentioned by Smokey, is the legal trend, which makes perfect sense as the tobacco industry is 
strictly regulated. More generally, new laws and regulations have a significant and direct impact 
on the Machine Manufacturing Industry . As the interviewee pointed out, very often new 
regulations lead to new opportunities. Overall, regardless of the type, trends seem one of the 
most popular external entities for the case firms to monitor. 
4.2.2.10 Conclusion scope environmental scanning 
The overall picture that emerges from the scope of environmental scanning is that the trade fair 
is by far is the most used and valued tool to keep track of the business environment. 10 out of 16 
case firms explicitly refer positively to it. Other valued sources of information about a firm’s 
external environment are personal networks, client networks and trends. If the environmental 
scopes of individual case firms are compared, Bee Hurst and Homer rank highest, followed by 
Lime Dry, Henry’s, Magnum and Luminata. These six firm have selected at least four external 
entities as possible sources of external information. The other firms limit themselves to three or 
less. 
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4.2.3 Summary Environmental orientation 
To assess the environmental orientation of the case firms we did not use an external and 
objective scale to measure the degree of environmental orientation. Instead, we compared the 
individual case firms, to determine if there were differences in the environmental orientation 
between the firms. Table 9 Scope of the environmental scanning presents the aggregated results 
of the environmental scanning scope, table 10 Summary Environmental orientation the 
aggregated results of the environmental scanning infrastructure. Three levels of environmental 
orientation emerge from the data. Bee Hurst and Homer stand out as the most environmentally 
oriented case firms, Chimney, Quad and Dully seem hardly environmentally oriented, and the 
other firms can be labelled as “somewhat environmentally oriented”. Table 11 Summary 
Environmental orientation Matrixpresents the results of the Environmental Orientation analysis 
in a matrix form. The final conclusion from the analysis of environmental scanning is that only 
three firms (Homer, Bee Hurst, and to a lesser degree Henry’s) resemble what we refer to as the 
Environmentally Oriented firm. These three firms have a broad and formal infrastructure to scan 
a wide scope of the environment. 
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4.3 Technological Core Competence Awareness 
In this section we will describe our observations about the technological core competence (TCC) 
awareness of the case firms. What we tried during the interviews was to assess an interviewee’s 
level of awareness of the firm’s unique capabilities that are rooted in the technological realm and 
that may be used to access new markets. We did not judge whether the TCC’s mentioned were 
indeed valuable, nor did we examine whether the TCC was actually existing within the firm or 
was a result of wishful thinking. As described in the previous chapter, we model the TCC 
awareness on two dimensions: the level of abstraction and the levels of intuition versus 
deliberate rationality behind the firms’ thinking about their TCC’s.  
Three ways to get information about firms’ TCC awareness were used. Firstly, we asked the 
interviewees what they see as their firm’s true strengths, which set them apart from the 
competition and make customers come to them, and why they are still in business instead of 
being overtaken by cheap imitators. These questions were indirect, in the sense that the term 
“core competences” was not used, and they were often embedded in other themes like strategy 
development (“I presume you have conducted a SWOT analysis for the strategy development 
exercise you just described to me, could you elaborate on what strengths were identified in that 
process?”) or competitor analysis (“Thank you for elaborating on your competition, could you 
explain what is it that makes your firm and products different from the competitors?”) or sales 
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processes (“OK, I understand the sales process now, but what is it that makes the customer prefer 
your product to that of the competition?”). Secondly, towards the end of the interview we asked 
the direct question: “Could you please elaborate on the technological core competences of the 
firm?” Thirdly, sometimes a certain level of awareness could be traced in the anecdotes and firm-
historical narratives in which a certain “jump’’ into new markets was explicated.  
The questions about TCC were straightforward and easy to understand, but the analysis of the 
answers was complicated because of the extreme diversity of the answers. While the 
interviewees were familiar with themes such as market orientation and market analysis, it was 
difficult for them to answer questions about TCC. Some struggled with the concept core 
competence itself, others were knowledgeable about the concept but apparently did not have a 
clear picture of their firm’s core competences. As a result the answers we got varied to the 
extreme; from vague to concrete, from giving a direct answer to giving an answer to an unasked 
question. 
4.3.1 Non-technical capabilities 
We tried to stick to our main question, concerning technical capabilities, and to leave out 
information about other capabilities. However, observations about two notable non-technical 
capabilities must be mentioned as they seem to be typical of the type of medium-sized machine 
manufacturing enterprises we studied.  
4.3.1.1 Customer intimacy 
Firstly, most of the case firms (Lime Dry, Shorty, Homer, Tubby, Chimney, Quad, BBC, Magnum) 
pointed out that being able to understand the customer needs and being able to act upon those 
specific needs is the key capability that makes them unique. This may very well be a true core 
competence, but it is quite possible that every machine manufacturer will give this answer, so 
that one wonders how unique this capability really is. Moreover, it is not a technological 
capability. Especially the first component (‘being able to understand the customers’ specific 
problems and needs’) seems a marketing, or market sensing capability, rather than a 
technological capability. And finally, it seems a matter of “willingness” of the firms rather than a 
capability. However this may be, purported customer intimacy (CI) is something that can be 
observed across all levels of TCC awareness, and as such it seems to reflect the customer-led 
nature of medium-sized firms in the Machine Manufacturing Industry . 
4.3.1.2 Reputation 
Another non-technological capability which was mentioned often was the reputation of the firm. 
Six firms (Lime Dry, Shorty, Homer, Luminata, Dully, Tubby) explicitly stated that their brand name 
(and their reputation) is a very important strength that attracts customers to the firm. However, 
if a firm mentions reputation as a strength this can be considered as an indication of low TCC 
awareness. Not only is reputation a non-technical attribute of a firm, but in several case firms – 
particularly Dully, and to a lesser degree at Shorty, Tubby and Lime Dry – reputation was seen as 
an obstacle to venture into new markets. For these firms their reputation was very strongly linked 
to their current niche markets. Moving to new markets might degrade their reputation in their 
current markets (Shorty, Lime Dry, Tubby). Dully came up with a reverse line of argument. A firm 
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can only get orders in niche markets in which it has a solid reputation already. Because firms have 
no reputation in markets in which they are not currently active it is nearly impossible for them to 
enter such new markets. Hence identifying possible opportunities is useless. This was a 
remarkable conclusion because in the relatively recent past Dully had made a large leap from one 
niche market into a completely new one. Apparently, the ability and willingness to identify and 
to exploit an opportunity was a onetime event, not rooted in the firm’s business culture.  
Unlike firms that mention customer intimacy as a strength, firms that regard reputation as one 
of their essential strengths tend to have a relatively low TCC awareness. The exception is 
Luminata, which scores high on TCC awareness and also regards reputation in a current niche 
market as a leverage tool into new niches. Lime Dry, Magnum, Shorty and Tubby, however, are 
firms that according to our analysis have a low TCC awareness, as the next sections will show. 
4.3.2 Level of abstraction 
In the following we will discuss the levels of abstraction, the first dimension of TCC awareness, 
discussed in section 3.1.3. We start with a notable exception. Of all the case firms Dully is the 
only one of which we cannot derive any information about their level of abstraction. In matters 
of TCC it simply appears as if awareness is non-existent. As already described in the previous 
section, Dully relies on reputation as the capability that distinguishes them from others in the 
market place. Both interviewees constantly stressed that in this modern age it has become nearly 
impossible to make a leap into another niche on the basis of a firm’s core technology because, 
firstly, lack of reputation in a new niche is preventing that and, secondly, because “everything has 
been invented already”. Dully has such a low TCC awareness that it literally falls outside the scope 
of the chart. 
4.3.2.1  “Manufacture” 
As described in the previous chapter, at the lowest level of abstraction a firm is focused on 
concrete aspects of their products. Next to describing specific machine capabilities, many 
interviewees had the urge to respond to questions about managerial and business themes with 
technical “nuts-and-bolts” answers (Lime Dry, Tubby). Also, when they were asked about their 
firm’s strengths or directly about its TCCs, their answers revolved directly around machine 
specifications (Tubby) and high quality standards of the manufactured machines (Magnum) or 
indirectly around technical customer needs which are the mirror image of the technical 
specifications of the machines (Lime Dry). A final variation in the type of answers at this lowest 
level concerns the capabilities and quality of the firm’s own manufacturing machine park 
(Magnum). Three firms clearly qualify for this lowest level of abstraction: Lime Dry, Magnum, and 
Tubby. 
4.3.2.2 “Being able” 
The majority of firms (Quad, Thames, Smokey, CelaVita, Homer, Golden Age, Henry, Shorty, Bee 
Hurst) fall into this second category on the scale of abstraction. In the answers and anecdotes 
related to firm strengths, core competences, and competitiveness in general, the interviewees 
representing these firms tend to speak in terms of processes, technologies and skills. They see 
their competitive advantage in terms of the more abstract notion of “being able” to manufacture 
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or develop some product and/or machine, not in terms of machine specifications. Three of the 
firms in this category (Quad, Homer, Shorty) state that customer intimacy is next to technological 
competences an important feature of their firms’ strengths. Although firms in this category define 
their competences in a more abstract manner than those in the previous category, they do not 
refer to uniqueness, customer benefits, or the potential use of their TCCs to access new markets. 
Because of this lack of awareness they are categorized in the middle category and not in the 
highest. 
4.3.2.3  “To distinguish” 
Regarding TCCs the interviewees of three firms (Luminata, Chimney and BBC) provided abstract 
descriptions of their core firm’s strengths, which echo the three criteria of core competences. 
The sales and marketing director at Luminata was very clear and specific about the technologies 
the firm uses. All these technologies could easily be outsourced, except for one that was very 
specific. This technology required special equipment, in combination with specific knowledge and 
skills to operate it. It was this technology which made the firm unique and which creates value 
for customers. Of the three firms in this category Luminata is the single one to indicate that 
reputation and brand name are unique strengths as well. Unlike the firms in the lowest category 
who consider reputation as a limiting factor to enter new markets, Luminata regards its 
reputation based on, and in combination with, the unique technology as an enabler or leveraging 
tool to enter new niche markets.  
At Chimney too, the interviewee was well-aware of the firm’s unique technological competences. 
What sets this firm apart from the others in this highest abstraction category is its recognition 
that it is not a single technology which makes them unique but the combination of the different 
technologies embedded in the four business units. This emphasis on a combination of 
technologies resembles Hamel’s and Prahalad’s (1994, p.219) description of core competences 
as “…a bundle of skills and technologies that enables a company to provide a particular benefit to 
customers”. In addition, Chimney’s director-owner explained that the firm has not defined 
specific products, markets, or product-market combinations. Instead it is the combination of 
knowledge, skills, and technology that is considered unique, and that can be exploited in many 
different and new markets.  
The third firm with a clear knowledge of its TCCs was BBC. Similar to Chimney, BBC is organized 
in four distinct organizational business units, each of which possesses a set or bundle of specific 
TCC’s. And just like Chimney, BBC regards customer intimacy as its most important non-technical 
capability. However, the interviewee at Chimney played down his statement about the 
importance of customer intimacy with the remark that such an answer might be too much of a 
cliché.  
4.3.3 Intuition versus rational awareness 
For most of the firms, looking over their core competences is a deliberate activity. Ten of the 16 
case firms (Quad, Thames, Smokey, CelaVita, Homer, Golden Age, Henry, Luminata, Chimney, 
BBC) approach the identification of these competences in a rational and structured way, and the 
interviewees at these firms are familiar with the concept of core competences. Within this 
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rational awareness category we distinguish two subgroups. The first comprises firms in which 
thinking about and discussing core competences has a general and continuous character (Quad, 
Homer, Golden Age, Chimney). In the second subgroup there is an identifiable point in time at 
which such a discussion took place (Thames, Smokey, CelaVita, Henry, Luminata, BBC). At 
Thames, CelaVita and BBC, for example, the owner-directors started mapping the core 
competences shortly after they became the owners of their firms. Similarly, at Luminata a 
capabilities mapping process took place shortly after the current sales and marketing director 
assumed his position. At Henry’s and Smokey’s, identifying core competences was part of a 
strategic repositioning exercise that followed a decline in revenues. Thus, the process of 
deliberately, structurally and rationally identifying one’s core competences can be triggered by a 
specific, identifiable event.  
The methods for deliberate and rational identification of core competences mentioned by the 
interviewees included strategic meetings, creative group meetings (various forms of 
brainstorming sessions) and customer satisfaction surveys. A noticeable method, the 
development of roadmaps to identify core competences, was used by Luminata. While the other 
methods have a strictly internal or external focus, road mapping incorporates both. Luminata’s 
road-mapping process is as follows. First, core products and technologies are identified internally. 
Next, possible future product-features are sketched, as well as products and technologies to be 
developed. Such a proto-roadmap is then discussed with key customers. In these meetings it is 
discussed what future needs the customers expect, so that Luminata is able to align its own 
roadmap with its customers’ roadmaps. In this way Luminata’s own understanding of 
technologies and capabilities that are unique and of value to customers is being validated by the 
external environment.  
However, not all firms make a deliberate effort to identify their core competences. In the 
interviews, five firms (Lime Dry, Magnum, Tubby, Shorty, Bee Hurst) found the theme that 
covered core competences, firms strengths and firm competitiveness troublesome. They did not 
really grasp the concept of core competences, apparently, and confronted with questions about 
the firm’s competitiveness – what makes them stand out against the competition, why they still 
exist in their highly competitive market – their answers were hesitant, vague and often evasive. 
It seems that non-technological capabilities such as customer intimacy (Lime Dry, magnum, 
Tubby, Shorty), entrepreneurial culture (Bee Hurst) and reputation (Lime Dry) are more 
important to them. But the main point is that these firms’ knowledge of their own strengths and 
core competences is of an intuitive nature, rather than stemming from deliberate thought and 
internal discussion. For these firms, the concept of core competences denotes “knowing what 
one is capable of”, which is something “one simply knows”, or it is an outcome of years of 
experience. In other words, knowledge of core competences is the cumulative result of past 
experiences. It is something “one just knows”. In this category Shorty takes a somewhat distinct 
position. As its history shows, at some point in the past this firm was able to switch from an 
intuitive mode to a rational, deliberate mode. When the revenues declined in the bread & pastry 
market, the two owners set out to analyze their true strengths and key capabilities in order to 
make the leap into a new niche market. In other words, their financial distress was a trigger to 
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switch to a rational core competence awareness mode. At the time of the interview, however, 
Shorty clearly expressed an intuitive approach to this theme again. 
4.3.4 Conclusion TCC awareness 
The analysis of TCC awareness yields three main findings. Firstly, we found that nine firms – the 
majority of our case firms – maintain a medium level of abstraction when discussing their 
strengths and competences. They go beyond concrete machine specifications but without 
describing their technical capabilities along the lines of the three criteria of core competences. 
Of these nine firms, seven have a deliberate approach towards identifying their strengths and 
capabilities. Only three firms fall in the highest category of TCC awareness.  
Secondly, the majority of the case firms, ten in total, have such a deliberate approach, while six 
firms were found to be more intuitive in matters of establishing Technological Core Competence 
Awareness. Of these six, only three firms fall in the lowest abstraction category, meaning that 
they describe their strengths in terms of product/specifications.  
Thirdly, there is a relationship between the level of abstraction and the intuitiveness of a firm’s 
TCC awareness – which becomes manifest when these dimensions are plotted against each other 
(Table 12 Technological Core Competence Awareness). The three firms in the highest category of 
abstraction, describing their strengths in terms of the concept of core competences, have an 
deliberate approach in extracting these competences, and the three firms in the lowest category 
of abstraction have an intuitive approach.  
Next to TCC awareness, two other capabilities were recurrently mentioned in the interviews. The 
first is Customer Intimacy, which is a non-technical capability that seems to be typical for SME 
firms in the Machine Manufacturing Industry. When compared to the large players in their 
segments, they are not able to compete on the basis of a price strategy due to their lack of scale 
and bargaining power. Hence a strategy of customer intimacy, flexibility and custom-made 
products is more appropriate. Customer Intimacy means that these firms think along with their 
customers, are flexible towards customer needs, and are familiar with the production processes 
of their customers and the needs of their customers’ customer. Customer intimacy is hardly a 
strategic choice, it is almost a pre-condition to survive as an SME in this industry. In half of the 
cases Customer Intimacy was mentioned as an important capability. CI and TCC awareness seem 
unrelated. CI is mentioned by case firms with high as well as with low TCC awareness. In contrast, 
the other recurring non-technological capability, Reputation, seems especially important to firms 
with lower levels of abstraction. The most conspicuous case is Dully, a firm that shows no TCC 
awareness at all and relies heavily on its reputation as a factor that distinguishes it from its 
competitors.  
Summarizing, three case firms (Luminata, Chimney, BBC) are found to have a relatively high TCC 
awareness, while four other firms (Lime Dry, Magnum, Tubby, Dully) rank lowest on our scale. Of 
these four, Dully is the extreme case as described above, and it is left out of the matrix (Table 12). 
The majority of the case firms take an intermediate position. Table 12 visualizes the relative 
rankings of the case firms in a two by three matrix (low left corner equals low TCC awareness, 
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high right corner equals high TCC), while table 13 lists the non-technological capabilities we 
encountered in the study. 
Deliberate  Quad (CI) 
Thames 
Smokey 
CelaVita 
Homer (Rep, CI) 
Golden Age 
Henry 
Luminata (Rep) 
Chimney (CI) 
BBC (CI) 
 
Intuitive 
 
 
Lime dry (Rep, CI) 
Magnum (CI) 
Tubby (Rep, CI, Cult) 
Shorty (CI) 
Bee Hurst (CU) 
 
 
 
 
 Product Process CC  
Table 12 Technological Core Competence Awareness 
    
Family owned–enterprise culture and/or 
Entrepreneurial, innovative team spirit 
Bee Hurst 
Tubby 
  
Ability to cooperate with suppliers Bee Hurst   
Reputation, Brand name Lime Dry 
Shorty 
Homer 
Luminata 
Dully 
Tubby 
 
Customer intimacy: Knowledge & ability to 
intensively get to know customer’s 
production processes and to be flexible 
towards customer specific needs 
Lime Dry 
Shorty 
Homer 
Tubby 
Chimney 
Quad 
BBC 
Magnum 
 
Management capacity  Dully   
    
Table 13 Non-technological competences 
4.4 Dominant perspective 
From the onset the objective of this part of the research model was to determine whether a case 
firm would fall in either the Eureka-perspective or the Creation-perspective. We expected to be 
able to create a dichotomy of case firms. To analyze the data, we went through the interviews 
carefully, keeping in mind the dimensions and key concepts we had extracted from the literature 
study (Table 6 Two perspectives on Opportunity identification, section 3.1.1) in order to 
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determine the Dominant Perspective for each case firm. The expected dichotomy was found with 
this approach. It is summarized in table 14. 
As the table shows, the majority of the firms have the Eureka approach as their Dominant 
Perspective. Only a minority of the firms approaches opportunity identification according to the 
Creation Perspective. In all cases it was pretty evident whether a firm had an Eureka or a Creation 
Perspective. The only exception was BBC which seemed to adhere to both perspectives. The 
explanation may be the typical organizational structure of this firm, with four independent 
business units. Each of these has its own business model, market approach and strategic 
objectives. Three business units tended towards a Creation Perspective, and one (“Specials”) 
exhibited a strong Eureka approach. The firm as a whole shows all the typical features of both 
perspectives.  
 Eureka Perspective Creation Perspective  
 Quad 
Lime Dry 
Shorty 
Henry´s 
Homer 
Golden Age 
Dully 
Magnum 
Tubby 
Thames 
BBC * 
Bee Hurst 
Luminata 
Smokey 
Chimney 
CelaVita 
BBC * 
 
 
 * BBC is made up of 4 relatively independent business units which had different 
perspectives.  
 
Table 14 Case firms’ Dominant Perspective 
4.4.1 Eureka Perspective 
Each of the two perspectives has its own specific indicators. In firms with a Eureka Perspective, 
the source of opportunities and the feeling of having no control over identifying opportunities 
are the most significant indicators. All the interviewees of the Eureka-minded firms see 
opportunities as something that originates externally, outside the firm, outside the boundaries 
of what they have control over. Therefore, the identification of opportunities is a matter of luck, 
even though some interviewees admitted that the amount of luck can be influenced by being 
open to the fact that opportunities may come by at any moment. In other words, opportunity 
identification is reactive and can hardly be managed or controlled. At best, one can be prepared 
to seize an opportunity if it shows itself. This is an attitude in the Eureka minded firms which is 
very strong and clearly visible in the data, particularly in the interview with the two owners of 
Dully. They insisted that for identifying opportunities a firm of Dully’s size is completely 
dependent on the external environment over which they have no control at all. 
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4.4.2 Creation Perspective 
In the interviews with firms with a Creation Perspective the identifying dimensions were 
“timescale of identification” and “individual versus collective”, while controllability also emerged 
as a strong indicator. At BBC, for example, the interviewee stated that he is continuously in search 
of new opportunities. Regularly, informal brainstorm meetings are held in which the 
management team is contemplating new directions that might be possible. On the one hand they 
are aware of their own capabilities, while at the same time they have a good insight in what the 
developments are in different sectors and markets. In these “sessions of reflection” this internal 
and external information is mixed, analyzed, and turned into new ideas and possibilities. It was 
acknowledged that identifying and entering new markets is a lengthy process which on average 
takes three years. When discussing the way BBC approaches opportunity identification the 
interviewee stressed its process-like and collective character. He also showed a great deal of 
confidence in having control over the act of identifying opportunities. The process of 
identification cannot be managed and controlled 100%, he admitted, and luck will always be part 
of the game, but one should be ready and open to new opportunities presenting themselves. 
Above all, one should be active in searching new opportunities, and deliberately so. A similar 
combination of external luck and internal controllability was stressed by one of the interviewees 
of Bee Hurst. He pointed out that innovation in the sense of opportunity identification is a matter 
of “steered coincidence”, meaning that external luck always will play a role but that a firm should 
be organized in such a way that it is ready to seize an opportunity when it presents itself. This 
idea that setting up a proper organization facilitates the process of opportunity identification also 
surfaced from the interview data of Luminata and Smokey.  
With its new Sales and Marketing director, Luminata was in the middle of a transition towards a 
more Creation-oriented enterprise. The interviewee (the sales and marketing director) was very 
specific about changing the organization, the structure, and the roles that employees fulfilled. He 
believed that more employees than only the sales managers should be involved in new business 
development. For example, he insisted that engineers should be more in direct contact with 
employees of the customer. Bringing people together, internally in discussing roadmaps but also 
in consultation with (potential) customers aligning roadmaps, is the key to identify new possible 
markets. Admittedly, the interviewee has a vocabulary that differs from this study, and he did 
not make a clear difference between serving existing markets and finding new markets, but 
implicitly he had a very strong Creation orientation, seeing new opportunities as managed human 
creations based on a proper organizational structure.  
Smokey was also in the middle of a transition from a Eureka Perspective towards a Creation 
Perspective. Initially the firm had used, in the interviewee’s words, a “shotgun” method to find 
new markets: just approach any kind of market and see what sticks. However, this method proved 
to be ineffective and hardly profitable. The few entry-projects in new industries were accidental, 
opportunities the firm ran against by luck, and in the end they happened to be unsuccessful. 
Inspired by the MBA study of one of the managers, a development towards a more Creation-like 
approach was started. A new account manager was appointed, exclusively responsible for new 
business development, which shows that opportunity identification had come to be seen as 
something that can be managed and controlled, at least to a certain degree.  
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Chimney is another example of a firm that combines the collective effort and process nature of 
opportunity identification with an pro-active attitude. New markets are sought with the use of 
predefined “customer-profiles”, which are based on the firm’s technological knowledge and 
capabilities. The interviewee argued that the Eureka Perspective is suitable for inventors but not 
for entrepreneurs. CelaVita also takes matters into its own hand. On the basis of the firm’s core 
competences, a new product concept was developed with the aim to enter a new market. Instead 
of waiting for opportunities passing by, CelaVita started an active search for new opportunities 
in new markets.  
In all these firms with a Creation Perspective, the idea that it is possible to have control over the 
identification of opportunities is far greater than in firms with a Eureka Perspective. This 
dichotomy of passive, reactive opportunity identification versus active, proactive opportunity 
identification coincides with the mode of identification as summarized in table 6 Two perspectives 
on Opportunity identification). This key concept proved to be the most telling and most 
consistent indicator in the Dominant Perspective analysis.  
4.4.3 Trajectories of opportunity identification 
After we established the existence of a dichotomy of perspectives in our case firms, we further 
analyzed the data because not all the information embedded in it had been used already. As 
described in the previous section, firms in the Eureka category were primarily identified on the 
basis of perceived externality of opportunities, that is, the belief of the interviewees that 
opportunities emerge in the environment outside the firm. However, we found that occasionally 
some Eureka-oriented firms had anecdotes and firm histories that contained elements of a 
process-like attitude towards opportunity identification. Rather than identifying an opportunity 
in the external environment in a Eureka kind of fashion, these stories explicitly show a long term 
development approach which fits better in the Creation Perspective. Because overall the firms 
were clearly having a Eureka Perspective, we went through the data again, now focusing on this 
discrepancy. The result was a revealing trichotomy. As will be described, this trichotomy is a 
refinement and fusion of the dichotomies described by the dimensions source or origin of 
opportunities and Time scale of identification (Table 6 Two perspectives on Opportunity 
identification). 
4.4.3.1 Inside-Out – trajectory 
The first trajectory corresponds to the Creation Perspective as it combines the process 
characteristics of the time scale dimension with the internal origin of the opportunity described 
by the source of opportunities dimension. All the firms in this study with a Creation Perspective 
have this type of trajectory – which we labelled the Inside-Out trajectory. In these Creation-
oriented firms, opportunity identification starts from technology-based ideas for new products 
or applications. All these firms are able to give examples of an initially vague idea that gradually 
develops into a clear and well-defined new business idea, including descriptions of technology, 
product, and market. In the course of this development process not only technological 
information is added but also external environmental and market information. The initial idea 
however, originated in the firm’s internal technological domain. This is the typical Creation 
Perspective approach, but the idea of an Inside-Out trajectory strongly emphasizes the 
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technological basis. This type of trajectory reminds of Hamel and Prahalad’s (1990) and Hargadon 
and Sutton’s (1997) description of how core competences can be leveraged into new markets.  
All the case firms in this study with a Creation Perspective follow this Inside-Out trajectory. It 
often starts from a distinct event or situation triggering the firm to evaluate its own key 
capabilities. After defining these capabilities the firm starts searching for new potential markets 
in which these might have commercial value, hence the label “Inside-Out”. Smokey, for example, 
first thoroughly analyzed the manufacturing processes its machines were capable of, and then 
analyzed which of these processes had a competitive edge. Once these key processes had been 
identified the question was raised for which other industries such processes could be useful. 
Admittedly, the Inside-Out trajectory in this case was exceptionally clear and evident, but it could 
be found in all other Creation-oriented firms in this study. Chimney went through a similar 
process, leading to so-called “customer profiles”. These profiles are not defined along specific 
market or industry boundaries, but they are based on the firm’s technological capabilities which 
are applied to specific customer needs. Chimney’s agents are on the road searching for potential 
customers in any industry or market that fits these customer profiles. This is again an example of 
this approach. Opportunities arise from within the technological core and are developed into a 
full-fledged business opportunity via a process of searching for new market.  
4.4.3.2 Market Signal Driven – trajectory 
The opposite of the Inside-Out trajectory is the Market Signal Driven trajectory. Firms on this 
trajectory emphasize that new opportunities are discovered in the outside world, sometimes 
involving a great deal of chance, and as such they clearly have a Eureka Perspective, but they also 
emphasize that discovery (the Eureka moment) is preceded by a considerable process of search. 
The Market Signal Driven trajectory was found in five firms – Lime Dry, Homer, Henry’s, Shorty, 
and Tubby. All these firms, with the exception of Shorty, have a strong Environmental orientation. 
They scan the environment and pick up all kinds of market information and external signals. Out 
of this pile of information sometimes an idea or hint for a new opportunity arises, which is then 
further developed by mixing information from the firm’s technological domain with external 
information until a clear business opportunity is reached. However, in their stories of innovation, 
the exploration of the outside world predominates. In the terminology we introduced in chapter 
2, one could argue that in the perspective of these firms, the discovery of a Market Opportunity 
is the most important part of their innovation process. We give an example from Lime Dry, a firm 
that carefully keeps track of several technological trends in its environment. The increasing 
demand for electric cars – the result of several trends, including an increasing ecological 
awareness, oil shortages, and rising oil prices - triggered a Market Signal Driven trajectory. First 
came the awareness that these trends might lead to potentially interesting and profitable new 
markets. The next step was to dig deeper and gather more information about the current state 
of affairs and relate this external information to Lime Dry’s own technological capabilities. 
Eventually, this iterative cycle of mixing and integrating internal and external information led to 
the identification of a new niche market for a modified version of their industrial mixers. A key 
component of an electric car is the battery, and the battery industry is making major leaps in 
creating longer lasting and more powerful batteries. Lime Dry realized that certain precious 
metals used in car batteries must be mixed in a specific manner because of their abrasive 
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character. This way, via a Market Signal Driven trajectory, Lime Dry identified the mixing of 
battery powder for the battery packs of hybrid/electric cars as a business opportunity. In a similar 
manner Homer identified decoration as a potential new market for its coating machines. The 
story is that in the USA in the early nineties brass and metal colored decorative applications such 
as door handles and indoor water taps became very popular. Homer picked up this consumer 
trend and combined it with its own technological competences, which led to a successful market 
penetration. In much the same way Shorty and Henry´s hope to trigger an opportunity 
development process. Both firms operate in the food processing Machine Manufacturing 
Industry , and both monitor the consumer trends in matters of food on a continuous basis.  
4.4.3.3 Direct Request- trajectory 
The third trajectory we found is what we called the Direct Request trajectory. Firms innovating 
along this trajectory see opportunities arising in the external environment and their perspective 
on innovation has many of the characteristics of the Eureka Perspective. However, these 
opportunities seem to appear almost by chance. There is neither a long and organized process of 
search as in the Market Signal Driven trajectory, nor is there a long process of internal search and 
development as in the Inside-Out trajectory. Its concrete appearance is remarkably similar across 
case firms. The general pattern is as follows: Out of the blue the firm is contacted by a new, 
potential customer from an industry, sector, branch or market hitherto not served by the firm. 
This customer requests a certain machine to be developed. The market, needs, problems, 
solutions, and technological functionalities have already been analyzed and defined by the 
requesting party. The only item missing is a properly working machine. In other words, the case 
firm is handed a “pre-fab” opportunity on a silver platter, and has only to decide whether it has 
the technological capabilities to develop such a machine, and whether it is willing to honor the 
request on the basis of matters such as the risk involved, profitability, capacity, and strategic 
desirability. Quad, Lime Dry, Shorty, Golden Age and Tubby all have clear anecdotal evidence in 
line with this trajectory. These five firms all rely heavily on Direct Request, which is an approach 
that has the typical Eureka-like characteristic of passiveness. One interviewee literally said it was 
a matter of waiting until the phone rings. Although passiveness may not sound like an attitude 
worth pursuing, it must be noted that these firms have been successful in following a Direct 
Request trajectory. The primary option to increase the chance that potential new customers will 
come to the firm with their (direct) request is to increase the firm’s visibility. 
The three trajectories are not completely mutually exclusive. Firms can adopt more than one 
trajectory, and in fact many of the case firms do. Lime Dry, Shorty and Tubby, for example, use 
the Market Signal Driven trajectory as an addition to the Direct Request trajectory. Tubby states 
that the Direct Request approach is for them the most successful, but that does not prevent them 
from monitoring trends in the external environment and experiment with Inside-Out trajectories. 
Henry’s uses the Market Signal Driven trajectory next to Direct Request as opportunity 
identification trajectories, while Homer relies solely on market signals. Bee Hurst is primarily 
engaged in Inside-Out trajectories, but receives many Direct Requests as well.  
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4.4.3.4 Conclusion trajectories of opportunity identification 
The following matrix brings together the findings concerning firms’ opportunity identification 
trajectories. Magnum, Thames and Dully are not represented as the data is inconclusive with 
regard to the trajectories of opportunity identification of these three firms. No clear and explicit 
information about any trajectory could be found in the interviews of these cases. To summarize, 
the Inside-Out trajectory is closely related to the Creation Perspective, while the Market Signal 
Driven trajectory is followed by firms with a Eureka Perspective. However, firms following a 
Market Signal Driven trajectory have a clear understanding of opportunity identification as a 
process; the Direct Request trajectory is also connected to the Eureka Perspective, but in this 
perspective opportunity identification is really associated with a single point in time.  
 External origins / Eureka 
Perspective 
Internal origins / Creation 
Perspective 
 
Long term 
Process  
Market Signal Driven 
Tubby, Homer, Henry’s, Shorty,  
Lime Dry, Chimney  
 
Inside-Out 
Bee Hurst, Smokey, Luminata, 
Chimney, CelaVita 
 
short term 
moment 
Direct Request 
Quad, Lime Dry, Shorty, Golden 
Age, Tubby, Henry’s, Bee Hurst 
 
  
    
Table 15 Trajectories of opportunity identification 
4.4.4 Dynamics of Dominant Perspective 
A closing remark about Dominant Perspectives is that they are dynamic, and not cast in stone. 
The data show that firms are able to switch from one approach to another. Luminata and Smokey 
were at the time of the interviews in the middle of a transition from a relatively passive Eureka-
oriented organization to a more pro-active Creation-oriented organization. A similar ambition 
could be observed with Quad. For a long time this firm had relied heavily on Direct Requests, 
which implies a Eureka Perspective, but with the arrival of a new general manager a 
reorganization was set in motion that included a more pro-active approach towards finding new 
markets. The same story could be told for Henry’s. Anecdotal evidence showed a clear Eureka 
Perspective in which Direct Requests played a dominant role. However, in the interview with the 
new sales director it became clear that Henry’s also wanted to head into a more pro-active 
direction in matters of opportunity identification. This re-setting of the mind-set was 
accompanied by a rearrangement of several parts of the organization. At the time of the interview 
this change process was still ongoing. At Golden Age such a change of mind-set had not taken 
place yet, but one interviewee admitted that the firm was too passive. The firm’s modus operandi 
was to wait for new customers with Direct Requests, but this approach was hardly successful and 
there was a dormant desire to pro-actively expand into new markets on the basis of core 
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technologies. The interviewee, however, was still figuring out how to organize such a 
fundamental change and we found no evidence that this intention was shared by other 
interviewees in the firm. On the contrary, the general director seemed to firmly believe in a 
Eureka-like approach: increasing the visibility of the firm via trade fairs and active sales managers 
should be enough to attract new customers.  
From these four case firms two observations can be drawn. Firstly, change of opportunity 
identification practices implies changing the organizational structure. Luminata, Smokey and 
Quad implemented a couple of organizational changes, including the hiring of new employees, in 
order to change the style of identifying opportunities. Secondly, fundamental changes in the way 
opportunities are identified require either new management or new insights of the existing 
management. At Luminata this process was initiated by the new sales and marketing director, 
while at Smokey the change was evoked by an MBA study by one of the members of the 
management team which resulted in a new interest of top management in expanding into new 
markets. This seems to confirm the classic view that organizational change needs (top-) 
management support and commitment. Lack of support from general management hinders 
change at Golden Age.  
This is also apparent at Dully, where a reverse process led from a Creation state of mind to a 
Eureka Perspective. Anecdotes of the first few years after the current owners acquired the firm 
reveal a typical Creation Perspective: a first assessment of what the firm is capable of, followed 
by a search for potential markets and subsequently the successful entering of these markets. At 
the time of the interviews, however, both interviewees’ state of mind of was surprisingly Eureka-
like. As described earlier, at Dully there is an absolute disbelief in the possibility of entering new 
markets. In a sense they have a Eureka Perspective – waiting for the magical moment an 
opportunity comes by. But in reality they don’t believe this will happen anyway.  
A third type of change in Dominant Perspective and/or dominant trajectory approach we 
encountered was a temporary switch. Some firms moved from a dominant Eureka Perspective to 
a Creation Perspective for a certain period and then returned to the Eureka Perspective. The 
clearest example is Shorty, of which we have a rich set of anecdotal evidence about Direct 
Requests of customers from new branches. The evidence shows that Shorty has had over time a 
Eureka-like Dominant Perspective. However, at a certain point in time the once prosperous 
markets started to decline dramatically, for external reasons. The resulting commercial and 
financial crisis triggered a temporary change of Dominant Perspective. The interviewees vividly 
recalled how they sat down to question their existence and their capabilities. After this “TCC 
awareness exercise” they went out into supermarkets, not only to get ideas about new markets 
but also to take a fresh look at their capabilities. They literarily went through the shelves, asking 
themselves at each item the question: “could we develop and manufacture machines that are 
needed to produce this food product?”. After identifying all the possible sectors and markets for 
which they had the required capabilities they selected the most promising market, commercially 
and financially. Thus they followed an Inside-Out trajectory, but once they had successfully 
plunged into the new industry they returned to a Eureka mode of identifying opportunities. 
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4.5 Integration Mechanisms 
An important component of our research model deals with Integration Mechanisms. Creating a 
New Business Opportunity requires that market needs and technical solutions are brought 
together. The information needed for opportunity identification may originate from many 
different sources, but ultimately it comes from either the internal technological domain or the 
external domain – and these two types of information have to be integrated. In individual cases 
we found concrete examples of such internal/external knowledge mixtures, which for lack of a 
better term we label “Integration Mechanisms”.  
Studying Integration Mechanisms proved to be complicated. What made sense in theory – 
tracking flows of information through the organization, asking interviewees to recount the way 
internal and external information were combined - was hard to accomplish in practice. Some 
interviewees were unfamiliar with definitions and concepts, and the answers they gave were 
often unclear. For an interview to be fruitful, the interviewee needs to have an understanding of 
the subjects to be discussed. For some interviewees the subject of Integration Mechanisms was 
either unfamiliar or without interest. Other interviewees, in contrast, did understand this subject 
and considered it valuable. The interviews with them yielded some useful insights in Integration 
Mechanisms and information linking.  
All in all, the interviews did not provide us with sufficiently rich and accurate information to give 
a detailed description of Integration Mechanisms, but it is possible to sketch the contours of a 
pattern. In the next sections we present five mechanisms, each concerning the linking of 
information from the external environmental domain and the internal technological domain. 
Obviously, the ambition must be to disclose the relation between these mechanisms and the 
other components of the research model but, frankly, it is too early for that. Claims such as “firms 
with an Y Dominant Perspective have in general Integration Mechanisms A or B” can only be 
made with the greatest care. Also, Integration Mechanisms are not exclusive. As table 16 
(Integration Mechanisms) shows, a firm may use more than one mechanism. In the remainder of 
the present section we will answer and elaborate on the operational research question stated in 
section 3.1.4: “Which Integration Mechanisms can be identified in each case firm?” 
 
 Individual 
Entrepreneurial Hub 
Permanent 
Dynamic Duo 
Temporary 
Duo 
Focused 
Discussion 
Common 
Sharing 
 
 BBC 
CelaVita 
Thames 
Magnum 
Henry’s 
Lime Dry 
Bee Hurst 
Golden Age 
Homer  
Shorty 
Thames 
Chimney 
Smokey 
Luminata 
Bee Hurst 
BBC 
QUAD 
CelaVita 
Luminata 
Henry’s   
Lime Dry 
Golden Age 
Homer 
Henry’s 
Bee Hurst 
 
       
Table 16 Integration Mechanisms 
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4.5.1 Individual Entrepreneurial Hub 
The integration of information can take place within one individual in what we refer to as 
Individual Entrepreneurial Hub. This individual resembles the classic technical inventor 
entrepreneur. He or she has extensive knowledge of both the technical and the sales domain, 
and is responsible for all information gathering and connecting of external and internal 
information used in the opportunity identification process. Experience in both domains is 
necessary for this mechanism to be successful. In all the cases we observed, the individual was 
an engineer with a thorough technical background but also with commercial capabilities and 
ambitions. Two organizational functions seem to coincide with the Individual Entrepreneurial 
Hub: product manager and director/owner. Another feature which stood out was the importance 
of having a large internal and external social network. Next to being a skilled engineer with 
commercial capacities, the individuals that fitted into this mechanism were also great networkers 
with extensive networks. Because it takes time to gain experience in both domains and to 
establish such an extensive network, the Individual Entrepreneurial Hub is not a mechanism that 
can be implemented on the spot. It takes time, effort and a long term commitment. 
4.5.2 Permanent Dynamic Duo 
A second Integration Mechanism we found is the Permanent Dynamic Duo. In this case two 
specific individuals work as a tandem in close cooperation in matters of opportunity 
identification, each representing one of the two domains. Often it is an individual with a technical 
background but with ambitions in the commercial domain who teams up with a technician or 
specialist. One of the partners of such a tandem is organizationally and functionally rooted in the 
sales/marketing domain, as sales manager, sales director, or marketing employee (Shorty). He 
represents the external domain, mainly working in the external environment of the firm. The 
other partner is firmly rooted in the technological core of the firm, being an engineer with design, 
development, and/or R&D as main responsibilities. The most important feature of this 
mechanism, we found, is that these duo’s are really tight teams. Based on long term cooperation, 
the partners can read each other’s mind, and they have gained a feeling for the other’s domain. 
The composition is fixed, meaning the two individuals, once linked, form a permanent couple. 
Because it takes time to build confidence in each other, these duo’s are not easy to establish. If 
they break up, for example because one of the two leaves the firm, the bond is lost and cannot 
be replaced easily.  
4.5.3 Temporary Duo 
This third mechanism of integrating information, the Temporary Duo is a variant of the 
Permanent duo. Again two individuals, each representing either the external or the internal 
domain, work together closely in order to bridge the gap between the two domains. In general, 
one of them is part of the sales team while the other is an engineer from the technical core of 
the organization. However, in contrast to the Permanent Dynamic Duo, these two cooperate not 
always in the same formation and are as such not a “complete” couple. The Temporary Duo is set 
up for specific cases and not always the same two individuals are being linked together. Couples 
are formed for specific problems, cases and projects. This less continuous character of the 
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partnership may explain why the bond between the partners of a temporary due is weaker than 
between the partners of the Dynamic Duo. 
4.5.4 Focused Discussion 
This non-permanent character is also a feature of the fourth Integration Mechanism we refer to 
as Focused Discussion. In this mechanism the hub is not a permanent routine or organizational 
entity, but has an ad hoc character. The key feature of this information integrating mechanism is 
its focus on solving problems. It is set in motion when specific issues or problems arise. 
Information is shared in groups that do not always have the same composition. Within the 
information sharing sessions there is little loss of information. A sender of information can 
directly see if and how his information is used by the others. The “density of the usage” of the 
information is high, as the sender knows where the information lands and whether it is 
understood correctly. Instant feedback enables the sender to resend the information in an 
altered way and, if necessary, to explicate it. This mechanism may take different forms such as 
classical brainstorm sessions in which members of several departments are involved (Henry’s), 
the developing of roadmaps (Luminata), having members of several different departments 
working on a specific problem (Quad), “war games” to discuss a specific real or imaginary business 
case with employees of the firm and agents (Lime Dry). Focused Discussion do not always happen 
in such formal and planned manner. An informal “hallway-chat” may become a brainstorm-
session if it is focused on a specific topic.  
4.5.5 Common Sharing 
Many informal discussions are about the firm, business, or another professional topic, but 
without a specific purpose. These can be viewed as a fifth information Integration Mechanism 
which we refer to as Common Sharing. In this mechanism no specific groups are formed to share 
information for a specific purpose. There are only individuals who wish to convey information. 
Moreover, the sender of information has no direct feedback mechanism to check whether the 
information reaches its destination, or whether it is understood as indented. The sender sends 
his information not as a reaction to what others in a discussion have put forward, but selects 
whatever he suspects to be of interest to the (other members of the) firm. If one compares 
Focused Discussion with an aimed and deliberate sniper shot, then Common Sharing is a shotgun 
blast. The sender is aiming in a general direction, pulling the trigger, and hoping to hit something. 
In this broadcasting mode, without instant feedback, loss of information is likely. Therefore, the 
information density is low.  
In the real world this mechanism can take on many forms. One is the general periodical 
interdepartmental meeting. Although these are formal group meetings, they also serve as a 
setting in which general information is passed between members of different departments of the 
firm. It is possible that the meetings start addressing specific issues in which technical and market 
information is involved, in which case the Common Sharing turns into a Focused Discussion. But 
more often, according to various interviewees, these periodic meetings are used to share general 
information – individuals elaborate on their current status, undertakings and projects – rather 
than that they are dedicated to sharing information about a specific problem (Golden Age, 
Homer, Henry’s, Bee Hurst).  
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Another form of Common Sharing is written reports that are sent throughout (parts of) the firm. 
This is a typical case of broadcasting: writing information down and tossing it over the fence in 
the hope that someone will read it, find it interesting, and act upon it. One of the most old-
fashioned examples we found was an article written for the firm’s newsletter. Bee Hurst 
frequently distributes such a newsletter, intended for an internal audience. Company news, like 
announcements of new employees, is published in this way in a friendly manner. But such 
newsletters not only contain information about the firm itself, but also interviews with 
employees, birthdays messages, reports on the firm’s soccer team, and so forth. The product 
manager of Bee Hurst found this newsletter a perfect vehicle to inform the rest of the firm 
periodically about his ventures and activities. A more modern version is to write formal reports, 
or white papers, and distribute them throughout the firm, possibly using e-mail or a firm’s intra-
web solution. Apart from the level of technical sophistication the broadcasting principle remains 
the same. One posts written information on the firm’s internal website and hopes for the best.  
A final example of Common Sharing is an oral form, again from the product manager at Bee Hurst. 
At the annual Christmas celebration of the firm, with several managers and directors delivering a 
speech, he includes information about the status of his pursuits in his own speech. In all these 
examples information is simply spread through the organization, and the sender can only hope 
that something will stick somewhere, connecting external information with internal information. 
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5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
“The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not ‘Eureka!’ 
but rather ‘hmm....that's funny...’”  
Source disputed but often credited to Isaac Asimov 
 
In this final chapter we will attempt to tie up all loose ends we created in the previous chapters. 
This study has been all about attempting to create a pragmatic framework which models the 
workings of the identifications of opportunities for medium-sized technology-based firms (1.2). 
We started out constructing an initial framework (2.1.3) based on relevant existing theories (2.2) 
which we then tested in the field by interviewing owners, managing directors and other managers 
of a series of medium-sized technology-oriented firms (3.4). Based on the observations described 
in chapter 4 we will attempt to answer the main research question of this thesis “How can 
opportunity identification in medium-sized, technology-based firms be modelled?”, hopefully 
leading to some pragmatic guidelines for entrepreneurs and managers in their quest for 
opportunities. Answering this main research question is not merely the sum of answering the 
operational research questions. Most important is to answer the derived research question “Does 
the proposed initial framework reflect the workings of the New Business Exploitation function of 
a medium-sized firm in the real world”. In order to test the validity of this initial framework we 
will need to address the propositions (section 3.3): 
 The identification of a New Business Opportunity (NBO), also modelled as Proven Ability 
to Identify Opportunities (PAIO) in the research framework, will occur only if a firm has 
simultaneously a high degree of Environmental Orientation and a high score on 
Technological Core Competence Awareness 
 The Dominant Perspective of higher management of the firm should equal what we 
have defined as the Creation Perspective.  
The central elements of the propositions, the Environmental Orientation of a firm, the 
Technological Core Competence Awareness and the Dominant Perspective are reflected in the 
operational research questions. Therefore, in order to answer the main research question we will 
work backwards: first we will answer three operational research questions, the outcome of which 
will clarify the validity of our propositions and we will then have an answer to the question 
whether the initial framework does model the act of opportunity identification or not. Once we 
have addressed all these questions, propositions and working statements we will be able to fine-
tune the framework properly. After this we will finally have a model to reflect on the findings in 
both the theoretical and the pragmatic context. The chapter will end with some reflections and 
thoughts about the methodology, possible follow up research and the applicability of the results 
in other industries.  
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5.1 Answering the research questions 
In this section we will attempt to answer the three operational research questions. The answers 
are needed in order to find out whether the framework adequately models the realities of 
opportunity identification at firms in the Machine Manufacturing Industry . 
5.1.1  “What is the Dominant Perspective of the firm”? 
As all the firms we studied were successfully diversified, and therefore had a track record of 
successful opportunity identification, we expected that the answer to this operational research 
question would be that all the case firms would have a Creation Perspective about opportunity 
identification. The reasoning was that firms with a Creation Perspective as Dominant Perspective 
would organize their New Business Exploration function in a balanced way so that both external 
and internal information would be gathered, resembling the workings of the framework we 
constructed (3.3 Research model). Firms with a Eureka Perspective as dominant logic were 
expected to have predominantly an external focus and, therefore, to rely almost exclusively on 
external information which, we predicted, should lead to less successful efforts in identifying 
opportunities.  
The observations however tell another story. The majority of the firms (10) had a clear Eureka 
Perspective (4.4 Dominant Perspective & Table 14 Case firms’ Dominant Perspective). This refutes 
the proposition that for successful opportunity identification the firm should have a Creation 
Perspective as Dominant Perspective. It appears possible for a firm to successfully identify 
opportunities while having an Eureka Perspective as Dominant Perspective. Therefore, the 
second proposition (NBO/PAIO exists only if the DP is similar to the Creation Perspective) must be 
rejected. This result makes it clear that the relation between Dominant Perspective and the New 
Business Exploration function is less straight forward than modelled initially. Therefore the initial 
framework needs refinement in order to model opportunity Identification correctly.  
5.1.2  “Does the firm fit the profile of an environmentally oriented 
organization?” and “What is the Technological Core Competence 
Awareness of the firm? “ 
These two questions have already been answered, implicitly yet in-depth, in sections 4.2.3 
Summary Environmental orientation) and 4.3.4 (Conclusion TCC awareness). In summary, the 
answer to the first question is that only three firms (Bee Hurst, Homer and Henry’s) can be seen 
as fitting the profile of a truly environmentally oriented firm. In matters of Technological Core 
Competence Awareness again only three firms can be considered having a truly high level of TCC 
(BBC, Luminata, Chimney). Because all the firms have been identified as having a Proven Ability 
to Identify Opportunities (PAIO), according to the model they all should simultaneously have a 
high Environmental Orientation and a high level of TCC. The first proposition (NBO/PAIO exists 
only if EO and TCCA are simultaneously present) therefore does not hold true. The simple 
conclusion is again that the model is not adequate, our initial framework does not reflect the 
realities of how firms identify opportunities. Again, the conclusion is that the initial framework 
needs to be refined.  
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5.1.3 The relationship between the opportunity identification perspective and 
the New Business Exploration Function. 
Generally speaking, our conceptual framework states that there is a relationship between the 
Opportunity identification perspective and the New Business Exploration Function. We can now 
dive into the issue by discussing the relationship between the Dominant Perspective of managers 
and the firm’s Environmental Orientation and Technological Core Competence Awareness. The 
initial assumption was that a Creation Perspective would be reflected in a balanced New Business 
Exploration function meaning that the firm has both a high Environmental Orientation and a high 
Technological Core Competence Awareness. Firms with a Eureka Perspective were expected to 
be merely externally focused, having therefore a high Environmental Orientation. Using the 
observations summarized in table 10 (Summary Environmental orientation), table 11 (Summary 
Environmental orientation Matrix) and table 12 (Technological Core Competence Awareness) 
from the previous chapter, we will put the following proposition to test: A Eureka Perspective 
goes together with a High Environmental Orientation combined with a low to medium TCC 
awareness, while a Creation Perspective goes together with high Environmental Orientation and 
a high TCC Awareness.  
In order to do this we chose the slippery route of adding the scores in the above mentioned tables 
and laying those results on top of table 14 (Dominant Perspective dichotomy). This is not a 
quantitative nor a statistical exercise but simply an effort to visualize our “through the eye lashes” 
interpretation of the data. The first conclusion is that there is no clear relationship between a 
Eureka Perspective and a high Environmental Orientation. As can be seen in table 17 (Relation 
Dominant Perspective - New Business Exploration Function) several firms with a Eureka 
Perspective score low on Environmental Orientation. For the firms following a Creation 
Perspective, the picture is less clear. With the exception of Chimney, one could conclude that 
firms with a Creation Perspective do have a balanced New Business Exploration function focused 
both on Environmental Orientation and on TCC awareness.  
Overall, it seems that there is not a really clear relationship between the Dominant Perspective 
of the management of a firm and the way its New Business Exploration function has been 
organized. While there is no relationship between the Eureka Perspective and a high 
Environmental Orientation, there does seem to be somewhat of a relationship between the 
Creation Perspective and a balanced New Business Exploration function. 
5.1.4 Answering the main research question 
After answering the first three operational research questions we can now answer the main 
research question we developed in the first chapter: “Does the proposed initial framework reflect 
the workings of the New Business Exploration function of a medium-sized firm in the real world?” 
with a simple “no, it does not”. This negative outcome will be addressed in the following section 
in which we will modify the initial framework with the help of new insights. 
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5.2 Adapted Framework 
We have seen that – unfortunately - the realities of opportunity identification are more complex 
than we envisioned in our initial framework. However, instead of starting from scratch building a 
new framework we will explore those aspects of the initial framework which are supported by 
our observations. Once those are established we can modify the framework by introducing and 
integrating the newly acquired insights from the case studies.  
5.2.1 Assumptions supported by the data 
First and foremost our basic idea of what a New Business Opportunity is seems pretty much to 
hold true. The idea that opportunities arise at the point where external market information meets 
internal technological information is supported by our data. This is clearly shown in the 
Integration Mechanisms we found in all the case firms (4.5 Integration Mechanisms): Whether it 
spawns from a single entrepreneurial individual or from a “common-sharing-shotgun-through-
the-organization”-approach, a New Business Opportunity appears at the nexus of external 
market information and internal information about technological core competencies. This 
pattern can be observed in the historical anecdotes about the identification of opportunities we 
gathered throughout the study (4.1 Introduction of the case firms). In short, the foundation of 
the framework still stands. 
Next to this foundation the pillars – so to speak - of the framework also seem to withstand the 
critique of our observations. Environmental Orientation (4.2 Environmental orientation), 
Technological Core Competence Awareness (4.3 Technological Core Competence Awareness) and 
Dominant Perspective (4.4 Dominant Perspective) have been found to be observable and 
measurable concepts that represent parts of a firm’s reality. Admittedly, these concepts have 
 Firms with Eureka Perspective Firms with Creation Perspective  
  EO TCC   EO TCC  
 Quad 
Lime Dry 
Shorty 
Henry´s 
Homer  
Golden Age 
Dully  
Magnum  
Tubby 
Thames 
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Table 17 Relation Dominant Perspective - New Business Exploration Function 
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been developed and operationalized for this study and the definitions, their exact meaning, and 
the measurement methods may need to be refined for future research. However, from the 
analyses of the data we have gathered it becomes clear that these concepts are a useful addition 
to the vocabulary of the research on opportunity identification. 
This is also true for the Integration Mechanisms which we expected to observe in the data and 
which we did. We found five distinct different mechanisms of integrating internal and external 
information (4.5 Integration Mechanisms). Although we are aware of the fact that this result is 
just a first step, which raises many questions for future research, the observation of Integration 
Mechanisms is another fundamental aspect of the initial framework that holds true. 
5.2.2 New insights derived from the data 
Apparently we fell into the trap of constructing a too deterministic-one-size-fits-all framework. 
Our initial framework assumed that there is a single approach towards successful opportunity 
identification: by having at the same time a true Environmental Orientation, a high Technological 
Core Competence Awareness and a Creation Perspective as dominant management perspective. 
Instead we found three different roads leading to Rome (4.4.3 Trajectories of opportunity 
identification). The discovery of these three trajectories makes the whole identification of 
opportunities more complex than expected. The Market Signal Driven trajectory and the Inside-
Out trajectory are variations of our initial framework. Of these two variations the Inside-Out 
trajectory resembles our initial ideas the most with opportunity identification appearing as a 
process of bringing external and internal information together internally in combination with a 
Creation Perspective. What stood out was that such trajectories were clearly initiated in the 
technological core of the firm. Very simply said; in such a trajectory the firms firstly identify the 
Technological Core Competences and subsequently connect those to external pieces of 
information hoping to find a truly new market. Hence the label Inside-Out. This is a classic 
textbook Core Competence approach (2.2.2) . 
The Market Signal Driven trajectory resembles the Inside-Out trajectory in also having a process 
approach of internally creating a nexus of internal and external information. The main difference 
is that in the Market Signal Driven trajectory the focus and initial starting point is the external 
environment in which the firm gathers all sorts and types of (market-)information hoping to 
connect those streams of information with internal technological competences in order to forge 
these two streams of information into a New Business Opportunity. Such a scheme has a very 
“marketing-textbook” and market-orientation of the firm look and feel to it (2.2.1 Market 
orientation). While the Inside-Out trajectory is internally focused and related to a Creation 
Perspective, the Market Signal Driven trajectory is outward looking, mostly in combination with 
a Eureka Perspective. Compared to the Inside-Out trajectory, the search for market information 
in the Market Signal Driven trajectory is relatively broad and unfocused. The Inside-Out search 
for market information is guided by knowledge of the TCC and therefore more focused. Roughly 
speaking, one can argue that the Market Signal Driven trajectory emphasizes external search over 
internal development, while it is opposite for the Inside-Out trajectory. 
Discussion and conclusion  
149 
 
Whereas these two trajectories are more or less in line with our initial framework, the Direct 
Request trajectory seems to totally deviate from our initial ideas. There is no internal 
development process; new opportunities seem to fall into one’s lap. While in the other two 
trajectories, though different in detail, New Business Opportunities are being created, in the 
Direct Request trajectory opportunities simply seem to exist in the external environment waiting 
to be discovered and harvested. It is not surprising that managers in firms following this trajectory 
think of opportunity identification along the lines of the Eureka Perspective: the opportunities 
appear at a single point in time. However, what is missing is a sense of search and discovery. 
What is going on? In the trajectory of Direct Request, opportunity identification happens in a way 
we had not envisioned beforehand. The crux of the matter is that in the Direct Request trajectory 
the nexus of two information streams is external to the firm. In our initial approach all the 
information is being processed and handled internally within the firm. What is happening in the 
Direct Request trajectory is that an external firm has gone through the process of shaping external 
market information into a concrete Market Opportunity which we have defined as a clearly 
defined need or problem, which has commercial potential (2.1.2.1 Market Opportunity). Also, this 
external firm has a clear notion and ideas about the technological competences that are needed 
to complement this Market Opportunity and turning it into a New Business Opportunity. 
However, this external firm lacks these competences and therefore needs to find them outside 
its own boundaries. For the potential suppliers in this environment, such New Business 
Opportunities seem to exist in the external environment as objective identities. One example that 
might clarify this abstract description of the Direct Request trajectory, can be found in the case 
of Shorty. This firm has a Eureka Perspective as Dominant Perspective and was approached by 
another firm with the question whether Shorty would be able to design an “automatic-fried-egg-
machine”. Not only had the requesting firm already done all the market research securing a stable 
market for pre-processed fabricated fried-eggs for school and business-restaurants (Market 
Opportunity), they also had worked out the functional design of the machine (technological 
competences). Now they only needed a machine-manufacturing firm with those technological 
competences that could actually transform the functional design into a technical blueprint and 
finally into a working prototype. In this example it is clear that the whole process of gathering 
and molding external information into a Market Opportunity is done by an external entity. By 
also developing a functional design needed to actually build the machine the requesting firm in a 
certain way also connects the Market Opportunity to a set of required Technological 
Competences.  
This way of identifying opportunities could be seen at many other case firms we visited. The 
general story of this Direct Request manner of exploring new opportunities is always the same: 
from the perspective of the requesting firm there is clearly a process of creation going on in 
identifying New Business Opportunities. However, from the point of view of our case firms, this 
New Business Opportunity is an objective entity “out there” in the external environment and the 
big challenge is to be visible to customers who have developed such “prefab-opportunities”.  
5.2.3 Final framework 
Using what we have found to hold true and combining it with the newly found insights, we are 
able to propose a new framework that models the identification of New Business Opportunities. 
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The final framework (Figure 10 Final Framework) is more complex than the initial one (Figure 5 
New Business Exploration Function), reflecting our findings in the real world. Instead of one single 
way to identify new opportunities it distinguishes three different ways. What remained is the 
most fundamental aspect of our framework and this study; the idea that New Business 
Opportunities come into existence at the nexus of external market information and internal 
technological information. This bringing together of the two streams of information within a firm 
is a distinct function of the firm which we refer to as the New Business Exploration function. This 
New Business Exploration Function is not a single employee function or a single department, 
rather it is the whole complex of individuals, groups, departments and mechanisms in a firm that 
are involved in integrating these two streams of information.  
Most notable difference with our initial framework is the addition of the three trajectories of 
opportunity identification. While Market Signals and Technological Core Competences seem to 
be merely new labels for the terminology we used in the initial framework (Gathering external 
customer needs and problems and gathering internal technological capability information), the 
important difference is that they are now considered as different possible starting points for the 
process of opportunity identification. The third trajectory, Direct Request, is a new feature of the 
framework and as such a noteworthy addition for understanding opportunity identification in 
practice. 
The introduction of three trajectories and particularly the Direct Request trajectory has several 
trickle down effects on the new framework. Instead of a single type of input of external 
information, we now model this input into two distinct streams of inputs. First we have a stream 
of what we already have referred to as Market Signals. These can be all kinds of bits and pieces 
of information in the realm of markets; all kind of trends, or breaks in trends, anecdotes, changing 
consumer-product-legislation, market anomalies etc. These Market Signals may lead to the 
identification of what we have called Market Opportunities. Secondly, the Direct Request 
trajectory is added to the framework as a second type of external market information stream. 
This is a clear idea or need which has a commercial potential and which originates from a third 
party in the external environment of the firm. This third party has gone through a process of 
opportunity development, but is in search of the right Technological Core Competences which 
are needed to actually transform the Market Opportunity into a concrete product. From the 
perspective of the receiving firm, the Direct Request results in a Market Opportunity or 
sometimes even in a ready-made New Business Opportunity. The recognition (Actually figuring 
out whether the Technological Core Competences of the firm matches such a Market 
Opportunity) of such an opportunity is not (for the manufacturing firm) the outcome of a slow 
process of searching and putting all bits and pieces of information together. Instead, it all happens 
in a very short time when the customer approaches the firm with a special request.  
The different manners of integration are reflected in the framework with the terms development 
and matching. Although the underlying practical mechanisms discussed in the last chapter (4.5 
Integration Mechanisms) might be the same, the character of the integration of the two streams 
differs significantly. While in the Inside-Out and the Market Signal Driven trajectories both types 
of information are being molded and combined in a process of internal development, in the Direct 
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Request trajectory the integration is more a matter of quickly matching a request from a 
customer with the firm’s technological competences.  
The Integration Mechanisms themselves are the stuff the development and matching activities 
are made of. Though we have found several clearly distinct Integration Mechanisms, exactly how 
these Integration Mechanisms and the various trajectories are related to each other is still not 
completely clear. However, because these Integration Mechanisms themselves are pretty well 
fleshed out from the data and we have some first indications of how these relationships look like 
we have included the individual Integration Mechanisms in the revised framework. We have 
confined ourselves, however, to simply list them in the core of the framework. In section 5.3.1. 
and table 18 (Synthesis of perspectives, trajectories and Integration Mechanisms) we will address 
the relationships. 
A final part of the original framework we retained in this final framework is the Dominant 
Perspective. Even though we feel that the relation between the Dominant Perspective and 
opportunity identification is still not clear enough, it can indeed be derived from the data that 
the Market Signal Driven trajectory and the Direct Request trajectory tend to be related to the 
Eureka Perspective while the Inside-Out trajectory is often combined with a Creation Perspective 
(5.1.3 The relationship between the opportunity identification perspective and the New Business 
Exploration Function). We also found that Dominant Perspectives can be dynamic, meaning that 
management can switch from a Eureka Perspective to a Creation Perspective and vice versa (4.4.4 
Dynamics of Dominant Perspective). It can be surmised that there is a relationship between the 
Dominant Perspective and the New Business Exploration Function even if this relationship is not 
very clear from the data yet. We included this relationship in the final framework because its 
presence is very likely, despite the lack of clarity about the details.  
 
Figure 10 Final Framework 
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5.3 Theoretical contributions 
Although we have utilized theories and insights from the market orientation literature (2.2.1 
Market orientation) and the body of theoretical works surrounding the Resourced Based View of 
the firm (2.2.2), our main interest in this study has been in the realm of the entrepreneurship 
literature, and more specifically the theory of opportunity identification. The core theoretical 
contribution of this study revolves around the two perspectives that have emerged from the 
existing literature; a discovery (Eureka) and a development (Creation) perspective. Both 
perspectives seem to have equal power of explanation (Alvarez & Barney, 2007), have the same 
power to actually be used by entrepreneurs in order to successfully identify opportunities 
(Vaghely & Julien, 2010; Zahra, 2008; Murphy, 2011), yet at the same time seem to be opposed 
to each other when examining their individual characteristics (3.1.1 Opportunity identification). 
In the following sections we will highlight the theoretical contributions of this study, offering a 
better understanding of these two opposing yet complementary perspectives. First we will take 
a closer look at the new theoretical insights emerging from this study concerning the fundamental 
nature of New Business Opportunities. Secondly we will fuse all these elements - perspectives, 
trajectories and Integration Mechanisms- into a single synthesis.  
5.3.1 The nature of a New Business Opportunity  
The main theoretical contribution made by this study is in line with the ongoing debate in 
entrepreneurship research about what is, at a fundamental level, the nature of a New Business 
Opportunity (Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Forster, 2012). Are business opportunities 
objective entities “out there” ready to be “discovered” and seized by entrepreneurs, a view 
presented by Shane and Venkataraman (2000) in their seminal article for which they were 
awarded the 2010 Academy of Management Review Decade Award or are they human creations 
developed in long drawn-out development processes? In this study we tried to figure out which 
of the two perspectives describes the true nature of opportunities best. We presumed that the 
Creation Perspective would have the upper hand in this “contest” and we included this 
perspective in the initial framework as a necessary condition for successful identification of 
opportunities. At face value this presumption seems incorrect, as most of the firms in this study 
– that all have a successful track record in identifying opportunities – have a Eureka Perspective 
(Table 14). However, when comparing opportunity identification arrangements in firms with a 
Eureka and with a Creation Perspective, we found more evidence of a Creation Perspective than 
evidence consistent with a Eureka Perspective. The comparison involved environmental scanning 
(scope and infrastructure), Technological Core Competence Awareness, and Integration 
Mechanisms.  
As to environmental scanning, firms with a Eureka Perspective have as broad a scope as firms 
with a Creation Perspective (Table 9), though the sources used are not identical. Firms with a 
Eureka Perspective rely much more on personal networks and consumer trends than firms with 
a Creation Perspective. Furthermore, the environmental scanning infrastructure of firms with a 
Eureka Perspective seems no less developed than the infrastructure of firms with a Creation 
Perspective (Table 8). The main difference is that the strategic apex has a prominent role in firms 
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with a Eureka Perspective while firms with a Creation Perspective tend to rely more on their sales 
department.  
With respect to Technological Core Competence Awareness the difference is larger between 
firms with a Eureka and firms with a Creation Perspective. Here we made a distinction between 
three levels of abstraction (lowest a focus on products; intermediate a focus on processes, 
technologies and skills; highest a focus on the firm’s distinct capabilities), and a distinction 
between an intuitive versus a rational or deliberate approach. Concerning the level of abstraction 
we found that most firms are in the intermediate category but the ”lowest” category contains 
only firms with a Eureka Perspective and the “highest” category only firms with a Creation 
Perspective. Moreover, all except one of the firms with a Creation Perspective have a deliberate 
(or rational) approach towards opportunity identification. For firms with a Eureka Perspective the 
distribution is less skewed (Table 12). 
Regarding the Integration Mechanisms used, the main finding is that all firms with a Creation 
Perspective have at least one such mechanism, but that applies also for most of the firms with a 
Eureka Perspective (Table 16). However, different mechanisms are used. Two mechanisms -
Individual Entrepreneurial Hub, and Focused Discussion- are used by Eureka Perspective and 
Creation Perspective firms alike. In contrast, Permanent Dynamic Duo and Common Sharing are 
mainly or even exclusively used by firms with a Eureka Perspective, while Temporary Duo is 
mainly used by firms with a Creation Perspective. 
To summarize, we did find differences between firms with a Eureka and firms with a Creation 
Perspective, relating to the nature of arrangements made in preparation of opportunity 
identification, but what we did not find is a lack of organizational arrangements for opportunity 
identification in firms that claim to have Eureka Perspective.  
At a fundamental level, the Creation Perspective is more valid than the Eureka Perspective. The 
process-like approach (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003; Buzenitz, et al., 2003; Muzyka, De 
Koning, & Churchill, 1995; Sarason, Dillard, & Dean, 2006) ultimately describes the identification 
of opportunities better than the more traditional idea of a Eureka-like spark of genius (Kaish & 
Gilad, 1991; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Baron, 2006; Gaglio, 2004). However, the spark-like eureka 
moment may still often be mentioned by the people involved, especially if their firm is following 
a Direct Request trajectory. What becomes clear from the data and the resulting new framework 
is that these eureka moments tend to be preceded by the same kind of development processes 
as described in the Creation Perspective. From the point of view of the observer in the diversifying 
firm however, this process is obscured when it happened in another firm. In such an outside firm 
bits and pieces of market information have been gathered, analyzed and integrated into a Market 
Opportunity. Once this outside firm starts its search for the required technological competences 
complementing this Market Opportunity, it can be experienced in the firm on the receiving end 
as a eureka moment. However, as we have explained extensively by now; all New Business 
Opportunities in essence are being created in a long-term social process in which external market 
information is mixed with technological competences. This is not a new insight; it is present in 
many previous studies reflecting what we have labelled a Creation Perspective.  
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However, in this study we have explained that the Eureka Perspective (and the theories 
supporting this perspective) seem to hold its ground as well and therefore why both perspectives 
seem to lead to successful opportunity identifications in the real world (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). 
We have hopefully shown that is not the case. In very broad strokes one could conclude that one 
of the main causes for this dualism is the fact that in the Eureka Perspective Market Opportunities 
are being confused with New Business Opportunities, or at least no real difference is being made 
between the two - a difference which is essential in our framework. Particularly in the classic 
theories revolving around the concept of entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973; Gaglio & Katz, 
2001; Baron, 2007) the opportunities mentioned are to be considered Market Opportunities, and 
not New Business Opportunities. These authors focus very much on gathering and analysing 
external market information, while almost ignoring the (technological) core component. In our 
framework this internal technical information is of equal importance.  
Next to this issue of defining opportunities there is another important cause for the persistent 
apparent dualism in perspectives. Even though the Eureka Perspective is at a fundamental level 
not correct, in practice it does seem to deliver concrete successes. The fact that the Eureka 
Perspective can also be associated with successful New Business Opportunity identification has 
been observed not only in this study but also in several others (Zahra, 2008; Vaghely & Julien, 
2010). This pragmatic success of the Eureka Perspective has obscured the fallacy of this 
perspective from a theoretical point of view. The distinction we have proposed between the two 
types of opportunities explains this apparent pragmatic success. Our findings are in line with the 
idea that different (sub)-types of opportunities exists (Welter & Alvarez, 2015) and that Eureka 
opportunities are a special or a sub type of the Creation opportunities (Luksha, 2008). With this 
research we have contributed to the advancement of knowledge about opportunities of which 
we still know little even after more than a decade of research (Shane, 2012). 
5.3.2 The identification of New Business Opportunities 
Our second contribution to the entrepreneurship theory is that we have shed some light on the 
little knowledge there is on the process of “how entrepreneurs identify opportunities” (Shane, 
2012, p. 14). We created a framework in which several elements or building blocks work together 
in modelling how opportunities are being identified. The first element that is important in 
identifying opportunities is the Dominant Perspective of the firm. This study is consistent with 
previous works about manager’s and entrepreneur’s dominant logic and mental models 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Porac, Mishina, & Pollock, 2002) as we present the Dominant 
Perspective of the management and/or owner as the dominant logic of the firm. Even though the 
relation between the Dominant Perspective and the other elements such as the Integration 
Mechanisms is less clear-cut than we had hoped for we have shown there is a relationship 
between the perspective and the trajectories (Table 15). It is clear that the Dominant Perspective 
of higher management and/or owner does play a role in how opportunities are being identified 
giving the concept of dominant logic a place in the entrepreneurship research. Our observation 
that both perspectives can be observed in firms, can change over time and that both perspectives 
seem to lead to successful opportunity identifications is in line with the recent work of for 
example Garud and Giuliani who write that “both discovery and creation are involved in dynamic 
ways as an entrepreneurial journey unfolds” (Garud & Giuliani, 2013, p. 158). This 
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acknowledgement of the existence of two perspectives and its influence on the opportunity 
identification process is important because of its impact on the research of entrepreneurship, 
teaching about it and on entrepreneurship itself (Alvarez & Barney, 2010).  
Probably the most original insight of this study is the notion of the possibility of following three 
different trajectories when identifying opportunities. In chapter four we have described them as 
we have observed them in practice (4.4.3), in this section we will outline them from a more 
theoretical standpoint trying to extract the key identifying attribute of each trajectory. Starting 
with the Direct Request trajectory, its most important precondition for success is being visible to 
potential customers, preferably far beyond one’s own market/sector/industry. To be more 
precise, it is about the visibility of the firm’s technological competences. This visibility can be 
achieved in various ways, but in our study we have observed that the requested Market 
Opportunities which firms received came into being because the entrepreneurs had large 
personal networks reaching beyond their own markets and comfort zones. Most of the 
individuals of other firms in other industries that made these requests, were in the social network 
of the interviewee/entrepreneur. Without such extensive personal networks, these Market 
Opportunities would not have been offered to them. The significance of social networking for 
opportunity identification has been recognized by many other authors before (Puhakka, 2006; 
Riquelme, 2013). This visibility enables the firm to engage in a more passive approach in 
opportunity identification by having external firms finding them instead of looking outwards for 
market signals. In other words, the ability but foremost the willingness and continuous habit of 
social networking outside the own comfort zone is an important part of entrepreneurship in the 
Direct Request trajectory. 
Networking can be important to increase the visibility of the firm, but it can also be important for 
gathering information on the external environment in the Market Signals Driven trajectory and 
to a lesser extent the Inside-Out trajectory. Firms that opt for a Market Signals Driven trajectory 
foremost scan their external environment for all kinds of market information until a certain piece 
of information or combination of market information triggers a process of development in which 
this external information is combined with internal technological knowledge into a New Business 
Opportunity. We have referred to this market information as market signals. Searching for such 
market signals does not just involve visiting trade fairs and reading trade journals, but also talking 
to people with many different backgrounds. More generally, one can argue that the archetypical 
entrepreneurial alertness that can be found in the literature is typical for firms following a Market 
Signals Driven trajectory. They are scanning the environment without a clear focus, trying to 
identify useful signals among the multitude of signals passing by.  
The recognition of such market signals as a starting point of a process of development may come 
as a Eureka moment for some. This may cause confusion in the terminology of opportunities. 
Market signals may appear to some entrepreneurs as business opportunities even though they 
are merely the triggers for an elaborate process of development of New Business Opportunities. 
One could argue that with the evaluation of one or a combination of multiple market signals 
something that resembles a Market Opportunity, similar as those described in the Direct Request 
trajectory, can be developed.  
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Firms following the Inside-Out trajectory finally, are far more focused in their search for market 
information. For them, the main activity in the process of opportunity identification is the 
exploration of the technological core competences of the firm. When they search for market 
information, they are primarily looking for possible applications of internal know-how in new 
markets. Their starting point is internal deliberation, leading to a relatively abstract 
understanding of the (technological) competences of the firm. This idea is very much in line with 
Danneels’ idea of de-linking and re-linking (Danneels, 2007). 
This exploration of the three trajectories discloses three important entrepreneurial qualities: 
1. Visibility: having a large social network which extends far beyond one’s own 
market/sector/industry.  
 
2. Alertness: being consciously and continuously on the lookout for Market Opportunities.  
 
3. Core competence awareness: having a thorough understanding of the own firm’s 
technological competences.  
The traditional literature on entrepreneurship emphasizes alertness, but says very little about 
visibility and core competence awareness. Entrepreneurial alertness has long been a key concept 
of entrepreneurship theory. It was first coined by Kirzner (1973) to explain the recognition of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. According to Kirzner (1973, 1979) entrepreneurial alertness is the 
individual’s ability to see overlooked opportunities. Kirzner did not elaborate much on the origins 
or the mechanics or the details of this concept. He rather stated that it exists as an explanatory 
concept. However after 40 years of research it is still an ill-defined concept and researchers are 
still adding new insights to it (Tang, Kacmar, & Busenitz, 2012; Valliere, 2013). While Kirzner 
emphasizes spontaneity in opportunity recognition and defines entrepreneurial alertness as the 
ability to recognize opportunities without deliberate search, Tang et al. (2012) stress three 
dimensions that resemble strongly our notion of alertness. Firstly, continuously scanning of the 
environment for new information, secondly combining this external information and thirdly 
evaluating whether this new combination of information is a potential Market Opportunity. In 
our framework however, alertness is only one of three possible entrepreneurial qualities. The 
other two qualities are being able to extend one’s social network in order to enlarge the visibility 
of the firm’s competences and being able to assess one’s own Technological Core Competences.  
The final contribution of this study is the uncovering of Integration Mechanisms. Whether the 
identification of New Business Opportunities begins with recognition of a firm’s own 
technological core competences, with the elaboration of market signals, or with a request made 
by another firm, at some point knowledge of internal assets and knowledge of market needs have 
to be brought together and integrated. We found five ways, or mechanisms, to accomplish such 
integration: Individual Entrepreneurial Hub, Permanent Dynamic Duo, Temporary Duo, Focused 
Discussion, and Common Sharing. These mechanisms themselves are not entirely new. They have 
been described in the literature already. Some quite extensive, others very brief. For example 
Maidique (1980) has stressed the importance of the entrepreneurial individual in an integrating 
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role in established firms in radical innovation processes. Griffin and Hauser (1996) present the 
blacksmith as an example of an individual who in the past conducted both the “R&D”-task and 
the sales and marketing tasks and as such acted as a linking pin. They state that “Even today in 
entrepreneurial firms, the producer-inventor frequently combines the knowledge of what is 
needed with how to develop it” (Griffin & Hauser, 1996, p. 192). Thus they provide a description 
of the Integration Mechanism that we refer to as Individual Entrepreneur.  
Souder (1980; 1988) describes the relationship between two individuals, one from R&D and one 
from marketing. These two employees are assigned by management to a project with clear and 
specific responsibilities, with as primary objective to connect the external commercial domain 
with the internal technological domain. According to Souder such relations can become very 
intense and can eventually institutionalize into long lasting relationships (Souder, 1987). In 
essence, he described what we have labelled as the Temporary and Permanent Dynamic Duo 
mechanisms (admittedly, in some of our cases one of the two individuals was not an employee 
but the owner-director).  
What we have coined Focused Discussion - the coming together of individuals from different 
departments and backgrounds in formal group meetings with the specific goal of integrating 
information - has been addressed in depth in the past. Many different forms have been described, 
among others the matrix organization, tasks forces, venture teams, brainstorm sessions, and 
product development committees (Griffin & Hauser, 1996; Slater, Mohr, & Sengupta, 2014; 
Gupta & Wilemon, 1985). Overall such organizational schemes can be grouped together under 
the umbrella term of cross-functional groups or teams and according to Barczak, Griffin, & Kahn 
(2009) 69% of the technology firms utilize such mechanism in their new product development.  
Finally, Lewin, Massini and Peters (2011) add companywide meetings, workshops and brochures 
and other printed materials distributed across the organization to the mix of possible interfacing 
arrangements. Their general idea resembles very much our Common Sharing mechanism.  
Overall, the idea of integrating the flow of information across the firm is not new. We have 
however linked them specifically to the study of entrepreneurship. We position the mechanisms 
within an integral view of opportunity identification. In this study we have related the 
mechanisms with the other elements of opportunity identification. In table 18 we have 
summarized and synthesized the key elements, including the Integration Mechanisms of our 
opportunity identification framework. The Direct Request trajectory is partly associated with the 
Eureka Perspective and visibility is the key entrepreneurial quality here, though alertness and 
core competence awareness do play a role as well. Entrepreneurial individual is the Integration 
Mechanism which seems to be related most strongly with this trajectory. The Market Signals 
Driven trajectory fits neatly within the Eureka Perspective. In this trajectory alertness is the key 
entrepreneurial quality, but TCC awareness is, of almost equal importance. Visibility hardly plays 
a role. Permanent Dynamic Duo, Focused Discussion and Common Sharing are the Integration 
Mechanisms most frequently used. Finally, the Inside-out trajectory fits perfectly in the Creation 
Perspective. This trajectory is about focused searching, and Core Competence Awareness is most 
important while alertness is of lesser importance and visibility does not seem to play a role at all. 
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The Temporary Dynamic Duo was found to be the Integration Mechanism of choice in this 
trajectory.  
 
Perspective 
 
                       
Eureka                                        
  
Creation 
 
Trajectory Direct Request Market Signal 
Driven 
Inside-Out 
 
Entrepreneurial 
quality 
   
Visibility +++ - - 
Alertness + +++ + 
Core competence 
awareness 
+ ++ +++ 
Integration 
Mechanisms 
 Entrepreneurial Individual  
  Temporary Dynamic Duo 
 Permanent Dynamic Duo 
 Focused Discussion 
 Common Sharing 
Table 18 Synthesis of perspectives, trajectories and Integration Mechanisms 
5.4 Managerial implications 
The main question of this study has been in what way technology-oriented SMEs could improve 
their success in finding new markets. So what does this new framework mean for SMEs in 
practice? What can be learned from the new theoretical insights and the new framework in 
matters of real-life opportunity finding? Management theories tend to be very straight-forward 
and one-dimensional. Often, they are presented as one-size-fit-all solutions wrapped in neat N-
steps to success packages. Such models and guidelines seem to us the product of overconfidence. 
In this section we adopt a more modest approach. We are fully aware that the new framework 
resulting from this study is a first draft. Many loose ends still need to be examined to refine the 
model. In the next and final section we will detail in more depth possible future research 
directions. However, we feel confident enough to give in the following some broad yet concise 
practical guidelines that may lead to more successful opportunity identifications. In the end 
opportunity identification is as much a managerial function as it is an entrepreneurial one 
(Hubert, Gilmore, & Carson, 2015). In the following we will describe practical umbrella principles 
which are derived from the framework as summarized in figure 10 (Final Framework) and table 
18 (Synthesis of perspectives, trajectories and Integration Mechanisms). Although the following 
may seem to have a linear N-step look to it, these managerial implications should not be seen as 
linear or stepwise guidelines, rather they are about awareness. Awareness of the fundamental 
nature of New Business Opportunities and self-awareness in the process of opportunity 
identification. 
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5.4.1 “Acknowledge the Nexus”  
To identify truly New Business Opportunities one needs to acknowledge the fundamental nature 
of them. They emerge at the nexus of external market information and internal technological 
information. The idea of merging the external with the internal is of course not new. For sure it 
has an overlap with the essence of strategic management. One will easily recognize the “S” and 
“O” of the SWOT-analysis. Therefore we stress that opportunity identification should be treated 
as a strategic activity and not just a task for sales & marketing. It is all too easy to see opportunity 
identification as an activity that can be left to the sales and/or marketing department. The danger 
of such an attitude is that there will be too much focus on the external world, with as result that 
one waits in vain for an opportunity to come by with no feeling of control whatsoever. Market 
Opportunities only lead to New Business Opportunities if they match the technological core 
competences of the firm. Leaving opportunity identification to sales and marketing, often lacking 
deep TCC awareness, reduces the chances of matching Market Opportunities with technological 
Core Competences. This may sound like a typical Eureka Perspective but as we have shown such 
an approach will also be viable in the case of Direct Requests, provided the firm is visible and 
well-networked. However, even when working along the lines of the Eureka Perspective one must 
keep in mind that opportunities are a match of the external and the internal. Therefore, whether 
one chooses the Eureka or the Creation Perspective: in order to keep focus on creating the 
convergence of external market information flows and internal technological competences we 
recommend to keep in mind the following guidelines. 
5.4.2  “Know and follow thy perspective” 
What may be clear by now is that though in theory the Creation Perspective describes the 
fundamental nature of New Business Opportunity identification best, both perspectives – the 
Eureka and the Creation Perspective – are applicable in the real world of opportunity 
identifications. While we would urge to adopt a Creation Perspective, in practice it seems that 
having a Eureka Perspective may lead to successful opportunity identification as well. And while 
there are still many aspects to be studied about the influence of the Dominant Perspective on 
the Integration Mechanisms and on the trajectories we still strongly believe that the Dominant 
Perspective plays a significant part in how the New Business Exploration Infrastructures are being 
organized. Hence, the Dominant Perspective in a firm is a powerful driver in the whole 
opportunity identification activity and therefore it is important to think about and acknowledge 
one’s own Dominant Perspective when organizing the New Business Exploration infrastructure. 
It should indeed be the starting point. 
If the Dominant Perspective has influence on the whole complex of what we have referred to as 
the New Business Exploration infrastructure then one should at least know what the firm’s or the 
–higher-management’s preferred line of thinking is. Table 6 (Two perspectives on Opportunity 
identification) is a good starting point for such an analysis. By asking and answering several 
questions it should become obvious which perspective is dominant. Examples of such questions:  
 How do you perceive the identification of an opportunity? As a split second epiphany-
like discovery or as a long, tedious, murky process? 
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 Is the discovery of an opportunity a team/effort or an essentially individualist 
achievement? 
 
 Are opportunities “out there”, simply waiting to be discovered or are they man-made 
constructions?  
 
 Does one have any control over discovering opportunities or is it mostly a matter of luck 
or serendipity? 
As this study is merely the starting point we cannot provide a complete and failsafe questionnaire. 
However, as we will argue in section 5.4.4 with regard to the identification of the technological 
core competences of the firm, it does not need to be a very academic exercise. Going through 
the basic ideas of the two perspectives, answering a few straight forward questions will easily 
provide a general understanding of what one´s preferred and Dominant Perspective is.  
Once the Dominant Perspective has been established, don’t feel locked in. Dominant Perspectives 
are to a degree dynamic. With this we mean that the perspective of the (higher) management of 
a firm is not set in stone; it can be replaced over time. This idea has been described by Vaghely & 
Julien (2008) and Zahra (2008) and is something we have observed in multiple cases as well (4.4.4 
Dynamics of Dominant Perspective). This change of perspective may for example be in order in 
the case that the more passive, wait-and-see-like Eureka Perspective is dominant but the 
changing situation in which the firm operates requires a more pro-active perspective. In such 
cases management can alter its perspective on opportunity identification.  
5.4.3 “Choose a trajectory” 
Whether it is wise and advisable to choose more than one type of trajectory might be the topic 
for a future study. What we wish to convey in this guideline is that one should deliberately choose 
one trajectory, organize for it and act accordingly. As mentioned already the exact relationship 
between the perspective and the trajectories is still open for debate but as we established in 
section 5.3.2 (The identification New Business Opportunities), there seems to be a 
correspondence between certain perspectives, trajectories, entrepreneurial qualities and 
Integration Mechanisms. Again, choosing a trajectory is not a matter of following some rigid rules, 
it is about an attitude from which a logical way of organizing and managing will follow. For 
example, in both the Inside-Out trajectory and the Market Signal Driven trajectory one will need 
to explore the external environment, looking for market signals, and at the same time develop a 
thorough understanding of one’s own core technological competences. However, following an 
Inside-Out trajectory one will focus primarily on these core technological competences and use 
these as starting point. The focus of the New Business Exploration function will be more in the 
technical domain of the firm than in marketing and sales. In the case of a Market Signal Driven 
trajectory the reversed focus applies. 
Another practical issue to be considered in matters of trajectories is the importance of a firm’s 
visibility in the Direct Request trajectory. While in the other two, more pro-active trajectories, a 
wide external network is needed to gather market information, in the Direct Request trajectory 
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it is also important for the purpose of being known by the outside world. External firms with 
possible Market Opportunities who are looking for firms with matching technological 
competences will need to know about the existence of the firm and its core technological 
competences in order to find it. Therefore, a firm following a Direct Request trajectory should 
focus on making itself and its technological competences as widely as possible known to the 
external environment. Several concrete activities may increase this external visibility. Examples 
we found in the data are the personal networks of the sales managers and general directors and 
the active attendance at fair trades to present the firm to the outside world. In a firm that follows 
a Direct Request trajectory, sales pitches and outbound-marketing become the center of the New 
Business Exploration infrastructure.  
5.4.4 “Know thyself”: Explore one’s own TCCs 
As we encountered many times in our interviews, even after 25 years since the introduction of 
the idea of core competences it is still not easy for firms to state their own unique technological 
competences. Therefore it is necessary to stress the importance of knowing one’s own core 
technological competences in matters of opportunity identification. However, this is rarely done 
in the entrepreneurship literature. There are many models, guidelines and handbooks out there 
that can help in identifying these competences. It is our belief that it is not so much a matter 
which model, guideline or handbook is used as long as the firm is deliberately and actively 
identifying core competences. Group meetings and proper brainstorm sessions involving as many 
employees as possible, but also external individuals, for example from the customers’ and 
suppliers’ domain are good tools for such analyses. Also one does not need to be very academic 
and detailed about what core competences are exactly, a tedious and pointless exercise one gets 
dragged into all too easily. In this study we analyzed the Technological Core Competence 
Awareness of a firm along two dimensions of which one axis represented the dichotomy 
deliberate versus intuitive. On the other axis we had a threefold dimension indicating on which 
level of abstraction the firm states its technological core competences. We pointed out that the 
higher the level of abstraction the easier it is to link one’s competences to other, new markets. 
The bottom-line of this guideline would therefore be; pick a model or handbook which suits one 
best, work deliberately in identifying the firm’s unique technological competences, and try to be 
as abstract as possible without losing grip on reality. 
5.4.5 “Create a large dragnet”  
The more bits and pieces of information are available in the nexus, the more likely there is 
something useful among them. Therefore firms seeking to increase the effectiveness of their New 
Business Exploration function should create a large information dragnet. For creating such a 
broad environmental scanning infrastructure this study has presented two starting points. Firstly, 
the firm could involve a broad range of functions in the scanning activity instead of limiting it to 
solely the sales and/or marketing department. Individuals from other departments are very 
useful in gathering external information as well. Especially employees from the technological 
domain may be neglected assets in scanning the environment, as we have seen. In our study we 
found employees from R&D departments, production departments, technical after-sales/service 
departments and product-managers who were deeply involved in scanning the environment 
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(4.2.1 Environmental scanning infrastructure). The strategic apex stood out particularly as an 
environment scanning asset. Also, involving external sales agents is a viable option. A second 
starting point is creating a broad scope. This is in its simplest form scanning many elements, using 
many external channels, in order to reach beyond the horizon of one’s own 
market/industry/sector. To achieve this we have found several options. For example one can visit 
trade fairs and scientific conferences. Establishing frequent contacts with knowledge institutes 
such as universities and science & technology institutes is another option. In visiting and 
contacting such institutes a firm should not limit itself to familiar sectors and technological 
domains. Trade fairs, scientific conferences, faculties and technological institutes outside one’s 
own domain may prove very valuable. Different channels may be used to scan the environment. 
Sales agents have already been mentioned, but personal social networks, client networks 
(customers and suppliers of customers), competitors and the whole linked production chain are 
all viable channels to reach beyond one’s own industrial/sector horizon. Finally, it is useful to 
keep an eye out for trends. These can be consumer trends (for example recently the superfood 
trend), technological trends, regulatory trends, etc. 
5.4.6 “Organize the nexus” 
All these streams of information must come together. It does not make sense to have many eyes 
scanning multiple elements in the external environment and to have one or more individuals with 
a good grasp of one’s own unique technological competences, if these streams of information 
are not brought together. Firms may organize this synthesis using what we have labelled as 
Integration Mechanisms. We have described several of these mechanisms in section 4.5 
Integration Mechanisms. Though still not all details about these mechanisms are understood, it 
seems they all have value as a nexus of opportunity identification. As a pragmatic managerial 
guideline we feel that particularly the first three – the Individual Entrepreneurial Hub, the 
Permanent Dynamic Duo, and the Temporary Duo - are the most promising mechanisms. Small 
to medium-sized firms are not too large for a single individual or a duo to keep an overview of all 
the information streams. The other two configuration - Focused Discussion, Common Sharing - 
appear to us to be less promising. They may have a complementary value if one of the first three 
mechanisms is in place, but not as the single primary mechanism. 
These Integration Mechanisms have been found in a limited set of relatively small, technologically 
oriented firms in a single industry, and it is very likely that further mechanisms will be found if we 
cast our net wider. However, the mechanisms we found already offer a useful starting point for 
practitioners who wish to organize the nexus, as they expose a number of underlying issues – or 
decisions that need to be made. Questions that must be addressed are for example;  
 Is the integration of internal (technological) and external (market) knowledge a 
subject that requires organization and planning, or can it be left to employees’ own 
discretion? 
 
 If it requires organization and planning, does it have to be a dedicated task, or should 
the task be added to the existing task portfolio of one or more individual employees of 
one or more departments? 
Discussion and conclusion  
163 
 
 
 Will the assigned task be temporary (project) or permanent? 
 
 Is it a coordination task or will the assigned individual(s) or department(s) have the 
power to decide? 
5.5 Reflections  
In this final section of our study we will firstly reflect on some methodological issues. We will 
keep it brief as we feel we have already been sufficiently critical of our methodological approach 
in the chapter concerned (3 Research approach). We will touch on three questions we in hindsight 
wondered about; firstly, did we gather enough data? Secondly, did we use the correct data 
gathering method? And thirdly, has our data analysis been fair, honest and robust enough?  
A study is never really finished and there will always be new questions raised. Therefore we 
cannot end this study without mentioning some possible future research directions. Admittedly 
these suggestions for follow-up research are partly concealed criticisms on our own approach to 
answer certain questions in this study. Next we will shed some light on the applicability of the 
results of this study outside the research population. We finish with some final thoughts. 
5.5.1 Reflections on methodology 
Although in theory it is sound that one stops gathering data at the point that more data does not 
reveal new or additional information, in practice we often had a feeling we needed more data. 
Particularly in the data analysis stage of the study there were many times we thought “if only we 
had interviewed more people at more firms”. We are afraid that this will always be the case in 
this type of studies. Every answer opens a can of new questions which can be frustrating. 
However, we feel we did stop gathering data at the right time according to the theory. Surely 
interviewing more individuals at more different firms might have added a bit more information, 
given us slightly more insight into the questions we had. However, we feel the gains would not 
weigh up against the costs (in this case the costs would be primarily more time, as we found it 
harder and harder to find firms that fitted our search criteria). One has to accept that there is no 
really hard limit or end-point, there is always more data to be gathered. In the end it is a matter 
of perception that the costs are beginning to outbalance the gains.  
Another doubt that started to creep upon us during the data analysis was whether we applied 
the appropriate data gathering method. In a way the semi-structured interview approach can be 
seen as historical research through means of oral sources. Using interviews we tried to 
reconstruct how firms with successful opportunity identification track records had organized 
their New Business Exploration function in the -recent- past in the hope of extracting some sort 
of understanding about New Business Opportunities and their identification. Although we also 
gained information about firms’ current activities, a lot of data we gathered was of a historical 
nature. Combined with the fact that the data was given in the third person, i.e. we did not observe 
the events and activities in the past ourselves, there will always be a certain amount of distortion 
in the data. A possible solution to this problem is to apply the anthropology-like method of 
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embedding. Being day-to-day present for a long period of time, experiencing and taking in all the 
data oneself at the moment it happens. Surely the data will be less distorted, less biased by an 
interviewee and probably more complete. However, again it is a matter of balancing gains against 
the costs. First of all, one can wonder how many firms would be willing to cooperate in such a 
research? Having a researcher peeping around all day long for a seriously long period of time? 
Secondly, most of the observed data would be non-relevant as opportunity identification is not a 
full-time activity. Therefore the researcher obtains a tremendous amount of data that is not 
relevant for the study at hand. Measured against the high costs in terms of time and effort, 
ultimately in this study the “fly-on-the-wall” method would cost more than it delivers. So 
ultimately even though sometimes one wished one had adopted such an approach, in the end 
the semi-structured interview approach delivers the bigger bang for the buck.  
A final doubt concerning the methodology we had mainly in the analysis stages was whether our 
method of analysis delivered useful and truthful information. Ideally one has a very clear and 
easy to follow step by step approach in which the information is systematically extracted from 
the data. This makes replication possible and the reader understands how the researcher has 
reached his conclusions. Unfortunately even with the best and most sincere efforts this is 
sometimes not 100% possible with qualitative research methods as adopted in this study. There 
are always certain insights that after long thoughts come as an epiphany by which even the 
researcher cannot exactly explain how he reached a certain result or conclusion. We have 
experienced that sometimes it is literally a matter of pasting cards with pieces of data to the wall, 
sitting back, staring at them for a long time and hoping to see an emerging pattern. Once this 
embryonic pattern had been identified we would develop little mini-tests with which we searched 
the data to see whether such a pattern made any sense. Overall, this type of research is clearly 
not as linear as the theory suggests or prescribes. One follows in general a pre-planned path with 
pre-planned analysis methods but at certain points one hits a wall. At this point one must be 
pragmatic and flexible, either going back in a kind of feedback loop or create other work-around 
analytic methods. 
5.5.2 Suggestions for future research 
Even after such work-arounds and throwing stuff to the wall, in the end we encountered several 
loose-ends that raised plenty of questions we were not able to answer within this study. This 
clearly begs for future research. We can identify two main themes which have intrigued us the 
most. Firstly, there is the matter of the Integration Mechanisms. Although we found several 
organizational arrangements with which internal and external information streams can be 
brought together, we may have only scratched the surface and, admittedly, what we have 
described is merely a starting point. In the following we take a closer look at the five different 
configurations in order to detail possible future research about this topic.  
We have already mentioned that not all Integration Mechanisms are equally strong. The 
Individual Entrepreneurial Hub for example we consider as a relative strong mechanism. 
However, we don’t think there is any value in considering this mechanism as a possible “stand 
alone” future research subject. It coincides very much with the classical entrepreneur as 
described in the Eureka Perspective, which is a subject that has been studied in depth for 
Discussion and conclusion  
165 
 
decades. As such the entrepreneur is in the literature, but also in daily life, an established and 
accepted concept. There are many studies out there dealing with the question what an 
entrepreneur is exactly and what traits, talents and behavior a successful entrepreneur should 
exhibit. Yet another “stand-alone” study into this subject does not seems useful to us.  
The two duo configurations we have identified are strong arrangements as well. However, both 
the Permanent Dynamic Duo and the Temporary Duo which we have seen at work in practice at 
several firms are to our knowledge fairly new as organizational concepts in the innovation and 
entrepreneurship literature. Admittedly these were arrangements that most of the time had 
come into existence inconspicuously. Despite this unplanned character, they were valid 
Integration Mechanism and seem to us promising organizational arrangements for integrating 
external and internal information streams. As far as we know such arrangements have hardly 
been described in the entrepreneurship literature as specific organizational integration concepts. 
Unfortunately we did not have enough specific data to answer several questions that we had 
about these duo mechanisms, for example:  
 How do these duos come into being?  
 
 Which roles and/or functions in the firm are suitable for such duos?  
 
 Are there specific character traits and/or personal capabilities involved in successfully 
creating such duos? 
 
  Is it possible to consciously set up such duos?  
Questions like these and the fact that they are powerful Integration Mechanisms justifies in our 
opinion future research in these specific duo configurations. 
With respect to the two remaining mechanisms, Focused Discussion and Common Sharing, a 
similar argument as for the individual entrepreneur can be made. Both are variations of 
commonly known and well-studied concepts in the management literature. In both the Focused 
Discussion and Common Sharing one will recognize ideas from the knowledge management 
literature - particularly distributing knowledge through the organization - and both have a lot in 
common with ideas about multidisciplinary teams. However, the literature on these mechanisms 
is much less dense than for instance the literature on the individual entrepreneur. Also, even 
though these configurations seem weaker than the first three, the question remains whether this 
is indeed the case. In the data there are indications that information density may be lower, but 
these two configurations still play an important role in the process of opportunity identification. 
Maybe not as primary Integration Mechanisms but as complementary mechanisms. Therefore, 
we suggest that there is room for follow-up research on these two mechanisms in the context of 
opportunity identification. Overall, a study on the role of these and possible other Integration 
Mechanisms in the context of opportunity identification and on the inner workings of these 
mechanisms will, in our opinion, strengthen the understanding and acceptance of our new 
framework.  
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Although the theme of Integration Mechanisms is interesting and promising enough for follow 
up research it is kind of a “stand - alone” research topic. It may be supplemented with another 
interesting line of investigation: studying the three key themes of our new opportunity 
identification framework in relation to each other. We suggested before that there might be 
relations between the Dominant Perspectives and the Integration Mechanisms. During the data 
analysis stage the notion emerged that there are also relations between these two elements and 
the newly discovered trajectories. Again several – research - questions popped up that we were 
unable to answer unambiguously with our current data, for example:  
 How and how much does the Dominant Perspective of the management of a firm 
determines which Integration Mechanisms are being used? 
 
 To what degree and in what way does the Dominant Perspective have an influence on 
the trajectories? 
 
 Or is it possible that the chosen trajectories and Integration Mechanisms determine the 
Dominant Perspective instead of the other way around? 
 
 Do the chosen trajectories influence the choice of an Integration Mechanism? 
 
 Or is the relationship the other way around?  
We have included some of these relationships carefully and conditionally into our new 
framework. Overall, we think that this is a theme that begs for further research as it is the key to 
develop the framework firstly further into a robust theoretical model of understanding the 
fundamental workings of opportunity identification and secondly into a pragmatic tool useful in 
real life for companies to be more successful in identifying New Business Opportunities.  
 
Figure 11 Future Research 
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5.5.3 Applicability of the results 
Despite the limitations of our research discussed above we are still convinced that the current 
framework is robust enough to be applicable for other machine manufacturing firms in the 
Netherlands. In other words, there is room for generalization of our findings. The next question 
in studies like this is how far findings can be generalized? This is always a tricky question to answer 
but we can make some guesstimate-like suggestions. We have chosen this sector mainly for two 
reasons: Firstly, a pre-study had shown that “how can we find new markets for our technologies?” 
was a pressing issue in this sector. Secondly, it is in general a successful sector that is able to 
compete internationally, and in addition to that it is a very important sector for the Dutch 
manufacturing industry as a whole because of its contribution to innovation processes. In our 
preliminary research steps, in which we developed a hands-on feeling with the sector, we tried 
to extract the key characteristics of the majority of the firms in this sector. Firstly, the majority of 
the firms are small to medium-sized with between 10 and 150 employees. Secondly, the bulk of 
the firms in this sector are true manufacturing firms. This is not the place to discuss the 
managerial and theoretical differences between manufacturing and service industries and firms, 
but it may be clear that these two are very different. We focused explicitly on firms that actually 
manufacture machinery and see this as their primary business. In other words, we did not include 
firms that do manufacture (often in license) some kind of machinery but whose business model 
is to earn primarily with after sales services rather than with the engineering, developing, building 
and selling of machines. A final observation was that the firms in this sector exhibit a medium- to 
high-tech character. Again this is not the place to discuss what the definition or the criteria of 
what medium and high tech are exactly but, as we pointed out in the opening chapters, it has to 
do with the degree of uniqueness and complexity of the technology the firms apply and how easy 
it is for others to replicate these technologies and the products these firms manufacture. These 
three elements – SME, focused on manufacturing goods and exhibiting a medium- to high tech 
character- have been our guidelines in the early stages of this study. The research methods and 
the selection of literature has been tuned to these characteristics. Therefore, this study as a 
whole is tweaked and tuned towards such firms. Hence, we believe that the results are also 
applicable to firms that fulfil these criteria, independently of which sector or industry they 
operate in.  
5.5.4 Final wrap-up 
We have reached the end of this study. Despite the setbacks, limitations and sometimes 
frustrating disappointments in the interim results, particularly the lack of solid, detailed insight 
in the relations between the several concepts, we feel we have fulfilled our primary objective; 
shedding some light on the identification of New Business Opportunities. Based on three main 
streams of theory –market orientation, resourced based-view of the firm and opportunity 
identification- we have built an integrative initial framework. This initial framework we tested in 
practice by interviewing multiple individuals at several firms in the target group. After the data 
had been painstakingly analyzed we encountered some unexpected results which made us again 
examine the data. Finally we were able to adapt the initial framework into what we referred to 
as the final framework. This framework reflects the new insights we obtained during this study.  
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Our main insight is that at a fundamental level New Business Opportunities are human constructs 
born out of longwinded social processes in which internal and external information is being 
merged. This perspective on opportunity identification we refer to as Creation Perspective which 
is in stark contrast with the Eureka-perspective, representing the more classic idea of an 
individual entrepreneur who spots opportunities in the market place as if these are objective 
entities that emerge beyond human interaction. The discovery however that firms with such a 
Eureka Perspective can be also successful in opportunity identification has led to the second 
insight that firms can identify opportunities in three specific ways, which we have labelled as 
trajectories of opportunity identification. Each of these trajectories comes with its own specific 
key entrepreneurial quality. Next we discovered several Integration Mechanisms which are being 
used to create the nexus of external and internal information in order to develop a New Business 
Opportunity.  
All these new insights and discovered elements – perspectives, trajectories, entrepreneurial 
qualities and Integration Mechanisms - hopefully trigger new and exciting future activities in both 
research and in practice. We laid out a few promising research directions in order to flesh out our 
framework and to further develop our understanding of opportunity identification. We also hope 
that the firms in the Machine Manufacturing Industry and other manufacturing SMEs with a 
medium to high-tech character will appreciate our practical managerial guidelines and find them 
useful in their quest for new markets. These guidelines state basically that managers and 
entrepreneurs wishing to increase their rate of success of finding truly new markets for their 
technology should first and foremost try to be aware of the true nature of New Business 
Opportunities. They should acknowledge that New Business Opportunities are being created at 
the nexus of external market and internal technological information. Accordingly they should 
align their own attitude towards this notion and the rest will follow. In contrast with the classic 
idea that opportunity identification is purely a matter of luck or serendipity, we are certain that 
it can be managed and organized effectively. And in what better way to end this thesis than 
quoting Sir Francis Bacon, one of the founders of the scientific method: “A wise man will make 
more opportunities than he finds.”  
And thus ends the tale of the two perspectives.  
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Appendix A: Interview protocol Stage 1 
1. Met wie heb ik de eer? 
1.1. Wat is uw functie titel?  
1.2. Wat zijn in het kort uw hoofdtaken en verantwoordelijkheden?  
1.3. Van welke afdeling/functionele eenheid maakt u deel uit? 
1.4. Wat zijn de hoofdtaken en activiteiten en organisatie van deze afdeling/eenheid? 
1.5. Waar valt deze eenheid binnen de gehele organisatie? 
1.6. Hoe groot is deze afdeling waar u werkzaam bent in fte’s? 
1.7. Wat is uw achtergrond?  
1.8. Opleiding? 
1.9. Hoe lang werkzaam in dit bedrijf? 
1.10. Wat voor functies had u voor deze functie? 
2. Algemene inleiding bedrijf 
2.1. Hoe ziet de organisatie van het bedrijf uit? 
2.2. Uit welke functionele gebieden is uw organisatie opgebouwd en hoe zijn deze 
gestructureerd? 
2.3. Wie zijn de leden van uw managementteam (opleiding, werkervaring)? 
2.4. Hoe zijn de eigendom verhoudingen? (Familie bedrijf, deel van groep van bedrijven 
etc?) 
2.5. Wat is de orde van grootte van het aantal fte’s? 
2.6. Wat is de orde van grootte van de omzet? 
2.7. Welk aandeel van de omzet is export? 
2.8. Welke markt-product combinaties hanteert de onderneming? 
2.9. Hoe verhouden zich deze qua omvang onderling? 
2.10. Welke functie vervullen deze producten bij uw klanten? Waar bevind zich de machine 
in de productie lijn? 
2.11. Hoe ziet in hoofdlijnen het primaire proces er uit? 
3. Diversificatie/geschiedenis/ New business development 
3.1. Wat is in het kort algemeen de geschiedenis van het bedrijf? 
3.2. Waar is het bedrijf ooit mee begonnen? 
3.3. Hoe lang bestaat het bedrijf? 
3.4. Wat waren in u ogen belangrijke punten in de geschiedenis van het bedrijf? 
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3.5. Kunt u kort beschrijven hoe de ontwikkeling van markten en producten door de tijd 
heen gelopen is in hoofdlijnen? 
3.6. Wanneer hebben jullie voor het laatst een nieuwe markt betreden? 
3.7. Hoe radicaal anders was deze markt dan de toenmalige markten die jullie al bedienden? 
Waarin verschilde die markt van jullie toenmalige markt(-en)? 
3.8. Kun je in het kort beschrijven hoe deze diversificatie in zijn werk gegaan is? 
3.9. Herken je de volgende fasering: herkennen van kansen, uitwerken business plan, 
implementatie business plan, evaluatie, exploiteren nieuwe markt. 
3.10. Als we inzoomen op het proces van de herkenning van kansen, kun je daar iets over 
vertellen hoe dat in zijn werk gegaan? 
3.11. Bij wie c.q. welke afdeling ontstond het eerste idee? 
3.12. Wat was de bron van het initiële idee, de externe omgeving of interne kunnen van de 
onderneming? 
3.13. Op welke hoofdlijnen verschilde het eerste idee met het uiteindelijke concrete 
business plan? 
3.14. Wie zijn er in (latere stadia ) nog meer bij betrokken geweest? 
3.15. Op welke wijze waren de anderen betrokken? 
3.16. Hoe was de communicatie georganiseerd? (formeel-informeel, mondeling-schriftelijk) 
3.17. Hoe is de “Ontdekker(-s)” te werk gegaan? 
3.18. Hoe was het MT betrokken bij de idee herkenning? Hoe heeft het MT het idee 
opgepakt? 
3.19. In welke fase heeft het MT het idee opgepakt? 
3.20. Wanneer werden er extra middelen ingezet c.q. ter beschikking gesteld om verder te 
gaan met het idee? 
3.21. Wat waren de criteria om hiertoe te besluiten?  
3.22. Was er iemand formeel “eigenaar’ van de ontwikkeling van het idee? 
4. Hoe ziet de context van de onderneming er uit? 
4.1. Hoe hebben jullie de markt ingedeeld in segmenten? Welke aparte 
markten/marktgroepen hebben jullie geïdentificeerd? 
4.2. Wie is betrokken bij het bepalen van de marktsegmenten? 
4.3. Hoe zou u de klanten van de onderneming omschrijven? (veeleisend, machtig, gewillig, 
goed mee samen te werken etc)  
4.4. Op welke wijze brengen jullie je klanten en potentiële klanten in kaart?  
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4.5. Wie is daarvoor verantwoordelijk? 
4.6. Hoe is dit proces georganiseerd? 
4.7. In hoeverre spelen trends en veranderingen bij de klanten van jullie klanten een rol in 
jullie organisatie? 
4.8. Op welke wijze uit zich dat?  
4.9. Monitoren jullie de klanten van jullie klanten? 
4.10. Wie is belast hiermee binnen de organisatie? 
4.11. Hoe zou u uw concurrentie positie willen omschrijven? (aantal concurrenten? /niche 
markt/Zijn deze concurrenten voornamelijk nationaal of internationaal) 
4.12. Op welke wijze wordt de concurrentie positie van de onderneming geanalyseerd?  
4.13. Wie is er voor verantwoordelijk? 
4.14. Wie wordt er nog meer betrokken bij deze activiteit? 
4.15. Hoe hebben jullie contact met de uiteindelijk eindgebruiker, de consument? 
4.16. Hoe volgen jullie technologie trends? (beurzen, vakbladen, derde commerciële 
partijen,……..?) 
4.17. Hoe volgen jullie economische en andere trends? (beurzen, vakbladen, derde 
commerciële partijen, …….?) 
4.18. Gaan jullie naar beurzen? Ieder jaar dezelfde of wisselt dat ook wel eens?  
4.19. Gaan jullie wel eens naar wetenschappelijke conferenties? 
5. Strategie ontwikkeling 
5.1. Hoe zou u de strategie van de onderneming willen omschrijven?  
5.2. Wanneer is de strategie voor het laatst (fundamenteel) gewijzigd? 
5.3. Hoe komt deze strategie tot stand?  
5.4. Welke methode/methodiek/uitgangspunten is gebruikt om deze strategie te 
ontwikkelen? (brainstrom sessies) 
5.5. Welke interne spelers waren betrokken bij de ontwikkeling van de strategie? 
5.6. Welke externe spelers waren betrokken bij de ontwikkeling van de strategie? (Klanten, 
Toeleveranciers, Concurrentie/concullega’s, Consultant/industrie experts) 
5.7. Wat zijn de sterke punten van de onderneming? Wat zijn voor jullie klanten de redenen 
om met jullie zaken te doen? (unique selling points) 
5.8. In hoeverre zijn de sterke punten van de onderneming uniek voor de markt c.q. in 
hoeverre maken deze sterkten jullie uniek? 
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5.9. Op welke wijze leveren deze sterkten direct een toegevoegde waarde voor jullie 
afnemers? 
5.10. Hebben jullie bij het bepalen van je sterkten en zwakten gebruik gemaakt van externe 
input? 
6. Kern competenties 
6.1. Is de term “core competencies/kern competenties” bekend?  
6.2. Wat verstaan jullie als organisatie daaronder? 
6.3. Werken jullie actief met het concept van kern competenties in jullie strategie 
ontwikkeling? 
6.4. Zo ja welke kern competenties zijn geïdentificeerd?  
6.5. Zo niet waarom niet? (Niet bekend mee, niet genoeg kennis van, geen behoefte) 
6.6. Op welke wijze identificeren jullie je kern competenties? 
6.7. Wanneer wordt doorlopen jullie dit identificatie proces? (continue of als er concrete 
aanleiding voor is) 
6.8. Wie is daarvoor verantwoordelijk?  
6.9. Wie in de organisatie is er bij betrokken? 
6.10. Wie van buiten de organisatie wordt er bij betrokken? (Klanten, Toeleveranciers, 
Concurrentie/concullega’s, Consultant/industrie experts) 
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(Hoe zou je, aan de hand van steekwoorden en twee perspectieven, het proces van het 
identificeren van opportunities in dit bedrijf willen omschrijven.) 
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Dutch summary  
Dit boek gaat over de wijze waarop middelgrote machinefabrikanten nieuwe 
ondernemingskansen identificeren. Veelal zijn deze technisch georiënteerde ondernemingen 
zeer gespecialiseerd in het ontwikkelen en vervaardigen van specifieke machines voor een zeer 
klein aantal specifieke nichemarkten. Een van de problemen waar deze ondernemingen tegen 
aan lopen is dat zij dusdanig verbonden zijn met de afnemers in de nichemarkten dat het niet 
eenvoudig is om nieuwe klanten in andere industrieën, bedrijfstakken of sectoren te vinden dan 
waar ze nu actief in zijn. Dit zoeken en vinden van dergelijke nieuwe klanten in echt nieuwe 
markten is wat wij bedoelen met het identificeren van nieuwe ondernemingskansen, hetgeen 
door de Nieuwe Ondernemingskansen Exploratie (NOE) Functie in een onderneming wordt 
uitgevoerd. Deze NOE functie is het geheel aan individuen, groepen, afdelingen en routines in 
een bedrijf dat zich bezighoudt met het identificeren van ondernemings-kansen.  
Daarmee samenhangend is in de ondernemerschapsliteratuur het theoretische vraagstuk over 
wat ondernemingskansen fundamenteel zijn en hoe deze geïdentificeerd worden nog verre van 
bevredigend beantwoord. In de kern gaat het in de ondernemerschapsliteratuur om de vraag of 
nieuwe ondernemerskansen simpelweg bestaan als entiteiten in de externe omgeving van de 
onderneming die door ondernemers ontdekt kunnen worden (Eureka perspectief) of zijn 
ondernemingskansen menselijke creaties die intern in een onderneming gecreëerd kunnen 
worden? (Creatie perspectief). Het antwoord op deze theoretische vraag is relevant voor de 
pragmatische uitvoering en inrichting van de NOE functie van de onderneming.  
In dit boek hebben we ons ten doel gesteld op deze vraag licht te laten schijnen door op basis 
van nieuw te verwerven theoretische inzichten te komen tot pragmatische handvaten voor 
ondernemers, managers en andere geïnteresseerden op dit gebied. De primaire onderzoeksvraag 
die we ons stellen is derhalve dan ook op welke wijze de identificatie van ondernemingskansen in 
middelgrote, technologisch georiënteerde bedrijven gemodelleerd kan worden? Voor de 
beantwoording van deze vraag is eerst een theoretische onderbouwd initieel framewerk 
ontwikkeld dat vervolgens in de praktijk is getoetst. Door dit toetsend karakter van deze studie 
kan de onderzoeksvraag herschreven worden tot: Modelleert het initiële framewerk de 
daadwerkelijke alledaagse werking van de NOE functie van een middelgrote technologisch 
georiënteerde onderneming?  
Het initiële framewerk is opgebouwd op basis van een aantal gangbare theoretische concepten 
uit de bedrijfswetenschappen; de Marktgeoriënteerde onderneming, Kerncompetenties en 
Ondernemerschap. De essentie van dit framewerk is dat om succesvol nieuwe 
ondernemingskansen te identificeren er aan een viertal voorwaarden moet worden voldaan; Ten 
eerste moet de top van de onderneming een Creatie perspectief hebben ten aanzien van 
ondernemingskansen. Ten tweede, moet er in ruime mate externe marktinformatie door de 
ondernemingen moeten worden ingewonnen. Ten derde moet de ondernemingen haar eigen 
technologische kerncompetenties helder in kaart gebracht hebben. Ten slotte moeten deze twee 
stromen van informatie geïntegreerd worden. Het is bij deze integratie dat Nieuwe 
Ondernemingskansen ontstaan. Deze vier voorwaarden vormen de basis voor een drietal 
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afgeleide secundaire onderzoeksvragen. Dit initiële framewerk is vervolgens getoetst in de 
praktijk middels een kwalitatief onderzoek waarbij getracht werd de onderzoeksvragen te 
beantwoorden. Hiertoe zijn bij een zestiental ondernemingen in de machine industrie 
semigestructureerd interviews gehouden met ondernemer-eigenaren, directeuren en managers.  
Uit de uiteindelijke observaties en analyses komt naar voren dat op fundamenteel niveau de basis 
aannames van het framewerk correct zijn: Nieuwe ondernemingskansen ontstaan daar waar 
externe marktinformatie en interne technologische kennis samenkomen. Uit de data echter 
kwamen enkele nieuwe inzichten naar voren die uiteindelijk zijn verwerkt in een aangepast 
framewerk dat de NOE functie goed weergeeft. Kortom, het Creatie perspectief beschrijft op 
fundamenteel niveau het best hoe ondernemingskansen geïdentificeerd worden. 
Echter, we beschrijven en verklaren waarom het lijkt alsof ook het Eureka perspectief in bepaalde 
gevallen kan leiden tot het succesvol identificeren van ondernemingskansen. Naast twee 
perspectieven zijn er drie verschillende trajecten waarlangs tot een ondernemingskans gekomen 
kan worden opgenomen in het framewerk. Het Van-binnen-naar-buiten traject begint bij de 
technologische kerncompetenties waarna er in de omgeving wordt gezocht naar marktsignalen 
en/of marktkansen die passen bij deze competenties. Kernkwaliteit bij dit traject is het zeer 
helder in kaart kunnen brengen van deze technologische kerncompetenties. In het 
marktsignaalgedreven traject ligt de nadruk sterk op het zoeken in de ondernemingsomgeving 
naar marktsignalen en marktkansen waarna deze verenigd worden met de kerncompetenties. In 
het laatste traject, het Directe-aanvraag traject, geschiedt de integratie buiten de onderneming, 
bij een externe onderneming. Deze externe onderneming ontwikkelt een marktkans op basis van 
marktsignalen en definieert daarvoor de benodigde technologische kerncompetenties. 
Aangezien deze externe partij deze competenties niet zelf in huis heeft wordt deze marktkans 
aangeboden aan de onderneming met het Directe-aanvraag traject met de vraag of deze wel 
beschikt over de noodzakelijke kerncompetenties. In dit traject gaat het er vooral om dat de 
onderneming haar technologische kerncompetenties voor de buitenwereld zo zichtbaar mogelijk 
kan maken.  
Ten slotte staan in het framewerk vijf integratie mechanismen centraal die de externe 
marktinformatie en de interne kennis over technologische kerncompetenties samenbrengen. Het 
eerste mechanisme is het entrepreneurachtige individu. Hierbij geschiedt de integratie door een 
individu die zowel een sterke technologische kennis heeft maar tegelijkertijd met een 
commerciële inslag de externe omgeving kan monitoren. Bij de twee volgende mechanismen, het 
permanente en het tijdelijke Dynamische Duo, zijn de externe en interne component verdeeld 
over twee individuen die gezamenlijk in een bijzonder hechte band de integratie verzorgen. 
Hierbij is het ene individu de “technische man” en de andere de “commerciële man”. In het 
Gerichte discussie mechanisme zijn meerdere individuen uit verschillende afdelingen actief om 
gezamenlijk doelgericht te werken aan de integratie van informatie. In het laatste mechanisme, 
Algemeen delen¸ wordt zowel interne als externe informatie lukraak de onderneming in gepompt 
in de hoop dat “ergens” in de organisatie de koppeling wordt gemaakt. Op basis van dit herziene 
framewerk worden tenslotte een aantal pragmatische handvaten uitgewerkt die hopelijk van nut 
zijn voor ondernemers, managers en andere geïnteresseerden in het onderwerp. 
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